Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Legal Ethics
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Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Arizona district court challenging the state's voting system, claiming it did not adequately protect voters' rights and should be replaced with a hand-counted paper ballot system. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Subsequently, the district court imposed sanctions on the plaintiffs' attorneys, including Alan Dershowitz, for filing a frivolous complaint.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint and granted the defendants' motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The district court found that the complaint contained false and misleading statements and ordered the plaintiffs' attorneys to pay a portion of the defendants' legal fees. Dershowitz, who signed the complaint as "of counsel," was held jointly and severally liable for a portion of the sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's holding that "of counsel" attorneys can be sanctioned under Rule 11 for signing frivolous complaints. The Ninth Circuit rejected Dershowitz's argument that the sanctions violated the First Amendment and found that the district court imposed sanctions to deter frivolous actions, not to silence speech. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the imposition of sanctions on Dershowitz, as the liability of "of counsel" attorneys under Rule 11 had not been clearly articulated in previous case law. The court declined to apply the rule retroactively but stated that it would apply to any signed pleadings after the publication of this opinion. View "Lake v. Gates" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Arizona district court challenging the state's electronic voting system, arguing it should be replaced with a system using exclusively hand-counted paper ballots. They also sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit the use of computerized equipment in elections. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of Article III standing, and the dismissal was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Lake v. Fontes. Subsequently, the district court granted the defendants' motion for sanctions against the plaintiffs' lead attorneys, Andrew J. Parker and Kurt Olsen, and their law firms, holding them liable for $122,200.00 in fees.The district court found that the lead attorneys made false, misleading, and unsupported factual assertions in their first amended complaint and motion for preliminary injunction, and did not conduct a reasonable pre-filing inquiry. Key false allegations included claims that Arizona does not use paper ballots and that its voting machines are not tested. The district court concluded that these misleading statements rendered the complaint factually insufficient and open to sanction. Additionally, the court found that the attorneys acted recklessly and in bad faith, particularly in the timing and nature of their motion for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's imposition of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees, as the lead attorneys' actions were both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry. The court also upheld the finding of bad faith, noting that the attorneys' behavior and timing in bringing the motion for a preliminary injunction were reckless. View "Lake v. Gates" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Chris Robles and the California Voting Rights Initiative filed a lawsuit against the City of Ontario, alleging violations of the Voting Rights Act and the California Voting Rights Act by conducting at-large elections for city council members, which they claimed diluted the electoral influence of Latino voters. The parties eventually settled, agreeing to transition to district-based elections by 2024 and included a provision for attorney fees incurred up to that point.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County initially sustained the defendants' demurrer with leave to amend, but the parties settled and submitted a stipulated judgment. The stipulated judgment included a provision for $300,000 in attorney fees and outlined the process for transitioning to district elections. Plaintiffs later filed a motion to enforce the stipulated judgment, alleging the city violated several statutory requirements related to the districting process. The trial court found the city had not complied with the stipulated judgment but denied plaintiffs' request for additional attorney fees, stating the settlement did not provide for fees beyond those already paid.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to seek additional attorney fees under the plain language of the stipulated judgment, which allowed for fees incurred in enforcing its terms. The court reversed the trial court's order denying attorney fees and remanded the case to determine whether plaintiffs were prevailing parties and, if so, the appropriate amount of attorney fees to be awarded. The appellate court clarified that the trial court's assessment of the prevailing party should focus on whether the plaintiffs achieved their litigation objectives. View "Robles v. City of Ontario" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Ohio denied a request from Jeryne Peterson, the mayor of Buckeye Lake, for writs of prohibition and mandamus against the Licking County Board of Elections and its members, the Fairfield County Board of Elections and its members, and the village of Buckeye Lake and its council president, Linda Goodman. Peterson was seeking to prevent a scheduled recall election from taking place.The court found that Peterson failed to show that she was entitled to a writ of prohibition preventing the village from setting the recall-election date or preventing the respondent boards of elections from conducting that election. She also failed to show that she was entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the respondent boards of elections to remove the recall election from the ballot. The court also denied Peterson’s motion to disqualify the village’s attorney. View "State ex rel. Peterson v. Licking County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

