Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

An organization based in Virginia requested access to Minnesota’s Registered Voter List under a federal statute, asserting it was entitled to the records despite Minnesota’s exemption from the law. Minnesota denied the request, citing its exemption as a state with continuous election-day registration since August 1, 1994. The organization also sought the information under a Minnesota statute, but was again denied because no Minnesota-registered voter joined the request. The organization acknowledged it could obtain the information by recruiting a Minnesota voter but did not do so. It then filed suit, claiming Minnesota’s exemption from the federal disclosure requirement was unconstitutional, alleging informational injury and other adverse consequences.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota reviewed the case. Minnesota moved to dismiss, and the United States intervened to defend the statute’s constitutionality. The district court dismissed the organization’s claim on the merits, concluding that the “equal sovereignty” principle does not apply to Congress’s authority under the Elections Clause.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered whether the organization had Article III standing. The court reviewed standing de novo and focused on whether the plaintiff had suffered a concrete injury in fact. The court held that a purely informational injury does not satisfy Article III’s requirements and found the plaintiff’s alleged downstream consequences insufficient, as they lacked a nexus to the interests Congress sought to protect. The court concluded the plaintiff failed to allege a concrete injury and therefore lacked standing.The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. View "Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Simon" on Justia Law

Several individuals and a nonprofit organization in Minnesota, focused on election integrity, wished to publicly advocate their interpretation that certain felons—specifically those still on supervised release—are constitutionally ineligible to vote in Minnesota. State law, however, allows felons to vote once released from incarceration, regardless of whether they are on parole or probation. Concerned about possible prosecution under a Minnesota statute that criminalizes knowingly false statements about voter eligibility made within 60 days of an election, the plaintiffs sought to continue their advocacy without facing criminal or civil penalties.After the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the group lacked standing to challenge the felon voting law in state court, the plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the election disinformation statute, arguing it violated the First Amendment. In response, the Anoka County Attorney filed a counterclaim, seeking to restrain the plaintiffs from violating the law and to obtain damages. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint and denied a preliminary injunction, concluding that the law could constitutionally restrict their speech. The plaintiffs appealed the denial of a preliminary injunction while the counterclaim remained pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the denial of preliminary injunctive relief and found that the plaintiffs had standing due to both actual and imminent injuries. The court held that the statute at issue regulated protected political speech based on its content and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny. The court determined that Minnesota’s law was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, as it both overreached and underreached in its restriction of speech, and also authorized unconstitutional prior restraints. The Eighth Circuit reversed the denial of a preliminary injunction in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for entry of a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs. View "Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Ellison" on Justia Law

Get Loud Arkansas and other plaintiffs challenged an Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners rule that required all voter registration applications to have a handwritten or “wet” signature, excluding digital or electronic signatures. The controversy arose after Get Loud developed an online voter registration tool, which allowed applicants to sign digitally and resulted in a significant increase in voter registrations, particularly among young voters. Following publicity about the tool’s success, the Arkansas Secretary of State instructed county clerks to reject electronically signed applications. Despite an opinion by the Arkansas Attorney General affirming the legality of electronic signatures, the Board adopted a rule requiring wet signatures, which forced Get Loud to modify its operations, reduce the effectiveness of its registration efforts, and expend additional resources.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, arguing that the rule violated the Materiality Provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B), which prohibits denying the right to vote based on immaterial errors or omissions on voter registration applications. The district court found that the rule likely violated federal law and granted a preliminary injunction, preventing enforcement of the wet signature requirement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Get Loud had standing due to direct interference with its core activities. The court concluded that Arkansas’s rule was not material in determining voter qualifications, as election officials did not use signature type to assess eligibility and had previously accepted both wet and digital signatures without issue. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s injunction, holding that enforcing the rule violated the Materiality Provision and that the balance of equities favored the plaintiffs. View "Get Loud Arkansas v. Jester" on Justia Law

Two individuals, a political commentator and a state legislator, brought suit against Minnesota officials to challenge a state statute that criminalizes the dissemination of “deep fake” content intended to influence elections. The law applies to realistic depictions that could mislead a reasonable person into believing a public figure engaged in speech or conduct they did not. The commentator created an AI-generated video of Vice President Harris, which he labeled as parody with a clear disclaimer. The legislator shared the same video without any disclaimer. Both plaintiffs argued that the statute infringed their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.After the complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, the district court found that the commentator lacked standing because the only videos he posted were labeled as parody and thus not covered by the statute. The court concluded that the legislator did have standing, since she shared content that could plausibly be seen as a deep fake under the law. However, the court denied her motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding she had unreasonably delayed in seeking relief—waiting over sixteen months after the statute’s enactment without sufficient explanation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the commentator did not demonstrate a credible threat of prosecution or show any evidence of injury, including from third parties. The court also determined that the legislator’s delay in seeking a preliminary injunction undermined her claim of irreparable harm, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying extraordinary relief. The Eighth Circuit left open the possibility of further proceedings on the merits, including a permanent injunction, but affirmed the denial of preliminary relief. View "Kohls v. Ellison" on Justia Law

