Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Proponents Peter Coulter and Lisa Brumfiel proposed Initiative 129 to amend article X, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution, known as the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights (TABOR). The Initiative sought to amend TABOR to define the term "fee" and differentiate it from a tax. Petitioner Anthony sought to challenge the initiative, arguing it contained multiple subjects. Alternatively, he argued the initiative's title was misleading. The Supreme Court concluded the initiative contained a single subject, and that the title clearly expressed a single subject. Therefore the Court affirmed the action of the Title Board. View "In re Title, Ballot Title, and Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #129" on Justia Law

The Pulaski County Election Commission (PCEC) filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the circuit court challenging the constitutionality of certain emergency rules promulgated by the Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners (ASBEC) relating to absentee voters. The circuit court declared (1) the emergency rules were derivative of Act 595 of 2013, which amended the Arkansas election code to require that voters provide proof of identity when voting; (2) the Act was unconstitutional; and (3) the emergency rules were also unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the circuit court correctly ruled that the rules relating to absentee voters promulgated by the ASBEC were unconstitutional; but (2) the circuit court erred in declaring the Act unconstitutional, as that issue was not pled or developed before the court. View "State Bd. of Election Comm'rs v. Pulaski County Election Comm’n" on Justia Law

In a consolidated ballot title case, three sets of petitioners have petitioned the Supreme Court to review the ballot title for Initiative Petition 58. Initiative Petition 58 (IP 58), essentially identical to Initiative Petition 47 (IP 47), would change the way that liquor is sold in Oregon by “eliminat[ing] the current system of state-licensed liquor stores” and allowing "'holders of distilled liquor self-distribution permits' (essentially wholesalers) to distribute liquor to 'qualified retailers,' who would, in turn, sell the liquor to the public." The Attorney General certified the ballot title for IP 58 before we issued the Supreme Court issued its opinion regarding IP 47, and two petitioners argued that the phrase "wholesale sales tax" did not avoid the problem that the Court noted in the IP 47 opinion. As noted in the IP 47 case, the phrase “sales tax” had more potential to confuse voters than to describe IP 47, and by extension IP 58, accurately. "[W]e cannot overlook [petitioners'] point that the phrase 'sales tax' is so commonly associated with a tax imposed at the point of a retail sale that the use of the phrase 'wholesale sales tax' may do more to confuse matters than clarify them." Accordingly, the Court referred the ballot title for IP 58 back to the Attorney General for modification. View "McCann v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

The California Supreme Court held that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the California Constitution; state voters then passed a ballot initiative, Proposition 8, amending the state constitution to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman. Same-sex couples who wished to marry filed suit in federal court, challenging Proposition 8. State officials refused to defend the law, so the district court allowed the initiative’s official proponents to intervene, declared Proposition 8 unconstitutional, and enjoined its enforcement. State officials declined to appeal. The intervenors appealed. The Ninth Circuit certified a question, which the California Supreme Court answered: official proponents of a ballot initiative have authority to assert the state’s interest to defend the constitutionality of the initiative when public officials refuse to do so. The Ninth Circuit concluded that petitioners had standing and affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that the intervenors did not have standing to appeal. Article III of the Constitution confines the power of federal courts to deciding actual “Cases” or “Controversies.” A litigant must demonstrate a personal and tangible harm throughout all stages of litigation. The intervenors had standing to initiate this case against the California officials responsible for enforcing Proposition 8, but once the district court issued its order, they no longer had any injury to redress and state officials chose not to appeal. The intervenors had not been ordered to do or refrain from doing anything. Their “generalized grievance” is insufficient to confer standing. The fact that a state thinks a private party should have standing to seek relief for a generalized grievance cannot override settled law to the contrary. View "Hollingsworth v. Perry" on Justia Law

The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973(a), was enacted to address racial discrimination in voting. Section 2 bans any “standard, practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen ... to vote on account of race or color,” applies nationwide, and is permanent. Other sections apply to some parts of the country. Section 4 defines “covered jurisdictions” as states or political subdivisions that maintained tests or devices as prerequisites to voting and had low voter registration or turnout in the 1960s and early 1970s. Section 5 provides that no change in voting procedures can take effect in covered jurisdictions until approved by federal authorities (preclearance). The coverage formula and preclearance requirement were to expire after five years, but the Act was reauthorized. In 2006, the Act was reauthorized for an additional 25 years, but coverage still turned on whether a jurisdiction had a voting test and low registration or turnout almost 50 years ago. Shelby County, in the covered jurisdiction of Alabama, sought a declaratory judgment that sections 4(b) and 5 are facially unconstitutional. The district court upheld the Act. The D. C. Circuit affirmed. A 5-4 Supreme Court reversed, finding Section 4 unconstitutional. Its formula may not be used to require preclearance. States have broad autonomy in structuring their governments and pursuing legislative objectives; the Tenth Amendment reserves to states “the power to regulate elections.” There is a “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” among the states. The Voting Rights Act departs from those principles by requiring states to request federal permission to implement laws that they would otherwise have the right to enact and execute. The Act applies to only nine states (and additional counties). In 1966, the departures were justified by racial discrimination that had “infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century” so that the coverage formula was rational in practice and theory. Nearly 50 years later, “things have changed dramatically.” Voter turnout and registration rates in covered jurisdictions approach parity; blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. Minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels. Congress, if it is to continue to divide the states, must identify jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that makes sense under current conditions. Data compiled by Congress before reauthorizing the Act did not show anything like the pervasive, rampant discrimination found in covered jurisdictions in 1965. Congress reenacted the formula based on 40-year-old facts with no logical relation to the present day. View "Shelby County v. Holder" on Justia Law

