Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves two groups of plaintiffs, referred to as the Schneider plaintiffs and the Page plaintiffs, who challenged the title and one-sentence "yes/no" statements prepared by the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Commonwealth (Secretary) for Initiative Petition 23-36. This petition proposed to replace the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) tests, currently used as a measure of student competency for high school graduation, with a system where students must satisfactorily complete coursework certified by their district as showing mastery of state academic standards.The plaintiffs filed their complaints in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, arguing that the title and one-sentence statements were misleading and inconsistent with the requirements of G. L. c. 54, § 53. The Page plaintiffs contended that the statements only mentioned the elimination of MCAS without stating that it would be replaced with something else. The Schneider plaintiffs argued that the statements did not disclose that the petition would prohibit the use of any uniform statewide assessment as a graduation requirement.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the title and one-sentence statements accurately characterized the petition's proposal to eliminate MCAS tests as a graduation requirement. The court noted that while the petition also proposed a new assessment scheme and prohibited any future statewide assessment from being used as a graduation requirement, these were not distinct regulatory features of the petition. The court concluded that the title and one-sentence statements did not need to describe every feature of the petition. The court also rejected the additional arguments forwarded by the Page plaintiffs. The court remanded the matter to the county court for entry of a judgment declaring that the Attorney General and Secretary's title and one-sentence statements were in compliance with the requirements of G. L. c. 54, § 53. View "Schneider v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

This case involves five ballot initiative petitions related to the classification of "app-based drivers" (drivers) as employees of delivery network companies or transportation network companies (collectively, companies). The petitions aim to ensure that drivers are not classified as employees, thereby excluding them from the rights, privileges, and protections that Massachusetts General and Special Laws confer on employees. Three of the five petitions couple this deprivation with "minimum compensation, healthcare stipends, earned paid sick time, and occupational accident insurance." The other two do not.The plaintiffs, a group of registered voters, challenged the Attorney General's certification of the petitions and the fairness and conciseness of the summaries prepared by the Attorney General. They argued that the petitions do not meet the related subjects requirement of the Massachusetts Constitution, that one of the petitions inappropriately asks voters for an exemption from the entirety of Massachusetts law, and that the three long-form versions contain prohibited "sweeteners" that are misleadingly described. They also argued that the petitions are designed to confuse by using dense and technical language.The Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk found that all five petitions share a common purpose of defining and governing the relationship between drivers and companies, and thus meet the related subjects requirement. The court also found that the Attorney General's summaries of the petitions were fair and concise, as required by the Massachusetts Constitution. The court remanded the case to the county court for entry of a declaration that the Attorney General's certifications and summaries comply with the requirements of the Massachusetts Constitution. However, the court retained jurisdiction to revisit its rulings and conclusions if the proponents seek to place more than one petition on the November ballot. View "El Koussa v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the certification of Initiative Petition 23-35, "An Act Giving Transportation Network Drivers the Option to Form a Union and Bargain Collectively" by the Attorney General. The plaintiffs argued that the petition should not have been certified as it does not meet the requirement of containing only related subjects. They contended that the provisions allowing transportation network drivers to organize and collectively bargain with transportation network companies are unrelated to its provisions subjecting the results of any collective bargaining to supervision, review, and approval by the Commonwealth's Secretary of Labor.The case was brought before the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, where the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the petition does not satisfy the related subjects requirement of art. 48, and an order enjoining the Secretary of the Commonwealth from placing the petition on the Statewide election ballot. The plaintiffs argued that the Secretary of Labor's role in the collective bargaining process is not part of the integrated scheme proposed by the petition.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts disagreed with the plaintiffs' argument. The court concluded that the petition seeks to establish a multistep collective bargaining scheme in which the Secretary of Labor's role is an integrated component. Therefore, the subjects of the petition are related for purposes of art. 48. The court affirmed the Attorney General's certification of the petition. The court also noted that the Secretary of Labor's supervisory role is designed to anticipate and address a potential consequence of the collective bargaining process the petition seeks to create, specifically a legal challenge that the collective bargaining process would be preempted by Federal antitrust law. View "Craney v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court declined to address the merits of these appeals challenging the Attorney General's (AG) decision denying Plaintiffs' initiative petition that would have instituted limits on contributions to independent expenditure political action committees, holding that the appeals were moot.The AG determined that the proposed law conflicted with the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights' right of free speech and, therefore, addressed an excluded subject under article 48. Ultimately, the AG concluded that the proposed limitation on campaign contributions was precluded under United States Supreme Court precedent. Plaintiffs appealed. Thereafter, the AG offered to agree to a stipulated order, but Plaintiffs refused to agree with the order. Before the Supreme Judicial Court, the AG argued that the appeals were moot because Plaintiffs did not gather the first round of signatures set forth in article 48. