Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

In 2018, Campaign Legal Center (CLC) filed an administrative complaint with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) alleging that 45Committee, Inc. violated the Federal Election Campaign Act by not registering as a political committee. After nearly two years of inaction by the FEC, CLC sued the FEC, seeking a declaration that the FEC's failure to act was "contrary to law." The court agreed and ordered the FEC to act within thirty days. When the FEC did not appear to act within that period, the court allowed CLC to bring a citizen suit against 45Committee.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially found that the FEC had failed to act on CLC's complaint and issued a default judgment against the FEC. The court ordered the FEC to act within thirty days, but the FEC did not notify the court or CLC of any action taken. Consequently, the court allowed CLC to bring a citizen suit against 45Committee. However, it later emerged that the FEC had held a reason-to-believe vote within the thirty-day period, which failed to garner the necessary votes to proceed with an investigation or dismiss the complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court was correct in dismissing CLC's citizen suit. The appellate court held that the FEC's holding of a reason-to-believe vote within the thirty-day period constituted conformance with the contrary-to-law determination. Therefore, the preconditions for bringing a citizen suit were not met, as the FEC had taken the required action by holding the vote, even though the vote did not result in a decision to investigate or dismiss the complaint. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the citizen suit. View "Campaign Legal Center v. 45Committee, Inc." on Justia Law

KalshiEx LLC, a regulated commodities exchange, sought to offer "Congressional Control Contracts" allowing individuals to bet on the outcome of the November 2024 congressional elections. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) prohibited these contracts, arguing they constituted gaming or election gambling, which is illegal in many states. Kalshi challenged this decision under the Administrative Procedure Act, claiming the CFTC's determination was arbitrary and capricious.The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in favor of Kalshi, finding that the CFTC erred in categorizing the contracts as gaming or gambling. The court vacated the CFTC's decision, reasoning that the term "gaming" did not apply to election contracts and that the contracts did not involve illegal activity under state law. The CFTC then sought a stay of the district court's judgment while it pursued an appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the CFTC's emergency motion for a stay pending appeal. The court denied the motion, concluding that the CFTC failed to demonstrate that it or the public would suffer irreparable harm without a stay. The court noted that the CFTC's concerns about potential harms, such as market manipulation and threats to election integrity, were speculative and not substantiated by concrete evidence. The court left open the possibility for the CFTC to renew its stay request if more concrete evidence of irreparable harm emerged during the appeal. The administrative stay was dissolved. View "KalshiEX LLC v. CFTC" on Justia Law

Three Libertarian Party candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives were disqualified from the 2024 general election ballot by the State Objection Panel for failing to comply with Iowa's statutory nomination requirements. The candidates, Nicholas Gluba, Charles Aldrich, and Marco Battaglia, were nominated at a party convention after no Libertarian candidates filed for the primary election. However, the party did not follow the required process for selecting delegates to the convention, which included holding precinct caucuses and county conventions on separate days and notifying county auditors of the delegates.The Iowa District Court for Polk County upheld the Panel's decision, finding that the Libertarian Party did not comply with Iowa Code section 43.94, which mandates that county convention delegates' terms begin the day after their election at precinct caucuses. The court ruled that strict compliance with this law was necessary, and the party's failure to follow the process invalidated the nominations. The court also rejected arguments that the objectors lacked standing and that the Panel's decision violated the candidates' First Amendment rights.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling. The court held that the statutory requirements for nominating candidates by convention must be strictly followed and that the Libertarian Party's failure to comply with these requirements justified the disqualification of the candidates. The court also found that the objectors had standing to challenge the nominations and that the Panel's decision did not violate the candidates' First Amendment rights. The court emphasized that the election laws are designed to ensure a fair and orderly process for candidate nominations. View "Gluba v. State Objection Panel" on Justia Law

