Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Arizona amended its election laws in 2022, introducing two provisions: one requires county recorders to cancel a voter’s registration in their county if the voter registers in a new county (“Cancellation Provision”), and the other criminalizes knowingly providing a “mechanism for voting” to someone registered in another state (“Felony Provision”). Three organizations engaged in voter registration and education activities claimed these provisions would interfere with their efforts, and sought to enjoin enforcement. They argued that the Cancellation Provision would lead to improper removal of voters and that the Felony Provision was vague and could chill their constitutionally protected activities.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted a preliminary injunction, barring enforcement of both provisions. The Arizona Attorney General appealed. A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the injunction, finding that the organizations lacked standing for the Cancellation Provision and were unlikely to succeed on the merits regarding the Felony Provision. The case was then reheard en banc after the prior panel’s opinion was vacated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the organizations lacked standing to challenge the Cancellation Provision because they did not clearly show that it directly affected or interfered with their core activities, as required by FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine. The court further held that the organizations had standing to challenge the Felony Provision due to a credible threat of prosecution, but were unlikely to succeed on the merits, as the statutory context indicated that “mechanism for voting” likely refers only to a ballot or ballot envelope, not to voter registration or education activities. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case. View "ARIZONA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS V. MAYES" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization focused on election integrity requested that Hawaii’s State Elections Office provide a statewide list of registered voters, citing a provision in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) that allows for public inspection of certain election records. Hawaii’s State Elections Office declined to provide the statewide list and recommended that the organization seek separate county-level lists from each of the four County Clerks, as the Office does not maintain or distribute such a combined list. After receiving this response, the organization sought injunctive and declaratory relief in federal court, arguing that the NVRA entitled it to the statewide voter list.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii dismissed the action, holding that the organization’s claim was not ripe because it had not first requested the information from the counties. The court found there was no Article III jurisdiction, as the organization had not suffered a concrete injury and could still pursue county-level records. The district court allowed time for the organization to amend its complaint if its claims became ripe, but the organization declined, maintaining that the NVRA required disclosure by the State. Final judgment was entered, and the organization appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the organization did have standing, as the denial of information requested under the NVRA constitutes a sufficient injury for Article III purposes. The appellate court also found the claim to be ripe, as the State had made clear it would not provide the requested information. However, on the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that the NVRA does not require disclosure of a statewide voter list, as such a list is not a record “concerning the implementation” of list-maintenance programs under the statute. The court therefore affirmed dismissal, but on the merits, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the claim with prejudice. View "PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC. V. NAGO" on Justia Law

A nonprofit political advocacy organization challenged a set of municipal campaign finance rules adopted by a California city after a history of local government scandals involving city officials and local business interests. The ballot measure, approved by 82% of city voters, imposed per candidate contribution limits for individuals and political action committees, as well as aggregate contribution limits, for city elections. The measure was adopted in response to a series of incidents where city officials accepted valuable gifts or travel from local business figures and subsequently took official actions arguably benefiting those providers. A district attorney’s investigation and report, media coverage, and a resident survey indicating strong public demand for accountability preceded the measure.After the measure took effect, the advocacy organization sued in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, arguing that the per candidate and aggregate contribution limits violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Both sides filed for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the city, holding that the per candidate limits were justified by a sufficiently important governmental interest and closely drawn to that interest, and that the aggregate limits did not impermissibly discriminate against candidates who also supported ballot measures. The court also upheld a related gift ban, but the plaintiffs did not appeal that aspect.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the city established an important governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, and that the contribution limits were closely drawn, not unconstitutionally low, and comparable to other cities’ limits. The court further found that the aggregate limits were constitutional, as they did not apply to ballot measure committees. Thus, the city’s campaign finance limits were upheld. View "MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. LOPEZ" on Justia Law

