Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, three individuals ran for the Colorado House of Representatives, House District 61: Kathleen Curry was a write-in candidate; Roger Wilson was the Democratic nominee, and Luke Korkowski was the Republican nominee. Under Colorado law, individual contributions to Ms. Curry were capped at $200, and individual contributions to each of her opponents were capped at $400. Contributors to Ms. Curry’s campaign sued state officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The district court rejected the claims and granted summary judgment to the state officials. The Tenth Circuit reversed on the equal-protection claim; and in light of this, declined to address the summary-judgment ruling on the First Amendment claims. View "Riddle v. Hickenlooper" on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on a matter of state campaign finance regulations in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in "Citizens United v. FEC," (558 U.S. 310 (2010)). Before "Citizens United" in 2010, New Mexico had introduced a new state campaign finance law that imposed a host of contribution and other limitations on political parties, political action committees, and donors to such entities. As pertains to this case, the state limited the amount an individual may contribute to a political committee. Potential donors, political parties, and political committees mounted an as-applied challenge to the law in federal district court, contending several of its provisions violated the First Amendment. The district court agreed and issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining the enforcement of two provisions: (1) limits on contributions to political committees for use in federal campaigns, and (2) limits on contributions to political committees that are to be used for independent expenditures. New Mexico appealed the latter ruling, contending that the limit on contributions furthers the state’s compelling interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption in campaign spending. After careful consideration, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court was correct that the challenged provision could not be reconciled with Citizens United and, as a result, did not err in entering a preliminary injunction. View "Republican Party of New Mexico, et al v. King, et al" on Justia Law

The petitioners in this case sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 9 (2014). They argued the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). Initiative Petition 9, if adopted by the voters, would amend provisions of the Oregon Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act. Upon review of the ballot title, the Supreme Court concluded that the proposed ballot title did not contain a concise and impartial summary of not more than 125 words that summarized the proposed measure and its effects. Furthermore, the Court found that the proposed summary of the initiative did not disclose that employees who were not members of the union but who were members of the bargaining unit would receive representation without cost. Accordingly the title was referred back to the Attorney General's office for modification. View "Towers v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

On June 6, 2013, the Green Party of Minnesota and its chair, Brian Begin, filed a petition asserting that Respondent Secretary of State Mark Ritchie erred in decertifying the Green Party as a minor political party. Petitioners sought an order from the Supreme Court to direct the Secretary to correct his alleged error by restoring the Green Party’s minor political party status as of January 1, 2013. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the Green Party’s claims fell outside the scope of the applicable statute. As such, the Court dismissed the petition. View "Begin vs. Ritchie" on Justia Law

Since 2001, Callaghan has worked part-time at the South Portland Library. Edwards works for the Parks and Recreation Department about four hours per week. Both are subject to a personnel policy, which, following 2010-2011 amendments, provides that city employees may not seek or accept nomination or election to any South Portland elective office; use the influence of their employment for or against any candidate for city elective office; circulate petitions or campaign literature for any city elective office; solicit or receive subscriptions, contributions or political service from any person for or against any candidate for any city elective office; or use city property to assist or advocate for or against any candidate. Callaghan has served on the School Board since 2007. When Callaghan sought reelection in 2011, the City Clerk stated that the personnel policy amendments prevented placement of her name on the ballot. Edwards had served on the Board for 18 years. In 2010, Edwards expressed interest in filling a vacancy on the Board. After the City Clerk questioned whether Edwards could be appointed given his city employment, Edwards did not pursue the appointment. Edwards and Callaghan filed a complaint, 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that the policy was an unconstitutional restraint on political speech. The trial court entered partial summary judgment for the employees and an injunction barring enforcement of a prohibition on any city employee seeking election to or serving on the School Board or, on their own time, from circulating petitions or campaign literature and soliciting or receiving contributions or political service for or against candidates in School Board elections. The Maine Supreme Court affirmed as to the employees, but vacated the judgment to the extent that it invalidates the policy as to employees who were not parties. View "Callaghan v. City of South Portland" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether Vermont’s nominating petition process for independent candidates for President of the United States unduly burdened the rights of such candidates and their supporters under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.  Upon review, the Court concluded that the trial court correctly held that it does and affirmed the trial court’s judgment for plaintiffs Ross “Rocky” Anderson, an independent candidate for President in the 2012 election and his campaign coordinator, plaintiff Benjamin Eastwood. Plaintiffs gathered 1400 signatures from at least twenty-two towns and cities.  However, supporters were delayed and ultimately frustrated in their nomination efforts by the Secretary of State’s interpretation of 17 V.S.A. 2402. As a result, plaintiffs were only able to get town clerk certification for 580 signatures before a June 14 deadline. The trial court concluded that overall, the statute appeared to be a reasonable regulation of elections.  Nonetheless, the trial court denied the State’s motion to dismiss and granted plaintiffs permanent injunctive relief on the ground that the Secretary of State’s requirement that town clerks certify only names listed on original statements (as opposed to faxes or photocopies of those statements) unduly burdened plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  The trial court denied plaintiffs’ request that the court eliminate the certification requirement altogether. The State appealed, arguing that the “original statement” requirement serves important state interests and imposes only a minor burden on plaintiffs’ rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the Secretary of State’s requirement that town clerks certify only original statements when performing their function pursuant to 17 V.S.A. 2402(a)(4) unconstitutionally burdened plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.  Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and permanent injunction for plaintiffs. View "Anderson v. Vermont " on Justia Law