In 2018, Robbie Gail Charette, a Republican candidate for Judge of the County Court-at-Law in Washington County, Texas, was indicted on four misdemeanor charges related to campaign law violations. These charges included misrepresenting the source of a campaign communication, falsely claiming to hold a public office, failing to file a personal financial statement on time, and not maintaining proper records of political expenditures. A special prosecutor pursued these charges without a prior referral from the Texas Ethics Commission (TEC).The trial court denied Charette's pretrial habeas application, which argued that the prosecution was unauthorized without prior TEC proceedings. The court found no legislative language granting the TEC exclusive authority to enforce the violations and ruled that district attorneys could independently investigate and prosecute election-related crimes. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals upheld this decision, stating that the district court had jurisdiction over the misdemeanors and that any alleged deprivation of civil due process rights by the TEC did not affect this jurisdiction.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the TEC has exclusive jurisdiction over the offenses listed in Chapter 571 of the Texas Government Code. The court held that the TEC must make an initial determination on alleged violations before any criminal charges can be brought. Since no TEC proceedings occurred in Charette's case, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the charges. Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and ordered the dismissal of the indictments against Charette. View "EX PARTE CHARETTE" on Justia Law

The case involves two groups of plaintiffs challenging several provisions in a 2022 manual issued by the Secretary of State, which provided instructions for election challengers and poll watchers. The plaintiffs argued that the provisions conflicted with the Michigan Election Law or required formal rulemaking under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The Court of Claims consolidated the cases and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on several points, finding that certain provisions of the manual were invalid under Michigan law.The Court of Claims found that the manual's requirements for election-challenger credentials, the communication restrictions between challengers and election inspectors, the categorization of challenges as permissible or impermissible, and the prohibition of electronic devices in absent voter ballot processing facilities violated the Michigan Election Law. The court ordered the Secretary of State to either rescind or revise the manual to comply with its opinion. The defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and issued a mixed ruling. The court held that the Secretary of State has the authority to require a uniform form for election-challenger credentials and that this requirement does not conflict with the Michigan Election Law. The court also upheld the manual's communication restrictions, except for the requirement that challengers at absent voter ballot processing facilities must raise issues to a challenger liaison who is not an election inspector. The court found that the categorization of challenges as permissible or impermissible was generally lawful but invalidated the provision allowing a challenger liaison to deem a challenge impermissible based on their assessment of its validity. The court declared the challenge to the prohibition of electronic devices moot due to subsequent statutory amendments and vacated the lower court's opinions on that issue. View "O'Halloran v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

A group called Riversiders Against Increased Taxes (RAIT) filed a petition to stop the City of Riverside from placing Measure C on the November 2, 2021, ballot. RAIT argued that Measure C, which involved transferring excess fees from the city-operated electric utility to the general fund, violated Proposition 218 because it was a general tax that should not be voted on in a special election. The City contended that the election was a general election as it was a regularly scheduled event, despite being labeled a "special municipal election" in city documents. The trial court granted RAIT's request for declaratory relief, finding the election was special, but did not cancel the election or enjoin certification of the results. Both parties appealed.The City argued on appeal that the trial court wrongly declared the election as special and that RAIT should not be considered the prevailing party. RAIT cross-appealed, claiming the trial court should have removed Measure C from the ballot and enjoined the certification of the election results. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's declaratory judgment, holding that the November 2021 election was a general election under state law, despite the city's charter labeling it as special. The court found that the election was regularly scheduled and consolidated with a general election, thus complying with Proposition 218. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the rest of RAIT's petition, noting that RAIT had multiple opportunities to object to continuances but failed to do so, making their appeal moot. The City was deemed the prevailing party and entitled to costs on appeal. View "Riversiders Against Increased Taxes v. City of Riverside" on Justia Law

