Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Oklahoma voters approved a state constitutional amendment that would prevent state courts from considering or using Sharia law. Members of the state election board asked the Tenth Circuit to review whether a federal district court abused its discretion when it granted a preliminary injunction to prevent the Board from certifying the result. Plaintiff Muneer Awad sued the Election Board to prevent the certification of ballot title "SQ 755" from the November 2, 2010 election. Plaintiff is an American citizen residing in Oklahoma, and is the executive director of the Oklahoma Chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations. Plaintiff alleged that SQ 755 violated his rights under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. He objected to the amendment's singling out his religion for negative treatment. The district court granted a temporary restraining order on November 9, 2010. On November 22, 2010, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing and granted a preliminary injunction one week later. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the Board argued that Plaintiff's claims were not justiciable, and even if Plaintiff's Establishment or Free Exercise claims were justiciable, each failed to meet preliminary injunction requirements. Upon careful consideration of the district court record and the constitutional questions posed by the parties' briefs, the Tenth Circuit held that Plaintiff's claims were justiciable and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction based on those claims. View "Awad v. Ziriax, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs contended that Barack Obama was constitutionally ineligible to be President of the United States. In addition to plaintiffs' constitutional claims, as well as their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their quo warranto claims for improper venue; their Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq., claims for failure to state a claim; and their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., claims against defendants First Lady Michelle Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Vice President Joe Biden, and former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, for failure to state a claim. The court adopted the district court's classification of the parties and held that each plaintiff lacked standing; the proper venue for plaintiffs' quo warranto claims was in the District of Columbia, pursuant to D.C. Code 16-3503; FOIA did not apply to any of defendants because they were all individuals, not agencies; and plaintiffs had six months between the original complaint and the amended complaint to attempt to set forth civil RICO allegations and their failure to do so was inexcusable. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' constitutional claims for lack of Article III standing and the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' quo warranto, FOIA, or RICO claims. The dismissal of the district court was affirmed and the emergency petition for writ of mandamus was denied. View "Drake, et al. v. Obama, et al.; Barnett, et al. v. Obama, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that recently-enacted amendments to the New York City Administrative Code, commonly known as the "pay-to-play" rules, violated the First Amendment by unduly burdening protected political speech and association, the Fourteenth Amendment by denying equal protection of the laws, and the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973. The challenged provisions (1) reduced below the generally-applicable campaign contribution limited the amounts that people who have business dealings with the city, including lobbyists, could contribute to political campaigns; (2) denied matching funds for contributions by people who have business dealings with the city and certain people associated with lobbyists; and (3) extended the existing prohibition on corporate contributions to partnerships, LLCs, and LLPs. The court affirmed summary judgment as to all three provisions, finding that the laws were closely drawn to address the significant governmental interest in reducing corruption or the appearance thereof. View "Ognibene, et al. v. Parkes, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners Fred Girod, Rod Monroe, David Schamp, Cary Johnson, Hobart Kytr and Steven Fick sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 21 (2012), arguing that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). Initiative Petition 21 would amend a number of statutory provisions pertaining to the commercial harvest and sale of salmon from the Oregon portion of the Columbia River. In this case, the Supreme Court found that in stating that the measure "may affect Columbia River Compact, tribal fishing rights, and fishing management agreements," it merely speculated that there was a possibility that the measure may affect the various laws and agreements listed in entirely unspecified ways. A possibility that enactment of a measure may produce unspecified consequences is not an "effect" within the meaning of ORS 250.035(2)(d). The summary therefore did not substantially comply with the statutory requirement to state the "effect" of the measure, and, for that additional reason, the Court held that ballot title must be referred back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Girod v. Kroger" on Justia Law

In the 1990s, Appellee Stephen Rambler mailed letters in an attempt to extort money from approximately thirty individuals by threatening to reveal certain sexually explicit correspondence if they did not pay him. Based on this conduct, Appellee was charged with violating federal law by mailing "threatening communications." Nearly ten years later, in November 2005, Appellee was elected mayor of Wrightsville, York County. He assumed office in January 2006. Two months later, the Commonwealth filed a complaint in quo warranto seeking to remove Appellee from office pursuant to Article II, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Commonwealth alleged that the federal offense constituted an "infamous crime" in Pennsylvania, and requested an order declaring Appellee unqualified for his mayoral office. The common pleas court ultimately issued an opinion and order in favor of the Commonwealth, removing Appellee from office, and disqualifying him from holding any office of trust or profit in Pennsylvania. Appellee appealed, claiming that his federal extortion conviction did not qualify as an infamous crime because his conviction only carried a maximum sentence of two years which is comparable to a misdemeanor sentence in state court. The Superior Court reversed. The Supreme Court found in its review that "Appellee sought to reap dishonest gain… This type of behavior is, quite obviously, 'inconsistent with commonly accepted principles of honesty and decency,' and is, moreover, akin to 'swindling, cheating, and other crimes of a kindred nature.'" The Court reversed the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Rambler" on Justia Law

