Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

This case involved a recall petition against Thurston County, Washington, Sheriff John Snaza. Petitioner Arthur West alleged Snaza committed a recallable offense because he stated in a press release that he would not enforce an order issued by the Washington State secretary of health intended to combat the COVID-19 (coronavirus) pandemic. Snaza appealed the trial court’s conclusion that the recall charge was factually and legally sufficient. The Washington Supreme Court concluded Snaza had discretion and his exercise of discretion (stating he would not criminally enforce the order) was not manifestly unreasonable. Therefore, the recall charge was neither factually nor legally sufficient, and the trial court's decision was reversed. View "In Re Recall of Snaza" on Justia Law

Voters in Calhoun County, South Carolina, approved a referendum in the November 2018 general election imposing a one percent sales and use tax ("a penny tax") to fund a list of fifteen projects. Nearly five months later, Appellants filed suit, contending four of the projects were not authorized pursuant to section S.C. Code Ann. sections 4-10-300 to -390 (2019). The County responded that the statute of limitations had expired, and alternatively, the projects fell within the scope of the Act. The circuit court found the thirty-day limitations period barred the action and did not address the merits. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding the statute of limitations had run. View "South Carolina Public Interest Foundation v. Calhoun County Council" on Justia Law

Xavier Becerra and his election committee (collectively, Becerra) successfully defended a petition for writ of mandate brought by Eric Early and his election committee (collectively, Early) seeking to remove Becerra as a candidate for California's Attorney General on the November 2018 ballot. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision denying the petition. Early alleged that Becerra was ineligible for the office of Attorney General because his state bar status was “inactive” during the five years preceding the election and therefore he was not “admitted to practice” in the state as required for that period under Government Code section 12503. We held that the phrase “admitted to practice” in the statute “refers to the event of admission to the bar and the status of being admitted, and does not require engagement in the ‘actual’ or ‘active’ practice of law.” Becerra brought a motion for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, which the trial court granted awarding Becerra $69,718 in attorney fees. "Becerra's successful defense of the petition enforced an important public right and conferred a significant benefit on the general public as required by subdivision (a) of section 1021.5. . . . Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining under subdivision (b) of section 1021.5 that the financial burden Becerra incurred in defending Early’s suit outweighed any pecuniary benefit in the form of the salary paid to the Attorney General or otherwise." View "Early v. Bacerra" on Justia Law

After garnering sufficient voter signatures to qualify, a proposed initiative entitled “Universal Childcare for San Francisco Families Initiative” was placed on the city’s June 2018 ballot as Proposition C. The initiative sought to impose an additional tax on certain commercial rents to fund early childcare and education. Approximately 51 percent of the votes cast were in favor of Proposition C. In August 2018, opponents filed suit to invalidate Proposition C on the ground that it needed a two-thirds majority vote to pass.The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of the city. While Proposition C imposes the type of tax that, if submitted to the voters by the Board of Supervisors, would need a two-thirds majority vote to pass, neither Proposition 13 nor Proposition 218 imposed such a requirement on a tax imposed by initiative. The absence of a constitutional provision expressly authorizing majority approval of local voter initiatives is immaterial. The City Charter does not impose a super-majority requirement View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Voters in the City of Enid presented a recall petition to City of Enid officials. The petition sought to recall plaintiff-appellant, City Commissioner Ben Ezzell for his support of a city wide mask mandate to combat the COVID epidemic. Ezzell objected to the recall petition, alleging that because the recall petition did not comply with the requirements of 34 O.S. 2011 section 3 and 34 O.S. Supp. 2015 section 6, which related to signature collection, the recall petition was insufficient. After a hearing, the trial court denied Ezzell's protest and determined that the petition was sufficient under the City Charter of Enid recall process. Ezzell appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held there was no conflict between the City Charter recall process, and the additional state requirements of 34 O.S. 2011 sec. 3 and 34 O.S. Supp. 2015 sec. 6, the state statutes governed, but were not properly followed. The recall petition was therefore insufficient on its face pursuant to Clapsaddle v. Blevins, 66 P.3d 352, and its predecessors. View "Ezzell v. Lack" on Justia Law

Consolidated cases involved constitutional challenges to amendments to Michigan's Election Law. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the challenges did not present a justiciable controversy. A few months after the amendments took effect, the Michigan Attorney General issued a written opinion that they violated the state and federal Constitutions. Plaintiffs, League of Women Voters of Michigan (LWV), Michiganders for Fair and Transparent Elections (MFTE), Henry Mayers, Valeriya Epshteyn, and Barry Rubin (collectively, the LWV plaintiffs), sued the Secretary of State, seeking a declaratory judgment that the amendments were unconstitutional along the same lines as the Attorney General suggested. LWV was described in the complaint as a nonpartisan group focused on voting and democratic rights. The individual plaintiffs were Michigan voters and MFTE was a ballot-question committee that, at the time the complaint was filed, intended to circulate petitions to amend the Constitution. A few weeks after the LWV plaintiffs brought their action, the Legislature also filed suit against the Secretary of State, requesting a declaratory judgment that the amendments were constitutional. The Michigan Supreme Court granted the Legislature’s motion to intervene, and held the Legislature had standing to appeal when the Attorney General abandons her role in defending a statute against constitutional attack in court. Then the Supreme Court concluded that case was moot as to the lead plaintiff, MFTE, because it no longer pursued its ballot initiative. As no other plaintiff had standing to pursue the appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the lower-court decisions. Finally, in light of this analysis, the Court affirmed on alternative grounds the Court of Appeals’ holding that the Legislature had no standing in its case against the Secretary of State, Docket No. 160908. Accordingly, both cases were remanded back to the trial court for dismissal. View "League of Women Voters of Michigan v. Secy. of State" on Justia Law