The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) requires states to accept and use a uniform federal form to register voters for federal elections, 42 U.S.C. 1973gg–4(a)(1). The form developed by the Election Assistance Commission, requires only that an applicant aver, under penalty of perjury, that he is a citizen. Arizona law required rejection of any application for registration, including the federal form, if not accompanied by documentary evidence of citizenship. The district court granted summary judgment, upholding Arizona’s requirement. The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, holding that the requirement is preempted by the NVRA. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Elections Clause imposes on states the duty to prescribe the time, place, and manner of electing Representatives and Senators, but confers on Congress the power to alter those regulations or supplant them altogether. The Clause confers authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections, including regulations relating to “registration.” The NVRA term “accept” implies that the form is to be accepted as sufficient and Congress, when it acts under the Clause, is always on notice that its legislation will displace some element of a state’s preexisting legal regime. While the NVRA forbids states to demand additional information beyond that required by the federal form, it does not preclude states from denying registration based on information in their possession establishing the applicant’s ineligibility. The NVRA can be read to avoid a conflict, however. The NVRA permits a state to request state-specific instructions on the federal form and a state may challenge rejection of that request. That alternative means of enforcing its constitutional power to determine voting qualifications remains open to Arizona. View "Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc." on Justia Law

The 2010 census showed an enormous increase in Texas' population which required the State to redraw its electoral districts for the United States Congress, the State Senate, and the State House of Representatives, in order to comply with the Constitution's one-person, one-vote rule. The State also had to create new districts for the four additional congressional seats it received. Plaintiffs subsequently brought suit in Texas, claiming that the State's newly enacted electoral plans violated the United States Constitution and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973. The Court held that because it was unclear whether the District Court for the Western District of Texas followed the appropriate standards in drawing interim maps for the 2012 Texas elections, the orders implementing those maps were vacated, and the cases were remanded for further proceedings. View "Perry v. Perez" on Justia Law

The major political parties in Marion County, Indiana followed a tradition of “slating” candidates that have the financial and organizational backing of party leadership in the primaries. Indiana enacted an “anti-slating” statute, prohibiting distribution of a list endorsing multiple political candidates during a primary election unless all such candidates have given written consent, Ind. Code 3-14-1-2(a). More than 10 years ago, that law was challenged as violating the First Amendment, resulting in a federal injunction against its future enforcement and a consent decree in which all parties stipulated and the court declared that the law was facially unconstitutional. The Marion County Election Board was a defendant, but nonetheless enforced the statute against a candidate running for state representative in the 2012 primary. That candidate sought an injunction. The district court dismissed the case under the “Younger” abstention doctrine, citing a still-ongoing Election Board investigation. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Election Board’s investigation is too preliminary a proceeding to warrant Younger abstention, at least in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs. Even if Younger abstention were theoretically available, the previous final federal judgment against the Election Board would amount to an extraordinary circumstance making Younger abstention inappropriate. View "Mulholland v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd." on Justia Law

In 2010, three individuals ran for the Colorado House of Representatives, House District 61: Kathleen Curry was a write-in candidate; Roger Wilson was the Democratic nominee, and Luke Korkowski was the Republican nominee. Under Colorado law, individual contributions to Ms. Curry were capped at $200, and individual contributions to each of her opponents were capped at $400. Contributors to Ms. Curry’s campaign sued state officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The district court rejected the claims and granted summary judgment to the state officials. The Tenth Circuit reversed on the equal-protection claim; and in light of this, declined to address the summary-judgment ruling on the First Amendment claims. View "Riddle v. Hickenlooper" on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on a matter of state campaign finance regulations in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in "Citizens United v. FEC," (558 U.S. 310 (2010)). Before "Citizens United" in 2010, New Mexico had introduced a new state campaign finance law that imposed a host of contribution and other limitations on political parties, political action committees, and donors to such entities. As pertains to this case, the state limited the amount an individual may contribute to a political committee. Potential donors, political parties, and political committees mounted an as-applied challenge to the law in federal district court, contending several of its provisions violated the First Amendment. The district court agreed and issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining the enforcement of two provisions: (1) limits on contributions to political committees for use in federal campaigns, and (2) limits on contributions to political committees that are to be used for independent expenditures. New Mexico appealed the latter ruling, contending that the limit on contributions furthers the state’s compelling interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption in campaign spending. After careful consideration, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court was correct that the challenged provision could not be reconciled with Citizens United and, as a result, did not err in entering a preliminary injunction. View "Republican Party of New Mexico, et al v. King, et al" on Justia Law