Petitioners Gail Rasmussen and Bethanne Darby sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 18 (2012). If approved by the voters, Initiative Petition 18 would enact a prohibition on the imposition of any state or local estate tax, inheritance tax, tax on property transferred in connection with a person's death, or tax on the transfer of property between family members. The proposed measure would supersede current statutes that imposed those taxes, and it would exclude from its prohibition certain statutes that imposed fees relating to attendant transactions following a person's death. Petitioners argued that the certified "yes" and "no" vote result statements did not comply with the applicable statutory standards. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that indeed the certified statements were inaccurate, and the Court "invited" the Attorney General to address and correct the problems with the narrative. View "Rasmussen v. Kroger" on Justia Law

Petitioners Beaufort County and several officials from county boards of elections and registration sought a declaration from the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction that the General Assembly has neither authorized the State Election Commission or the County Election Commissions to conduct a Presidential Preference Primary in 2012, nor mandated that Petitioners bear the financial burden of conducting the primary. The South Carolina Republican Party scheduled a Presidential Preference Primary for January 21, 2012. In the 2011-2012 Appropriations Act, the General Assembly provided that filing fees received from candidates to run in primary elections may be used by the State Election Commission to conduct the 2012 Presidential Preference Primary elections. In addition, the State Election Commission is authorized to use funds originally appropriated for ballot security to conduct the Presidential Preference Primary elections and the statewide primaries and runoffs. Petitioners contended the General Assembly did not authorize the State Election Commission or the County Election Commissions to conduct a Presidential Preference Primary in 2012 or any election cycle thereafter. In addition, Petitioners argued the amount set forth in the Appropriations Act were insufficient to cover the actual costs to the counties of conducting the 2012 primary. Because the Court was "firmly persuaded" that the General Assembly, through passage of Provisos 79.6 and 79.12 for fiscal year 2011-2012, intended to suspend the temporal limitation in S.C. Code Ann. 17-11-20(B)(2) (Supp. 2010), the Court entered judgment for Respondents the State Election Commission. View "Beaufort County v. SC Election Commission" on Justia Law

This case arose from litigation challenging the validity, under the United States Constitution, of the initiative measure (Proposition 8) that added a section to the California Constitution providing that "[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California" (Cal. Const., art. I, section 7.5). The Ninth Circuit posed the following procedural issue to the court, "[w]hether under article II, section 8 of the California Constitution, or otherwise under California law, the official proponents of an initiative measure possess either a particularized interest in the initiative's validity or the authority to assert the State's interest in the initiative's validity, which would enable them to defend the constitutionality of the initiative upon its adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative, when the public officials charged with that duty refused to do so." In response, the court concluded that when the public officials who ordinarily defended a challenged state law or appealed a judgment invalidating the law declined to do so, under article II, section 8 of the California Constitution and the relevant provisions of the Election Code, the official proponents of a voter-approved initiative measure were authorized to assert the state's interest in the initiative's validity, enabling the proponents to defend the constitutionality of the initiative and to appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative. View "Perry v. Brown" on Justia Law

John Fletcher, John McConnon, and Tom Leader (collectively, "Fletcher") appealed an order of the Chancery Court of Hancock County incorporating the City of Diamondhead, Mississippi. Fletcher argued that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction over the petition for incorporation because it did not include two-thirds of the signatures of the qualified electors residing in the proposed incorporation area, and notice was improper. Fletcher also argued that objectors to the incorporation were denied the right of cross-examination at the hearing, and that the second chancellor's failure to order a new trial was an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court found that the petition for incorporation met the jurisdictional requirements, because notice was proper and the petitioners presented substantial evidence that the petition contained two-thirds of the signatures of the qualified electors residing in the proposed incorporation area. Furthermore, the Court found that the chancellor did not deny the objectors' right of cross-examination, and the second chancellor's decision not to order a new trial was within his discretion. View "Fletcher v. Diamondhead Incorporators" on Justia Law

Appellants, the Libertarian party and three candidates, challenged the constitutionality of North Dakota Century Code 16.1-11-36, contending that the statute as applied to them violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause because it prevented appellants' names from appearing on the 2010 general election ballot despite their winning the party's primary. The court held that the burden imposed by the statute was not undue or excessive and the state had a compelling interest in having a minimum vote requirement before a candidate could appear on the general election ballot. Therefore, the court held that N.D.C.C. 16.1-11-36 was not unconstitutional on First or Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Furthermore, because the law applied equally to all candidates and did not result in unequal treatment, the court held that the statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court. View "Libertarian Party of ND, et al. v. Jaeger" on Justia Law