This appeal concerned plaintiff's filing of an administrative complaint with the FEC alleging that various organizations violated election laws during their efforts to keep him off the ballot. The FEC dismissed the complaint and the district court subsequently granted summary judgment against plaintiff, later denying his motion to alter or amend its judgment. Plaintiff appealed. The court rejected plaintiff's claim of competitor standing where he sought to compel FEC enforcement against his opponents years after the campaign had run its course, and claim of informational standing where he asserted an injury that was not sufficiently concrete to confer standing. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal and concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the suit because plaintiff lacked standing. View "Nadar v. FEC" on Justia Law

Voters filed suit against Officials challenging the process by which Officials confirmed the eligibility of voters who register on election day (election day registrants or EDRs). Voters also challenged a provision of the Minnesota Constitution denying the right of persons under guardianship to vote, as well as the sufficiency of notice afforded to such persons under certain Minnesota statutes. The court concluded that Voters could not prevail on their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims based on Officials' failure to verify EDR's voting eligibility before allowing EDRs to cast their votes where Voters raised no allegations of the "aggravating factors" identified in Pettengill v. Putnam County R-1 School District; alleged no discriminatory or other intentional, unlawful misconduct by Officials sufficient to implicate section 1983; and alleged no defects causing Minnesota's voting system to be so "fundamentally unfair" that relief under section 1983 would be appropriate. Further, Voters lacked standing to raise their remaining claims where the amended complaint failed to allege that any plaintiff has been denied the right to vote by a constitutional provision barring persons under guardianship from voting. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Voters claims and denial of their motion for summary judgment as moot. View "Minnesota Voters Alliance, et al. v. Ritchie, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners claimed that Article V, Section 16(b) of the state charter was unconstitutional. They argued that section 16(b) deprived them of their inherent right to be free of age-based discrimination, particularly because the section mandates that jurists retire the year they turn 70 years old. In prior decisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that Article V, Section 16(b) was not so irrational as to be considered unconstitutional. The Court denied petitioners' application for relief and dismissed the case with prejudice. View "Friedman v. Corbett" on Justia Law

The California Supreme Court held that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the California Constitution; state voters then passed a ballot initiative, Proposition 8, amending the state constitution to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman. Same-sex couples who wished to marry filed suit in federal court, challenging Proposition 8. State officials refused to defend the law, so the district court allowed the initiative’s official proponents to intervene, declared Proposition 8 unconstitutional, and enjoined its enforcement. State officials declined to appeal. The intervenors appealed. The Ninth Circuit certified a question, which the California Supreme Court answered: official proponents of a ballot initiative have authority to assert the state’s interest to defend the constitutionality of the initiative when public officials refuse to do so. The Ninth Circuit concluded that petitioners had standing and affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that the intervenors did not have standing to appeal. Article III of the Constitution confines the power of federal courts to deciding actual “Cases” or “Controversies.” A litigant must demonstrate a personal and tangible harm throughout all stages of litigation. The intervenors had standing to initiate this case against the California officials responsible for enforcing Proposition 8, but once the district court issued its order, they no longer had any injury to redress and state officials chose not to appeal. The intervenors had not been ordered to do or refrain from doing anything. Their “generalized grievance” is insufficient to confer standing. The fact that a state thinks a private party should have standing to seek relief for a generalized grievance cannot override settled law to the contrary. View "Hollingsworth v. Perry" on Justia Law