Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Tati Abu King and Toni Heath Johnson were unable to register to vote in Virginia due to felony convictions. King was convicted of felony drug possession in 2018, and Johnson was convicted of multiple felonies, including drug possession, in 2021. Virginia's constitution disenfranchises individuals convicted of felonies unless their civil rights are restored by the Governor or other appropriate authority. King and Johnson argued that this disenfranchisement violated the Virginia Readmission Act, a federal statute from 1870, which they claimed restricted Virginia from amending its constitution to disenfranchise individuals for crimes that were not felonies at common law in 1870.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed three of the four counts in the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim but allowed one count based on the Virginia Readmission Act to proceed. The defendants, including various state election officials and the Governor of Virginia, moved to dismiss the complaint on sovereign immunity grounds, which the district court rejected.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs' claim met the requirements of the Ex parte Young doctrine, which allows suits for prospective relief against state officials to prevent ongoing violations of federal law. The court affirmed the district court's decision to allow the claim to proceed against most defendants but reversed the decision regarding the Governor of Virginia and the Secretary of the Commonwealth, finding that they lacked enforcement responsibility for the challenged state action. The court concluded that the Governor and Secretary must be dismissed from the case on sovereign immunity grounds. The district court's order was thus affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "King v. Youngkin" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of relators seeking to place a proposed constitutional amendment titled "Ohio Voters Bill of Rights" before Ohio voters. The relators submitted the text and a summary of their proposed amendment to the Ohio Attorney General, Dave Yost, for certification. The Attorney General refused to certify the summary, arguing that the title "Ohio Voters Bill of Rights" was not a fair and truthful statement of the proposed amendment.Previously, the relators had submitted their petition with a different title, "Secure and Fair Elections," which the Attorney General also rejected for similar reasons. The relators revised their petition and resubmitted it with the new title, but the Attorney General again refused to certify it, focusing solely on the title's perceived inaccuracy.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. The court determined that the Attorney General's authority under R.C. 3519.01(A) is limited to examining the summary of a proposed constitutional amendment, not its title. The court found that the Attorney General exceeded his statutory authority by rejecting the petition based on the title. The court noted that the statutory scheme differentiates between a "summary" and a "title," and the Attorney General's duty is to review only the summary.The Supreme Court of Ohio granted a limited writ of mandamus, ordering the Attorney General to examine the summary of the relators' proposed amendment within ten days, determine whether it is a fair and truthful statement, and, if so, certify and forward the petition to the Ohio Ballot Board. The court emphasized that the Attorney General must perform his statutory duty without considering the title of the proposed amendment. View "State ex rel. Dudley v. Yost" on Justia Law

Petitioners, Bill Paschall and Arkansans for Patient Access (APA), sought a declaration from the court that the ballot title for the proposed "Medical Marijuana Amendment of 2024" was sufficient and requested that votes for the amendment be counted in the November 5, 2024, general election. The proposed amendment aimed to expand access to medical marijuana and included provisions for legalizing marijuana possession for all purposes if federal law changes. The Secretary of State, John Thurston, and intervenors, Jim Bell and Protect Arkansas Kids (PAK), opposed the petition, arguing that the proposal was insufficient due to misleading language and failure to meet signature requirements.The Secretary of State rejected APA's petition on the grounds that APA did not meet the 90,704 minimum-signature requirement, as affidavits were signed by individuals from Nationwide Ballot Initiative (NBA) rather than APA. PAK argued that the popular name and ballot title were misleading, as they did not inform voters about the amendment's broader implications, including the legalization of recreational marijuana and changes to the Arkansas Constitution unrelated to medical marijuana.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and found that the Secretary of State erred in rejecting the petition based on the signature requirement, as APA's delegation to NBA was permissible under Arkansas law. However, the court agreed with PAK that the popular name and ballot title were misleading. The court held that the proposed amendment's popular name suggested it was limited to medical marijuana, while it also sought to legalize recreational marijuana and amend unrelated constitutional provisions. The ballot title failed to adequately inform voters about these significant changes.The Supreme Court of Arkansas denied the petitioners' request, granted the intervenors' request for relief, and enjoined the Secretary of State from canvassing or certifying any ballots cast for the proposed amendment in the November 5, 2024, general election. View "PASCHALL V. THURSTON" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellants, members of the Crittenden County Board of Election Commissioners, appealed a decision by the Crittenden County Circuit Court. The appellees, Shirley Brown and Lavonda Taylor, filed a petition seeking to compel the Board to conduct early voting at specific locations for the 2024 General Election. The Board had failed to unanimously approve an early voting site in West Memphis, leading the County Clerk, Paula Brown, to designate the Seventh Street Church of Christ as an early voting site. The appellees also sought to maintain the First Baptist Church as an early voting site, as it had been used in the 2022 General Election.The Crittenden County Circuit Court partially granted the appellees' petition, ordering the Board to conduct early voting at the Church of Christ but denied the request to include the First Baptist Church. The court found that the County Clerk had the authority under Arkansas Code Annotated section 7-5-418(a)(1)(A) to designate the Church of Christ as an early voting site. However, it ruled that the statute requiring polling sites to remain the same as the previous general election did not apply to early voting sites.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision with modifications. The Supreme Court agreed that the County Clerk had the authority to designate the Church of Christ as an early voting site. However, it modified the writ of mandamus to clarify that the Board must only comply with its statutory duties regarding early voting conducted by the County Clerk. On cross-appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that the First Baptist Church must remain an early voting site for the 2024 General Election, as the Board had not voted to change it from the 2022 General Election. View "Barton v. Brown" on Justia Law