A woman who immigrated from Vietnam to the United States and became active in the Vietnamese community in Sioux City, Iowa, organized a campaign in 2020 to assist Vietnamese Americans—many of whom had limited English proficiency and were unfamiliar with the U.S. election system—in registering to vote and casting absentee ballots. Her efforts were not solely for civic engagement; she hoped these voters would support her husband, who was a candidate in the election. She facilitated the process by providing forms, translating, and returning completed documents to the county auditor. However, she also engaged in fraudulent conduct by instructing family members to complete and submit voting documents for absent adult children, and in some cases, she filled out and signed the forms herself. In total, she submitted 26 documents with forged signatures. The county auditor became suspicious and contacted the FBI, leading to her arrest and indictment on 52 counts of voter fraud under two federal statutes.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa presided over her trial. The court used model jury instructions that did not require the jury to find that she knew her conduct was illegal or that the children did not consent to her actions, despite her request for such an instruction. The jury found her guilty on all counts, and her motion for judgment of acquittal was denied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether the jury instructions accurately reflected the law and whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The court held that the instructions properly conveyed the required mental states—knowledge and willfulness—and did not need to require knowledge of the specific law violated. The court also found the evidence sufficient for conviction, including for counts involving equivocal testimony, based on the defendant’s pattern of conduct. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

In 2009, Arkansas enacted a law limiting the number of voters one person could assist to six, with violations classified as misdemeanors. Arkansas United, a non-profit organization, and its founder, L. Mireya Reith, challenged this law, arguing it conflicted with Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which allows voters needing assistance to choose anyone to help them, except their employer or union representative.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas denied an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order but later granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, enjoining the enforcement of the six-voter limit. The court also awarded attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs. The State sought and obtained a stay of the injunction from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, allowing the six-voter limit to remain in effect for the 2022 General Election.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Section 208 of the VRA does not create a private right of action. The court found that enforcement of Section 208 is intended to be carried out by the Attorney General, not private parties. The court also rejected the argument that the Supremacy Clause provided a basis for a private right of action. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs, vacated the permanent injunction and the award of attorney fees and costs, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Arkansas United v. Thurston" on Justia Law

In 2021, the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, Spirit Lake Tribe, and three individual Native American voters filed a lawsuit against North Dakota’s Secretary of State. They claimed that the state's 2021 redistricting plan diluted Native American voting strength, violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 2 of the VRA prohibits vote dilution, which can occur through packing a minority group into one district or dividing them among several districts to weaken their voting power.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota denied the Secretary's motion to dismiss, which argued that private plaintiffs lacked a cause of action under Section 2 and could not use § 1983 to enforce it. The district court allowed the case to proceed, and after a bench trial, it ruled that the 2021 redistricting map violated Section 2. The court permanently enjoined the Secretary from using the map and ordered the North Dakota Legislative Assembly to adopt a remedial map. When the Assembly failed to do so, the court imposed the plaintiffs' proposed map.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The main issue was whether private plaintiffs could enforce Section 2 of the VRA through § 1983. The court held that Section 2 does not unambiguously confer an individual right enforceable under § 1983. The court emphasized that Section 2 focuses on the entities regulated (states and political subdivisions) rather than unambiguously creating individual rights. Consequently, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it for lack of a cause of action. View "Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. Howe" on Justia Law

Mark Moore and two others filed suit against the Arkansas Secretary of State, challenging certain Arkansas statutes that set the filing deadline for individuals who wish to appear on the general election ballot as independent candidates. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the filing deadline is unnecessarily early and thus violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Secretary from enforcing this deadline against Moore. The district court granted the Secretary's motion for summary judgment and denied Moore's motion for reconsideration. The court concluded that the district court correctly noted that the March 1 filing deadline for independent candidates imposes a burden "of some substance" on Moore's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and that Arkansas has a compelling interest in timely certifying independent candidates for inclusion on the general election ballot. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in determining that there was no genuine dispute of material fact whether the March 1 deadline is narrowly drawn to serve that compelling interest. In this case, there exists a genuine factual dispute whether the verification of independent candidate petitions would conflict with the processing of other signature petitions under the former May 1 deadline. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Moore v. Martin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Minnesota Secretary of State and others, challenging a statute prohibiting the wearing of political insignia at a polling place, Minnesota Statute 211B.11. This court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' as-applied First Amendment claim in Minnesota Majority v. Mansky, 708 F.3d 1051, 1059 (8th Cir. 2013). The district court, on remand, granted summary judgment for defendants. The court concluded that the statute and Policy are viewpoint neutral and facially reasonable. The court noted that the statute and Policy prohibit more than election-related apparel. The court explained that, even if Tea Party apparel was not election-related, it was not unreasonable to prohibit it in a polling place. In order to ensure a neutral, influence-free polling place, all political material was banned. In this case, EIW offered nothing to rebut evidence that the Tea Party has recognizable political views. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment because no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the statute and Policy as applied to EIW violated its First Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky" on Justia Law

After MFA formed a campaign committee less than 30 days before the November 4, 2014, election and violated Missouri law section 130.011(8), MFA filed suit against the executive director of the Missouri Ethics Commission (MEC), in his official capacity, seeking to declare unconstitutional the 30-day formation deadline. The district court granted a temporary restraining order, but after the election, dismissed MFA’s suit as not ripe. The court concluded that MFA has Article III standing to challenge section 130.011(8) on First Amendment grounds where MFA’s self-censorship is objectively reasonable; although the 2014 election has passed, this case is not moot where MEC can at any time implement its policy and assess the fee for violation of the formation deadline in section 130.011(8) and, in the alternative, this action is not moot under the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness; and MFA’s case is ripe for review where MFA asserts the harm of self-censorship, based on its compliance with section 130.011(8). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Missourians for Fiscal Accountability v. Klahr" on Justia Law