Five Asian-American residents sued the City of Santa Clara (City) contending that at-large elections for the office of city council violated the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 (Elec. Code, 14025-14032). The trial court agreed that occurrences of racially polarized voting impaired the ability of Asian-American voters, as a result of vote dilution, to elect their preferred candidates to Santa Clara’s seven-member city council. It ordered the City to implement district-based city council elections and awarded attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs totaling more than $3 million.The court of appeal affirmed. Racially polarized voting in five of 10 city council elections satisfied the standard for a cognizable voting rights claim, which required a showing that the majority voting bloc in Santa Clara’s electorate “usually” voted to defeat the candidate preferred by Asian-American voters. The trial court did not err in assigning more weight to certain elections and appropriately used statistical evidence to support its findings of racially polarized voting. The imposition of “race-based districts” did not violate the Equal Protection Clause nor did it impinge the City’s plenary authority as a charter city under the California Constitution to control the manner and method of electing its officers. View "Yumori-Kaku v. City of Santa Clara" on Justia Law

The City filed a complaint for declaratory relief to establish whether Measure P, the Fresno Clean and Safe Neighborhood Parks Tax Ordinance, has been duly enacted through the voters' initiative power. On the same day the City filed its action, FBHC filed its own complaint for declaratory relief and petition for writ of mandate, seeking a declaration declaring that Measure P had been duly enacted.The Court of Appeal consolidated the cases and endorsed the holdings and reasoning of All Persons City and County of San Francisco v. All Persons Interested in the Matter of Proposition C (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 703, 708. Finding that All Persons was controlling in this case, the court concluded that neither Proposition 13 nor Proposition 218 affects the voters' initiative power, and therefore neither imposes a two-thirds voting requirement on the passage of voter initiatives that impose special taxes. The court rejected the Association's policy argument, noting that the Association's policy concerns are best addressed by the Legislature. The court reversed the judgments; on the City's action, the court ordered the trial court to enter a new judgment in favor of FBHC declaring that Measure P has passed; and on FBHC's action, the court directed the trial court to enter a new judgment granting FBHC's request for declaratory relief and declaring that Measure P has passed. View "City of Fresno v. Fresno Building Healthy Communities" on Justia Law

Delaware’s Constitution contains a political balance requirement for appointments to the state’s major courts. No more than a bare majority of judges on any of its five major courts “shall be of the same political party.” Art. IV, section 3. On three of those courts, those members not in the bare majority “shall be of the other major political party.” Adams, a Delaware lawyer and political independent, sued, claiming that those requirements violate his First Amendment right to freedom of association by making him ineligible to become a judge unless he joins a major political party.The Supreme Court held that because Adams has not shown that he was “able and ready” to apply for a judicial vacancy in the imminent future, he failed to show a “personal,” “concrete,” and “imminent” injury necessary for Article III standing. A grievance that amounts to nothing more than abstract and generalized harm to a citizen’s interest in the proper application of the law is not an “injury in fact.” Adams must at least show that he is likely to apply to become a judge in the reasonably foreseeable future if not barred because of political affiliation. Adams’ only supporting evidence is his statements that he wanted to be, and would apply to be, a judge on any of Delaware’s courts. The evidence fails to show that, when he filed suit, Adams was “able and ready” to apply for a judgeship in the reasonably foreseeable future. Adams’ statements lack supporting evidence, like efforts to determine possible judicial openings or other preparations. Adams did not apply for numerous existing judicial vacancies while he was a registered Democrat. He then read a law review article arguing that Delaware’s judicial eligibility requirements unconstitutionally excluded independents, changed his political affiliation, and filed suit. View "Carney v. Adams" on Justia Law

North Dakota Governor Doug Burgum petitioned the State Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and issue declarations and a writ of mandamus concerning who appoints the replacement after the pre-election death of a candidate for an office in the Legislative Assembly. Four candidates appeared on the 2020 general election ballot for two available seats for the office of State Representative for District Eight. The prior officeholder died in October 2020, twenty-nine days before the election, and after ballots were printed and early voting had begun. The North Dakota Secretary of State requested an advisory opinion from the state Attorney General on what to do about votes cast for the deceased candidate. The Attorney General responded stating that the North Dakota legislative assembly would follow the procedure codified in N.D.C.C. 16.1-13-10: "Upon the application of state law and the ‘American’ rule, it is my opinion that this would be the appropriate method to fill a vacancy." Election day totals showed Dave Nehring received the most votes and David Andahl received the second most votes. In accordance with the Attorney General's Opinion, the election results were certified but no certificate of election was issued to Andahl because of his death. Officials for the District Eight Republican Committee announced their intention to appoint an individual to fill the office. Kathrin Volochenko received the third most votes. She intervened in this case and claimed no vacancy in office would exist because she was elected to the office. On December 1, 2020, Nehring was set to fill one of the seats because he received the most votes. Andahl received the second most votes, and he presumably would have filled the other seat but died and will not do so. Therefore, as a matter of law, a vacancy would exist on December 1, 2020. When a vacancy in office occurs, the Governor’s constitutional authority to fill it is contingent upon there being “no other method” provided by law. A governor does not have authority to fill a legislative branch vacancy unless the gap-filling authority of N.D. Const. art. V, section 8 permits it. The Supreme Court declared a vacancy in office would exist on December 1, 2020, and the Governor did not have statutory or constitutional authority to make an appointment to fill the vacancy in this case. "He has not established a clear legal right to performance of the acts he seeks. Therefore, a writ of mandamus is not warranted. We deny the requested relief." View "Burgum v. Jaeger, et al." on Justia Law