The case involves a petition filed by Jennifer McGill and Cherokee Nation Entertainment, LLC (CNE) seeking to invalidate a proposed constitutional amendment concerning the Pope County casino license. The petitioners argued that the Arkansas Secretary of State, John Thurston, improperly certified the proposed amendment. They claimed that the number of valid signatures was insufficient and that the popular name and ballot title were misleading. Local Voters in Charge (LVC) and Jim Knight intervened in the case, supporting the proposed amendment.Previously, the Arkansas Supreme Court granted expedited consideration of the petition and allowed the intervention. The court bifurcated the proceedings into two counts: the sufficiency of the signatures and the sufficiency of the popular name and ballot title. A Special Master was appointed to resolve factual disputes regarding the signatures, which were addressed in a separate opinion. This opinion focuses on the challenges to the popular name and ballot title.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the popular name and ballot title certified by the Attorney General. The court held that the popular name and ballot title were sufficient and not misleading. The court found that the ballot title adequately informed voters that any existing casino license in Pope County would be revoked if the amendment passed. The court also rejected arguments that the popular name and ballot title failed to disclose conflicts with federal law or that they misled voters about the amendment's impact on future constitutional amendments.Ultimately, the Arkansas Supreme Court denied the petition, allowing the proposed amendment to remain on the ballot for the November 5, 2024, general election. The court issued its mandate immediately. View "MCGILL V. THURSTON" on Justia Law

This case involves five initiatives submitted to the Washington State legislature in 2024. The Secretary of State reviewed the signatures on the petitions for these initiatives and determined that there were enough valid signatures to certify them. The initiatives included measures on parental rights in education, repealing the state’s capital gains tax, forbidding state and local income taxes, prohibiting carbon tax credit trading, and making participation in the state’s long-term care insurance program optional. Defend Washington, along with Susan Young and Sharon Chen, challenged the adequacy of the Secretary’s review, arguing that it did not ensure the signers were legal voters.The trial court found that the Secretary’s review was adequate and dismissed the challenge. The court ruled that the Secretary’s use of statistical sampling techniques to verify signatures was consistent with state regulations and that checking signers’ addresses was not required. The Secretary had already submitted the initiatives to the legislature, which passed two of them and left the remaining three to be decided by voters in the upcoming general election.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that the Secretary’s procedure of validating signatures by matching them with voter rolls did not violate RCW 29A.72.230, which requires verification of legal voters’ names on the petition. The court found no statutory requirement to verify addresses and concluded that the Secretary’s actions were consistent with the law. The court also noted that any further requirements for signature verification procedures would need to be established by the legislature or the Secretary through rulemaking. The superior court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Defend Washington v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

Bryan Norris submitted a countywide ballot initiative in Independence County, Arkansas, proposing that all elections be conducted using paper ballots. The County Clerk, Tracey Mitchell, rejected the initiative, claiming the ballot title was misleading. Norris then filed a petition for writ of mandamus and declaratory and injunctive relief in the Independence County Circuit Court, challenging Mitchell's decision. The circuit court found the ballot title and popular name legally sufficient, granted the writ of mandamus, and directed Mitchell to certify the ballot initiative. Mitchell was also enjoined from rejecting the measure.Mitchell appealed the circuit court's decision, arguing that the ballot title was insufficient because it omitted and misstated material information, potentially leading voters to enact an ordinance conflicting with Arkansas law. Specifically, she contended that the ballot title failed to disclose that the proposed ordinance conflicted with state statutes requiring the use of tabulation devices for paper ballots and did not inform voters about the existing legal methods for casting and counting votes.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case, noting that the sufficiency of a ballot title is a matter of law. The court emphasized that a ballot title must provide an impartial summary of the proposed amendment, giving voters a fair understanding of the issues and the scope of the proposed changes. The court found that the ballot title did not need to include every possible consequence or legal argument and that Mitchell's concerns were speculative. The court concluded that Mitchell did not meet her burden of proving the ballot title was insufficient and affirmed the circuit court's order directing Mitchell to certify the measure as sufficient to the county election board. The decision was affirmed, and the mandate was issued immediately. View "MITCHELL V. NORRIS" on Justia Law