Two nonprofit organizations and an individual challenged two provisions of Arizona’s 2023 Election Procedures Manual (EPM). The first provision, known as the Speech Provision, purported to summarize Arizona’s voter intimidation laws and included examples of prohibited conduct, such as using offensive language or engaging in behavior that could be seen as intimidating or harassing voters. The second, the Canvass Provision, described the Secretary of State’s duty to certify statewide election results by a statutory deadline, specifying that if a county failed to submit its official results on time, the Secretary must proceed without including that county’s votes.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging that the Speech Provision violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by chilling protected political speech, and that the Canvass Provision unconstitutionally burdened the right to vote by threatening disenfranchisement if a county missed the certification deadline. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge both provisions, denied a request to stay the case under Pullman abstention, and granted a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of both the Speech and Canvass Provisions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction as to the Speech Provision, holding that the plaintiffs had standing because they intended to engage in political speech arguably covered by the provision and faced a credible risk of enforcement. The court found a likelihood of success on the merits, as the state did not contest the district court’s conclusion that the Speech Provision likely violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of standing regarding the Canvass Provision, concluding that plaintiffs had not shown a substantial risk that any county would fail to certify its results and thus vacated the injunction as to that provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "AMERICAN ENCORE V. FONTES" on Justia Law

A group of Latino voters from Washington State’s Yakima Valley challenged the state’s legislative district map, arguing that the configuration of one district diluted their votes and denied them an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The state’s bipartisan redistricting commission had drawn the map following the 2020 Census, but the plaintiffs contended that the map “cracked” their community, undermining their voting power. After a bench trial, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington agreed with the plaintiffs, enjoined the enacted map, and, when the commission declined to draw a new map, imposed its own remedial map.Three Yakima Valley voters, who had intervened in the district court, appealed. They challenged both the district court’s finding of a Section 2 violation and the remedial map, arguing that the new map violated the Equal Protection Clause and Section 2, and that the district court lacked jurisdiction because a three-judge panel was not convened.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction, ruling that 28 U.S.C. § 2284 requires a three-judge court only for constitutional, not statutory, challenges to legislative apportionment. The court found that the intervenors lacked standing to appeal the Section 2 liability finding and to challenge the remedial map under Section 2, as they failed to show traceable or redressable injuries or vote dilution. However, one intervenor had standing to bring an equal protection challenge to the remedial map.On the merits, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the remedial map did not constitute an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, as race was not the predominant factor in its design. The court dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction except for the equal protection claim, which it affirmed, upholding the district court’s remedial map. View "PALMER V. TREVINO" on Justia Law

No Labels Party of Arizona (No Labels) is a political party that only seeks to run candidates for the offices of President and Vice President of the United States. During the 2024 election, five No Labels party members filed statements of interest to run for down-ballot positions. No Labels requested that the Arizona Secretary of State (the Secretary) disregard these filings, but the Secretary refused, citing Arizona law that mandates acceptance of candidate filings by eligible persons.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted No Labels a permanent injunction, finding that the Arizona law substantially burdened No Labels's First Amendment rights by forcing it to associate with candidates for offices it did not wish to pursue. The court concluded that Arizona's interests were minimal and did not outweigh the burden on No Labels's rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the Secretary's enforcement of Arizona's election law, which allowed eligible No Labels party members to be placed on the primary ballot, imposed at most a minimal burden on No Labels's associational rights. The court found that Arizona's interests in ensuring voter and candidate participation, avoiding voter confusion, and limiting opportunities for fraud and corruption outweighed any burden on No Labels. The court concluded that the Secretary's actions were narrowly tailored to advance these compelling state interests. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit vacated the permanent injunction issued by the district court. View "No Labels Party of Arizona v. Fontes" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Arizona district court challenging the state's voting system, claiming it did not adequately protect voters' rights and should be replaced with a hand-counted paper ballot system. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Subsequently, the district court imposed sanctions on the plaintiffs' attorneys, including Alan Dershowitz, for filing a frivolous complaint.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint and granted the defendants' motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The district court found that the complaint contained false and misleading statements and ordered the plaintiffs' attorneys to pay a portion of the defendants' legal fees. Dershowitz, who signed the complaint as "of counsel," was held jointly and severally liable for a portion of the sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's holding that "of counsel" attorneys can be sanctioned under Rule 11 for signing frivolous complaints. The Ninth Circuit rejected Dershowitz's argument that the sanctions violated the First Amendment and found that the district court imposed sanctions to deter frivolous actions, not to silence speech. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the imposition of sanctions on Dershowitz, as the liability of "of counsel" attorneys under Rule 11 had not been clearly articulated in previous case law. The court declined to apply the rule retroactively but stated that it would apply to any signed pleadings after the publication of this opinion. View "Lake v. Gates" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Arizona district court challenging the state's electronic voting system, arguing it should be replaced with a system using exclusively hand-counted paper ballots. They also sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit the use of computerized equipment in elections. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of Article III standing, and the dismissal was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Lake v. Fontes. Subsequently, the district court granted the defendants' motion for sanctions against the plaintiffs' lead attorneys, Andrew J. Parker and Kurt Olsen, and their law firms, holding them liable for $122,200.00 in fees.The district court found that the lead attorneys made false, misleading, and unsupported factual assertions in their first amended complaint and motion for preliminary injunction, and did not conduct a reasonable pre-filing inquiry. Key false allegations included claims that Arizona does not use paper ballots and that its voting machines are not tested. The district court concluded that these misleading statements rendered the complaint factually insufficient and open to sanction. Additionally, the court found that the attorneys acted recklessly and in bad faith, particularly in the timing and nature of their motion for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's imposition of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees, as the lead attorneys' actions were both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry. The court also upheld the finding of bad faith, noting that the attorneys' behavior and timing in bringing the motion for a preliminary injunction were reckless. View "Lake v. Gates" on Justia Law