Phil Lyman sought extraordinary relief from the Utah Supreme Court regarding the 2024 primary election for the Utah Republican Party. He requested the court annul the primary election results and certify him as the Republican nominee for Governor in the general election. Lyman argued that the Republican Party’s internal rules should override Utah’s election laws, a claim previously rejected by the court in Utah Republican Party v. Cox. Additionally, Lyman sought the production of voter signatures from nominating petitions and the removal of Lieutenant Governor Deidre Henderson and Governor Spencer Cox from office for alleged malfeasance.The lower courts had not reviewed this case. Lyman filed his petition directly with the Utah Supreme Court, bypassing the district court. He argued that it was impractical to file in the district court due to the urgency of the impending general election deadlines and the long-standing issues surrounding Senate Bill 54, which had been litigated in various courts.The Utah Supreme Court denied Lyman’s petition. The court held that the Republican Party’s internal rules do not override state election laws, reaffirming its decision in Utah Republican Party v. Cox. The court also found that Lyman had not demonstrated why it was impractical to seek relief in the district court and noted that he could not assert claims on behalf of other candidates. Additionally, the court determined that Lyman had not exhausted his administrative remedies under the Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA) for his request for voter signatures. Finally, the court found no viable factual or legal basis for Lyman’s request to remove Henderson and Cox from office. Consequently, the court denied Lyman’s petition for extraordinary relief and his related injunction motions as moot. View "Lyman v. Cox" on Justia Law

The Idaho Attorney General filed a petition seeking to prevent an initiative from appearing on the 2024 general election ballot. The initiative, proposed by Idahoans for Open Primaries, aims to replace Idaho’s closed party primary system with a non-partisan "top four primary" and implement ranked-choice voting for the general election. The Attorney General argued that the signatures supporting the initiative were obtained through false statements, violating Idaho Code section 34-1815, and that the initiative violated the single-subject rule of the Idaho Constitution by proposing two distinct changes to election laws.The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the Attorney General’s petition on procedural grounds. The court held that allegations of fraud in the signature-gathering process must first be adjudicated in the district court. The court emphasized that its original jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition and mandamus is limited and that the Secretary of State has no clear legal duty to invalidate signatures based on alleged fraud without a prior judicial determination. The court also found that the Attorney General’s challenge to the initiative on the grounds that it violated the single-subject rule was not ripe for review, as the initiative had not yet been approved by voters.The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the Secretary of State’s role in the initiative process is ministerial and does not include adjudicating the validity of signatures based on alleged misrepresentations. The court dismissed the petition, allowing the initiative to proceed to the ballot, but noted that the Attorney General could pursue his claims in the appropriate district court. View "Labrador v. Idahoans for Open Primaries" on Justia Law

The Attorney General of California drafted language for the ballot title, summary, and label for Proposition 5, a proposed amendment to the California Constitution that would allow certain local bonds to be approved by 55 percent of voters instead of the current two-thirds requirement. Jon Coupal and the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association challenged the ballot label, arguing it was misleading because it did not mention the existing two-thirds approval requirement. They claimed this omission failed to inform voters of the measure's true purpose.The Superior Court of Sacramento County agreed with the challengers, finding that the ballot label did not adequately inform voters of the measure's chief purpose. The court ordered the Attorney General to revise the ballot label to include the current two-thirds approval requirement. The Attorney General then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, challenging the Superior Court's decision.The Court of Appeal concluded that the ballot label drafted by the Attorney General accurately and concisely described Proposition 5 and was not misleading. The court emphasized that the Attorney General is afforded considerable discretion in drafting ballot materials and that the label's language was factually accurate. The court found that the Superior Court failed to accord the proper discretion to the Attorney General and that there was no clear and convincing evidence that the ballot label was misleading. Consequently, the Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the Superior Court to deny the challengers' petition and allow the Attorney General's original ballot label to be used. View "Bonta v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Stark County Board of Elections considered and voted to purchase Dominion Voting Systems equipment during four meetings. These discussions and decisions occurred in executive sessions, which are closed to the public. Look Ahead America and Merry Lynne Rini filed a complaint alleging that the board violated Ohio’s Open Meetings Act by not limiting its executive-session discussions to matters where premature disclosure would give an unfair competitive or bargaining advantage.The Stark County Court of Common Pleas upheld the board’s actions, interpreting R.C. 121.22(G)(2) to mean that the premature-disclosure clause applied only to the last-listed reason for entering executive session, not to the purchase of property. The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing with the trial court’s interpretation.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower courts. The court held that the premature-disclosure clause in R.C. 121.22(G)(2) applies to all the permissible reasons listed for entering executive session, not just the last one. The court reversed the Fifth District’s judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial applying this interpretation. View "Look Ahead Am. v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law