The case involves the Ohio Democratic Party and two voters, Norman Wernet and Eric Duffy, who filed a mandamus action against Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose. They sought to compel LaRose to rescind Directive 2024-21, which requires individuals delivering absentee ballots for family members or disabled voters to complete an attestation at the board of elections and prohibits returning such ballots to a drop box. The directive aims to prevent "ballot harvesting" and ensure the integrity and security of absentee ballot delivery.Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio ruled in League of Women Voters of Ohio v. LaRose that certain Ohio laws limiting who can return absentee ballots for disabled voters were preempted by the federal Voting Rights Act. Following this, LaRose issued Directive 2024-21 and later Directive 2024-24 and Advisory 2024-03, which provided additional guidance but did not substantially alter the original directive.The Ohio Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the relators' claims were barred by laches due to their unreasonable delay in filing the complaint. The court noted that the directive was issued on August 31, but the complaint was not filed until September 27, a 24-day delay. This delay was deemed unreasonable, especially given the time-sensitive nature of election-related matters. The court also found that the delay caused material prejudice to the Secretary of State and county boards of elections, as absentee voting had already begun, and changing the procedures at this stage would lead to voter confusion and administrative burdens.The Ohio Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus based on laches and did not address the merits of the relators' claims. The court also denied the motion to intervene filed by the Republican National Committee and the Ohio Republican Party but accepted their brief as an amici curiae brief. View "State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. LaRose" on Justia Law

A county auditor filed an administrative complaint against the Secretary of State, alleging that the statewide voter registration file, known as I-Voters, lacked adequate security measures and safeguards to prevent unauthorized access and erroneous removal of eligible voters, thus violating the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). The Secretary of State moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it was speculative and that the file complied with federal standards. The administrative body agreed and dismissed the complaint.The county auditor then sought judicial review in the Iowa District Court for Polk County, arguing that the administrative body had erred in dismissing his complaint without an evidentiary hearing. The Secretary of State contended that the county auditor lacked standing and that the complaint was insufficient. The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that the county auditor had not demonstrated an injury in fact.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the county auditor had standing due to his role as the county commissioner of elections, which gave him a specific, personal, and legal interest in the integrity of the voter registration file. The court also found that the administrative body had improperly resolved factual questions without allowing an opportunity for the presentation of evidence. The court held that the county auditor's allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss and that the administrative body should not have decided factual issues at the motion to dismiss stage.The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Linn County Auditor v. Iowa Voter Registration Commission" on Justia Law

In 2018, Campaign Legal Center (CLC) filed an administrative complaint with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) alleging that 45Committee, Inc. violated the Federal Election Campaign Act by not registering as a political committee. After nearly two years of inaction by the FEC, CLC sued the FEC, seeking a declaration that the FEC's failure to act was "contrary to law." The court agreed and ordered the FEC to act within thirty days. When the FEC did not appear to act within that period, the court allowed CLC to bring a citizen suit against 45Committee.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially found that the FEC had failed to act on CLC's complaint and issued a default judgment against the FEC. The court ordered the FEC to act within thirty days, but the FEC did not notify the court or CLC of any action taken. Consequently, the court allowed CLC to bring a citizen suit against 45Committee. However, it later emerged that the FEC had held a reason-to-believe vote within the thirty-day period, which failed to garner the necessary votes to proceed with an investigation or dismiss the complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court was correct in dismissing CLC's citizen suit. The appellate court held that the FEC's holding of a reason-to-believe vote within the thirty-day period constituted conformance with the contrary-to-law determination. Therefore, the preconditions for bringing a citizen suit were not met, as the FEC had taken the required action by holding the vote, even though the vote did not result in a decision to investigate or dismiss the complaint. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the citizen suit. View "Campaign Legal Center v. 45Committee, Inc." on Justia Law