Arizona enacted a statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-122, 16-135, 16-584, in 1970, which required each voter who votes in person to cast his or her ballot at the precinct polling station at which the voter was registered to vote. Plaintiff and others challenge the precinct vote rule on the grounds that it violated the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 52 U.S.C. 10301, and unjustifiably burdened their election rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. After the district court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, plaintiff filed an emergency appeal. The court found that the precinct vote rule, as administered by Arizona, probably does not impermissibly burden minority voters by giving them less opportunity than non-minorities to participate in the political process. But even assuming, without deciding, that it imposes a cognizable burden on minority voters, plaintiff has not shown that Arizona’s enactment of the precinct vote rule is linked to social and historical conditions that have or currently produce racial discrimination against minority voters. Therefore, the court found that the district court correctly denied relief for the claimed violation of the VRA. The court also affirmed the district court's finding that the constitutional violation claims failed because the precinct vote rule, when considered together with other options available to Arizona voters, imposes only a minimal burden upon minority and majority voters. The court explained that such a minimal burden is sufficiently justified by Arizona’s interests in effective administration of voting in the State. View "Feldman v. Arizona Secretary of State's Office" on Justia Law

Leslie Feldman and others filed suit challenging Arizona House Bill 2023 (H.B. 2023), which precludes individuals who do not fall into one of several exceptions (e.g., election officials, mail carriers, family members, household members, and specified caregivers) from collecting early ballots from another person. Plaintiff argues that this state statute violates section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. 10301, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the First Amendment because, among other things, it disproportionately and adversely impacts minorities, unjustifiably burdens the right to vote, and interferes with the freedom of association. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and plaintiff filed this emergency interlocutory appeal. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on her Voting Rights Act claim. In this case, the district court did not clearly err in concluding that plaintiff adduced no evidence showing that H.B. 2023 would have an impact on minorities different than the impact on non-minorities, let alone that the impact would result in less opportunity for minorities to participate in the political process as compared to non-minorities. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that H.B. 2023 imposed a minimal burden on voters’ Fourteenth Amendment right to vote, in finding that Arizona asserted sufficiently weighty interests justifying the limitation, and in ultimately concluding that plaintiff failed to establish that she was likely to succeed on the merits of her Fourteenth Amendment challenge. The court also concluded that ballot collection is not expressive conduct implicating the First Amendment, but even if it were, Arizona has an important regulatory interest justifying the minimal burden that H.B. 2023 imposes on freedom of association. Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that the plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits of her First Amendment claim. In this case, plaintiff is not only unlikely to prevail on the merits, but, as the district court concluded, her interest in avoiding possible irreparable harm does not outweigh Arizona’s and the public’s mutual interests in the enforcement of H.B. 2023 pending final resolution of this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. View "Feldman v. Arizona Secretary of State's Office" on Justia Law