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After the 2020 presidential election, Michigan election officials canvassed the results. Michigan law allows any candidate with a “good-faith belief” that he lost the election due to “fraud or mistake” to request a recount within 48 hours after the canvass. No candidate did so. On November 23, the bipartisan Board unanimously certified results indicating that Biden had won the state by 154,188 votes. On November 25, Plaintiffs sued several “state defendants,” asserting that they had “fraudulently manipulat[ed] the vote” through “a wide-ranging interstate—and international—collaboration” and that unspecified “foreign adversaries” and “hostile foreign governments” had accessed Dominion voting machines; that Detroit election officials had participated in countless violations of state election law, including an “illegal vote dump”; and that expert analysis showed that the election results were fraudulent. The Supreme Court declined to intervene. Michigan’s electors cast their votes for Biden. Detroit served plaintiffs and their attorneys with a “safe harbor” letter, warning that it would seek sanctions under Rule 11 if plaintiffs did not voluntarily dismiss their complaint. Plaintiffs did not respond. The district court held that plaintiffs’ counsel had violated Rule 11 by filing their suit for an improper purpose, failing to conduct an adequate prefiling inquiry into the legal and factual merits of their claims; and ordered plaintiffs’ attorneys to pay the reasonable legal fees of the moving defendants.The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. The selective-enforcement claim (42 U.S.C. 1983) and a state-law claim were non-sanctionable under Rule 11. Plaintiffs’ other claims were all sanctionable. Counsel are liable for the defendants’ reasonable attorney’s fees after December 14 because they failed to dismiss their case after it had concededly become moot the allegations in the complaint itself refuted allegations about the Dominion system used in Michigan. Allegations of harassment and intimidation, however, were credible. View "King v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

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The Pennsylvania Secretary of the Commonwealth decertified certain voting equipment that Fulton County acquired from Dominion Voting Systems, Inc. (“Dominion”) in 2019 and used in the 2020 general election. The Secretary decertified the voting equipment after learning that, following the 2020 election, Fulton County had allowed Wake Technology Services, Inc. (“Wake TSI”), to perform a probing inspection of that equipment as well as the software and data contained therein. The Secretary maintained that Wake TSI’s inspection had compromised the integrity of the equipment. Fulton County and the other named Petitioner-Appellees petitioned in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction to challenge the Secretary’s decertification authority generally and as applied in this case. During the pleading stage, the Secretary learned that Fulton County intended to allow another entity, Envoy Sage, LLC, to inspect the allegedly compromised equipment. The Secretary sought a protective order from the Commonwealth Court barring that inspection and any other third-party inspection during the litigation. The court denied relief. The Secretary appealed that ruling to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which entered a temporary order on January 27, 2022, to prevent the inspection and to preserve the status quo during the Court's review of the Secretary’s appeal. Months later—and with no public consideration, official proceedings, or notice to the courts or other parties to this litigation—the County allowed yet another party, Speckin Forensics, LLC to inspect the voting equipment and electronic evidence at issue in this litigation. Upon learning of this alleged violation of the temporary order, the Secretary filed an “Application for an Order Holding [the County] in Contempt and Imposing Sanctions.” The Supreme Court found Fulton County willfully violated the Supreme Court's order. The Court found Fulton County and its various attorneys engaged in a "sustained, deliberate pattern of dilatory, obdurate, and vexatious conduct and have acted in bad faith throughout these sanction proceedings." Taken as a whole, that behavior prompted the Court to sanction both the County and the County Attorney. View "County of Fulton, et al. v. Sec. of Com." on Justia Law