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the cases as moot, holding that Plaintiffs failed to meet the deadline to file additional signatures with the Secretary of the Commonwealth. View "Herrmann v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court entered judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Commonwealth on all claims in Plaintiffs' complaint raising facial constitutional challenges to various aspects of the "Act fostering voter opportunities, trust, equity and security" (VOTES Act), including claims that universal early voting provisions were facially unconstitutional, and denied Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief, holding that there was no merit to Plaintiffs' claims.The VOTES Act, which was passed by the legislature on June 16, 2022 and approved by the Governor six days later, provided that any qualified voter in Massachusetts can vote early, in person or by mail, in primaries and biennial State elections. Plaintiffs, all associated with the Massachusetts Republican Party, brought this action challenging the VOTES Act, specifically the Act's requirement that the Secretary mail applications for early voting ballots to all registered voters by July 23, 2022. The court entered judgment for the Secretary on all claims, arguing that Plaintiffs' claim that the universal early voting provisions were facially unconstitutional was without merit and that Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on their remaining claims. View "Lyons v. Secretary of Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the printing and distribution of an initiative petition concerning the establishment of a medical loss ratio for dental insurance the Supreme Judicial Court granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss, holding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief.Plaintiffs filed a complaint bringing claims for certiorari and equitable relief, and for libel, and moved for a temporary restraining order enjoining the Secretary from publishing the proponents' arguments for and against the initiative petition. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the complaint, holding (1) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 54, 54 did not provide Plaintiffs with a private right of action, and therefore, count one of the complaint must be dismissed; (2) the Secretary cannot be held liable for defamation related to a publication required by law; and (3) Plaintiffs' emergency motion for a temporary restraining order was moot. View "Committee to Protect Access to Quality Dental Care v. Secretary of the Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the Attorney General's certification of Initiative Petition 21-13 to be placed on the ballot in the 2022 statewide election complied with article 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution.On September 1, 2021, the Attorney General certified to the Secretary of the Commonwealth that the initiative petition at issue, entitled "Initiative Petition for a Law to Implement Medical Loss Ratios for Dental Benefit Plans," was in proper form for submission to the people. After it was determined that a sufficient number of certified signatures had been submitted Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that the measure was not in compliance with the requirement that an initiative petition contain only subjects that are related or that are mutually dependent. The Supreme Judicial Court denied relief, holding that Initiative Petition 21-13 did not contain unrelated subjects and that the Attorney General's certification complied with article 48. View "Clark v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the Attorney General's decision to certify two initiative petitions to be placed on the ballot in the 2022 statewide election was in error and that the petitions may not be placed on the ballot.Plaintiffs, twelve registered voters, brought this action arguing that the two initiative petitions, each proposing "A Law Defining and Regulating the Contract-Based Relationship Between Network Companies and App-Based Drivers," violated the requirement under article 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution that initiative petitions must contain only related or mutually dependent subjects. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding (1) the initiative petitions were not in compliance with the related subjects requirement of article 48; and (2) therefore, the petitions were not suitable to be placed in the 2022 statewide election. View "El Koussa v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Attorney General's certification of Initiative Petition 21-03, "An Initiative Petition for a Law Relative to 21st Century Alcohol Retail Reform," holding that the Attorney General properly certified the initiative as in proper form to be submitted to the voters.Plaintiffs, opponents of the initiative, sought to enjoin the Secretary of State from placing the petition on the November ballot, arguing that the certification of the petition was improper because the measure did not present "a unified statement of public policy on which the voters can fairly vote 'yes' or 'no.'" The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding that the Attorney General's certification of the initiative petition was in compliance with the requirements of article 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution. View "Colpack v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the existing September 1, 2020 deadline for the receipt of mail-in primary election ballots is constitutional.In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Legislature passed an emergency law to increase voting options in the September 1 primary election and the November 3 general election. The act included the additional voting option of voting by mail. For the primary election, voters may apply for a mail-in ballot, so long as their application to vote by mail is received by August 26, and the mail-in primary election ballot is completed and received by local election officials before 8 p.m. on September 1. Plaintiffs argued that the September 1 deadline significantly interferes with the constitutional right to vote. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the September 1 deadline for the receipt of mail-in primary election ballots is not unconstitutional. View "Grossman v. Secretary of the Commonwealth" on Justia Law