Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court entering a declaratory judgment that Mo. Rev. Stat. 115.646 violated public officials' right to free speech and was void for vagueness, holding that the circuit court erred.Section 115.646 prohibits officials from directly using public funds to advocate, support, or oppose a ballot measure or candidate for public office. Plaintiffs initiated a lawsuit seeking a judgment declaring section 115.646 unconstitutional. The circuit court sustained Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declaring that section 115.646 violated the officials' First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) because section 115.646 regulates the use of public funds, not the officials' speech, it does not implicate the free speech clause of the First Amendment; and (2) the circuit court erred in declaring certain words and phrases in the statute to be unconstitutionally vague. View "City of Maryland Heights v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court issuing a declaratory judgment invalidating Mo. Rev. Stat. 116.180 and 116.334.2, which prohibit the collection of referendum petition signatures before the Secretary of State has certified the referendum's official ballot title and affixed it to the petition, holding that there was no error.In invalidating sections 116.180 and 116.334.2, the circuit court declared that those provisions interfere with and impede the right of referendum, therefore conflicting with Mo. Const. art. III, 49 and 52(a). The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment declaring those statutes constitutionally invalid, holding that the statutes' prohibition on collecting referendum petition signatures before the Secretary certifies the official ballot title unreasonably shores the timeframe for petition circulation, thus interfering with and impeding the constitutional right of referendum reserved to the people. View "No Bans on Choice v. Ashcroft" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellants' request for injunctive and declaratory relief that allows all Missouri voters to vote by mail without having their signatures on their ballot envelopes acknowledged by a notary or other official authorized by law to administer oaths, holding that the request for relief was not supported or warranted by Missouri law.In the face of the ongoing public health crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Missouri legislature expanded voting options for 2020 elections but put in place certain limitations on the newly created mail-in voting system. Appellants challenged one of those limitations - that absentee and mail-in ballot envelopes be notarized for certain voters. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in ruling that the plain and ordinary meaning of Mo. Rev. Stat. 115.277.1(2) does not allow Missouri voters who expect to confine themselves to avoid contracting the COVID-19 virus to vote absentee without notarization; and (2) where there is no constitutional right in Missouri to vote by absentee or mail-in ballot, Appellants' constitutional claims were without merit. View "Missouri State Conference of National Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Petitioners' petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief with respect to Missouri's absentee voting statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. 115.277, for failure to state a claim, holding that counts I, III, and IV of the petition stated claims upon which relief could be granted.In response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the upcoming August primary and November general elections, Petitioners filed a four-count petition seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to secure the ability to exercise their right to vote without leaving their homes to reduce the risk of contracting or spreading COVID-19 during the process. The Supreme Court sustained the State's motion to dismiss as to all counts. Petitioners appealed the dismissal of Counts I, III, and IV but abandoned their claim in Count II. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the circuit court's judgment with respect to Count II but reversed the remaining portions of the judgment, holding that Petitioners' claims plainly meet the pleading requirements for a declaratory judgment cause of action and the largely similar requirements for actions seeking injunctive relief. View "Missouri State Conference of National Association for Advancement of Colored People v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court declaring the affidavit requirement of Mo. Rev. Stat. 115.427.2(1) and 115.427.3 unconstitutional and enjoining the State from requiring individuals who vote under the non-photo identification option provided in section 115.427.2(1) to execute the affidavit or in enjoining it from disseminating materials indicating photo identification is required to vote, holding that the circuit court did not err.Respondents filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Missouri secretary of state, alleging that section 115.427 unconstitutionally burdens individuals' right to vote. The circuit court entered a judgment finding section 115.427 constitutional except for subsections 2(1) and 3, the affidavit requirement, and enjoined the State from requiring individuals who vote under this option to execute the affidavit required under subsections 2(1) and 3. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the affidavit requirement of sections 115.427.2(1) and 115.427.3 is misleading and contradictory, and therefore, the affidavit requirement is unconstitutional; and (2) the circuit court did not err in enjoining the affidavit requirement. View "Priorities USA v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment holding that the St. Louis City Board of Election Commissioners violated the sunshine law, Mo. Rev. Stat. 610.010 et seq., in refusing to produce absentee ballot applications and envelopes to David Roland, holding that St. Louis absentee ballot applications have ceased being protected from disclosure by law.The circuit court declared that the election board had violated the sunshine law by withholding the absentee ballot applications and ballot envelopes and then taxed costs against Roland in regard to the election board's defense of Roland's assertion that the election board's violation was purposeful or knowing. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in declaring that the ballot applications were subject to disclosure, and ballot envelopes are open to the public after the voted ballot is removed; and (2) the election board was not entitled to costs under either the sunshine law or the general law governing the award of costs. View "Roland v. St. Louis City Board of Election Commissioners" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court quashing its preliminary order in mandamus against the Missouri Democratic Party and its chair and the secretary of state (collectively, Respondents), holding that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, Representative Courtney Curtis failed to show he was entitled to mandamus relief under Mo. Rev. Stat. 115.357.Curtis requested the circuit court issue a writ of mandamus ordering Respondents to accept his declaration of candidacy for the fourteenth senate district pursuant and filing fee as timely filed. The circuit court issued a preliminary order in mandamus then, following a hearing, quashed the preliminary order in mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Curtis failed to prove that either the Missouri Democratic Party or its chair were public officials against whom the remedy of mandamus is properly imposed; and (2) because the record did not reflect that Curtis submitted or attempted to submit his filing fee to the secretary of state’s office, the secretary of state did not fail to perform the ministerial duty of accepting Curtis’ filing fee in this case. View "Curtis v. Missouri Democratic Party" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Administration Hearing Commission (AHC) affirming the Missouri Ethics Commission’s (MEC) imposition of fees arising from the failure to Robin Wright-Jones and Wright-Jones for Senate (collectively, Appellants) to comply with the rules of Mo. Rev. Stat. chapter 130. The court also affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding that Mo. Rev. Stat. 105.961.4(6) was not unconstitutional. On appeal, Appellants claimed that the monetary fees assessed by the MEC violated Mo. Const. art. I, section 31. Specifically, Appellants argued that, pursuant to section 105.961.4(6), the MEC may not assess fines for violations of state statutes, regulations, or rules. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) there was no improper delegation of authority to the MEC; (2) the AHC’s decision was supported by the record; and (3) the assessed fees were not excessive. View "Wright-Jones v. Missouri Ethics Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Administration Hearing Commission (AHC) affirming the Missouri Ethics Commission’s (MEC) imposition of fees arising from the failure to Robin Wright-Jones and Wright-Jones for Senate (collectively, Appellants) to comply with the rules of Mo. Rev. Stat. chapter 130. The court also affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding that Mo. Rev. Stat. 105.961.4(6) was not unconstitutional. On appeal, Appellants claimed that the monetary fees assessed by the MEC violated Mo. Const. art. I, section 31. Specifically, Appellants argued that, pursuant to section 105.961.4(6), the MEC may not assess fines for violations of state statutes, regulations, or rules. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) there was no improper delegation of authority to the MEC; (2) the AHC’s decision was supported by the record; and (3) the assessed fees were not excessive. View "Wright-Jones v. Missouri Ethics Commission" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a proposed ordinance establishing a minimum wage for Kansas City. The City of Kansas City filed an action seeking to have the trial court order the Kansas City Board of Election Commissioners and other election authorities serving the City to remove from the November 3, 2015 ballot the proposed ordinance, arguing that, if enacted, the ordinance would conflict with Mo. Rev. Stat. 285.055. Several individuals (collectively, the Committee), who proposed the ordinance using the initiative petition provisions of the Kansas City Charter, intervened in the City’s action, arguing that the proposal should remain on the ballot. The trial court entered judgment for the City and ordered that the measure be removed, concluding that the proposed ordinance was inconsistent with section 285.055. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the claims of the City and the Committee were premature. View "City of Kansas City v. Kansas City Board of Election Commissioners" on Justia Law