Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Earls filed nomination papers for alderman of Chicago’s 28th Ward on November 22, 2010, for an election to take place on February 22, 2011. An objector complained to the board of election commissioners that Earls and her husband, joint owners, were claiming homeowner property tax exemptions for properties other than the one in which they resided. The Municipal Code states that: “A person is not eligible for an elective municipal office if that person is in arrears in the payment of a tax or other indebtedness due to the municipality.” Earls had obtained documentation that, as of November 17, 2010, she had no outstanding debt for parking, water, administrative hearings, inspection fees, cost recovery, and tax/licensing. The Earls waived the extra exemptions and made payment to the county treasurer. The board concluded that property taxes owed because of unauthorized exemptions did not mandate ineligibility for municipal office. The trial court affirmed. The appellate court reversed on the last business day before the election, and directed that Earls’ name be removed from the ballot or that voters be given written notice that Earls had been disqualified. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, but declined to order a new election. Earls’ property taxes were owed to the county collector, not the city. View "Jackson v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, City of Chicago" on Justia Law

At the February 2010 primary, there was no name printed on the Republican ballot for the office of member of the St. Clair County board of review, and no candidate was nominated as a write-in. In March, the Republican Party central committee appointed plaintiff as its candidate, and, in April, made a filing with the county clerk, entitled “resolution/certificate of appointment.” Plaintiff circulated and filed nominating petitions and other required documents, pursuant to Election Code section 7–61. The electoral board sustained an objection so that plaintiff’s name did not appear on the November ballot. Trial and appellate courts affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, first holding that it could address the moot issue under the exception for matters of public interest. The lower courts applied the wrong section of the statute, which contains different sections for different situations. View "Wisnasky-Bettorf v. Pierce" on Justia Law