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In 2019, Tennessee imposed new requirements for conducting voter-registration activities. The law required individuals to register with the state; complete state-administered “training”; file a “sworn statement” agreeing to obey Tennessee’s voter-registration laws; and return “completed” voter-registration forms within 10 days. Plaintiffs argued that the law significantly burdened their rights of speech and association, in violation of the First Amendment, and was unconstitutionally vague. The court stated that the defendants had offered “little, if any, evidence” in support of the Act’s requirements, “despite having had an opportunity” and held that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits, further noting “the vagueness about the scope and nature" of the Act. The court “ordered” the defendants “not to take any steps to implement” or otherwise enforce the challenged provisions. The defendants did not appeal. Seven months later, the state repealed the provisions.The district court approved a stipulation to dismiss the case without prejudice. Plaintiffs were awarded attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988, as the “prevailing party.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A preliminary injunction that, as a practical matter, concludes the litigation in the plaintiffs’ favor and that is not challenged on appeal, is, in this case, enduring enough to support prevailing-party status under section 1988. View "Tennessee State Conference of the NAACP v. Hargett" on Justia Law

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Sigcho-Lopez, the alderman for Chicago’s 25th Ward, filed a complaint with the Illinois State Board of Elections, alleging that his predecessor’s (Solis) campaign committee unlawfully paid Solis's personal legal fees from campaign funds. The Board dismissed Sigcho-Lopez’s complaint. On administrative review, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Legal fees incurred to pay for a public official’s criminal defense against investigations or charges of public corruption do not amount to a per se prohibited personal debt under the plain language and spirit of Election Code section 9-8.10(a)(3); whether legal defense fees amount to a personal debt that does not defray the customary and reasonable expenses of an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Solis was not indicted but worked with federal investigators using his official capacity to expose public corruption. Considering the evidence before the Board, its conclusion that Solis’s legal fees amounted to a proper expenditure not prohibited as “satisfaction or repayment” of personal debt but incurred “to defray the customary and reasonable expenses of an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions” was not clearly erroneous. View "Sigcho-Lopez v. Illinois State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

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About seven weeks after the 2020 presidential election, Republican state legislators, individual voters, and organizations representing voters from Wisconsin, Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, and Pennsylvania—all states carried by Joseph R. Biden Jr.—sued to prevent Congress from certifying their states’ electoral results. The district court denied their motion to enjoin the counting of electoral votes, and, after the Senate certified Biden as the winner, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their case. In a post-dismissal order cataloging the suit’s “numerous shortcomings,” the district court referred plaintiffs’ counsel, Kaardal, to the Committee on Grievances for possible discipline. “When any counsel seeks to target processes at the heart of our democracy,” the district court reasoned, “the Committee may well conclude that they are required to act with far more diligence and good faith than existed here.”The D.C. Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court’s referral is not a final order. Rather than fixing Kaardal’s rights and liabilities, the challenged order merely initiated disciplinary proceedings. View "Wisconsin Voters Alliance v. Harris" on Justia Law

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After losing their bids for the November 2019 elections for Quitman County Chancery and Circuit Clerk, Shirley Smith Taylor and Tea “Windless” Keeler, respectively, filed election contests. In July 2020, following a two-day trial of the consolidated contests, the court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dismissing the election contests with prejudice and finding that six enumerated claims brought by Taylor and Keeler were frivolous.Further, the court denied Brenda Wiggs’s and T.H. “Butch” Scipper’s requests that Taylor and Keeler be sanctioned, and that Wiggs and Scipper be awarded attorneys’ fees under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) and the Litigation Accountability Act of 1988 (LAA). The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed in part the circuit court’s denial of an award of attorneys’ fees under Rule 11(b) since the court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in part the circuit court’s decision to deny the imposition of sanctions and award of attorneys’ fees under the LAA in light of its finding that six of Taylor’s and Keeler’s claims were frivolous. View "In Re: Contest of the November 5, 2019 General Election for the Chancery Clerk of Quitman, Mississippi" on Justia Law