Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

A prospective candidate for the 2025 New York City mayoral election, who had not been affiliated with any political party since 2006, sought to run as the nominee of an independent body named the “Independence Party.” New York election law prohibits both political parties and independent bodies from using certain words, including “Independence” and “Independent,” in their names. The candidate argued that these naming restrictions, as applied to him, violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and association.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York reviewed the candidate’s request for a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the naming restrictions. The district court found that the candidate had standing to sue but denied the injunction. The court concluded that the naming provisions did not impose a severe burden on the candidate’s First Amendment rights, as they did not prevent him from communicating his political message or engaging in petitioning activity. Applying the Anderson-Burdick balancing test, the court determined that the restrictions were reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and justified by the state’s interest in preventing voter confusion.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Second Circuit held that the naming restrictions apply to independent bodies, that the candidate had standing, and that the state officials were not entitled to sovereign immunity. The court further held that the naming provisions did not impose a severe burden on the candidate’s First Amendment rights and were reasonable and viewpoint-neutral regulations justified by the state’s interest in avoiding voter confusion. The denial of the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Walden v. Kosinski" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Douglass Mackey, was convicted of conspiring to injure citizens in the exercise of their right to vote in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241. The conviction was based on three memes he posted or reposted on Twitter shortly before the 2016 presidential election, which falsely suggested that supporters of then-candidate Hillary Clinton could vote by text message.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Donnelly, J.) oversaw the trial, where a jury found Mackey guilty. Mackey appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knowingly agreed to join the charged conspiracy. The government presented evidence of Mackey's participation in several private Twitter message groups where members discussed strategies to influence the election, including the creation and distribution of misleading memes. However, Mackey was not a member of these groups during the critical period when the conspiracy was allegedly formed and discussed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the government failed to provide sufficient evidence that Mackey knowingly agreed to join the conspiracy. The court noted that while Mackey posted the misleading memes, there was no direct evidence that he viewed or participated in the relevant discussions within the private message groups. The court emphasized that mere association with individuals involved in an unlawful undertaking is not enough to prove knowing involvement in a conspiracy.The Second Circuit concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support Mackey's conviction and reversed the judgment of the district court. The case was remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal for Mackey. View "United States v. Mackey" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of certain contribution restrictions within New York City's campaign finance laws. Plaintiffs claimed that the laws’ restrictions on contributions unduly burdened their protected political speech in violation of the First Amendment and denied them equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief and dismissed their claims challenging the constitutionality of the contribution restrictions. Several years later, the Supreme Court issued its decision in McCutcheon v. FEC. Plaintiffs contend in their Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration that McCutcheon established, inter alia, a more rigorous standard of review with respect to the government’s burden of proof and what constitutes a permissible governmental interest, a standard under which the “pay to play” rules do not pass muster. The court concluded that neither of plaintiffs' purported effects, considered alone or in combination, satisfies the threshold requirement under the third clause of Rule 60(b)(5) that the judgment sought to be reconsidered apply prospectively. In this case, the February 2009 order at issue was immediately final and required nothing of the parties or the district court going forward; it did not apply prospectively. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion. View "Tapper v Hearn" on Justia Law