Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed a case involving the redrawing of congressional districts in South Carolina following the 2020 Census. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and a voter from District 1 challenged the new map, alleging that it resulted in racial gerrymanders in certain districts and diluted the electoral power of the state's black voters. The District Court held that the state drew District 1 with a 17% black voting-age population target in mind, violating the Equal Protection Clause and unlawfully diluting the black vote.The Supreme Court disagreed with the District Court's findings. The Court found that the District Court erred in its conclusion that race predominated in the design of District 1. The Court noted that the challengers did not provide sufficient evidence to show that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles to racial considerations. The Court also criticized the District Court for not drawing an adverse inference from the challengers' failure to submit an alternative map that would have allowed the state to achieve its districting goals while maintaining a higher black voting-age population in District 1.The Supreme Court reversed the District Court's decision in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court concluded that the same findings of fact and reasoning that guided the court's racial-gerrymandering analysis also guided the analysis of the challengers' independent vote-dilution claim, and that conclusion also could not stand. The Court found that the District Court erred in conflating the two claims. View "Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP" on Justia Law

In this case, a group of Colorado voters contended that Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits former President Donald J. Trump from holding the Presidential office again. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed, ordering the state to exclude Trump from the Republican primary ballot and to disregard any write-in votes cast for him.The case centered around the interpretation of Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which disqualifies any person from holding a federal or state office who has previously taken an oath to support the Constitution and subsequently engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States. The voters claimed that Trump's actions following his defeat in the 2020 Presidential election, particularly the incitement of the crowd that breached the Capitol on January 6, 2021, constituted such insurrection.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court, ruling that the Constitution makes Congress, rather than the States, responsible for enforcing Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates. The Court maintained that while the States may disqualify persons holding or attempting to hold state office, they lack the power to enforce Section 3 with respect to federal offices, including the Presidency. The Court argued that permitting state enforcement of Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates would invert the Fourteenth Amendment’s rebalancing of federal and state power and would raise serious questions about the scope of that power. The Court concluded that such enforcement would lead to chaos and inconsistency in the electoral process. Therefore, the responsibility for enforcing Section 3 rests with Congress, not the States. View "Trump v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The U.S. Constitution's Election Clause requires the legislature of each state to prescribe rules governing federal elections. Following the 2020 decennial census, North Carolina’s General Assembly drafted a new federal congressional map. The map was challenged under the North Carolina Constitution as impermissible partisan gerrymandering. The North Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged that gerrymandering claims are outside the reach of federal courts but held that such questions were not beyond the reach of North Carolina courts. The court enjoined the use of the maps but subsequently addressed a remedial map adopted by the trial court, repudiated its holding that gerrymandering claims are justiciable under the state constitution, and dismissed the suits without reinstating the 2021 maps.The Supreme Court first held that it had jurisdiction to review the Elections Clause holding. The court’s decision to withdraw its second decision and overrule the first did not moot the case; it did not amend the judgment concerning the 2021 maps nor alter the first decision’s analysis of the federal issue.The Elections Clause does not vest exclusive and independent authority in state legislatures to set the rules regarding federal elections. In prescribing such rules, they remain subject to state judicial review and to state constitutional constraints. When legislatures make laws, they are bound by the documents that give them life. When a state legislature carries out its federal constitutional power to prescribe rules regulating federal elections, it acts both as a lawmaking body created and bound by its state constitution and as the entity assigned particular authority by the U.S. Constitution. Both constitutions restrain that exercise of power. Federal courts must not abandon their duty to exercise judicial review. The Court declined to decide whether the North Carolina Supreme Court strayed beyond the limits derived from the Elections Clause. View "Moore v. Harper" on Justia Law

In 1992, Voting Rights Act (52 U.S.C. 10301) Section 2 litigation challenging Alabama’s districting map resulted in Alabama’s first majority-black district and its first black Representative since 1877. Alabama’s congressional map has remained similar since then. Following the 2020 census, the state enacted a new districting map (HB1), which produced only one district in which black voters constituted a majority.The Supreme Court affirmed a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the use of HB 1.Section 2 provides that the right to vote “shall not be denied or abridged ... on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” A 1982 amendment incorporated an effects test and a disclaimer that “nothing” in Section 2 “establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.” The Supreme Court subsequently employed the “Gingles framework,” under which Section 2 plaintiffs must satisfy three preconditions and then show that, under the “totality of circumstances,” the challenged process is not “equally open” to minority voters.The district court correctly found that black voters could constitute a majority in a second district that was “reasonably configured” and that there was no serious dispute that Black voters are politically cohesive, nor that the challenged districts’ white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat Black voters’ preferred candidate. The court’s findings that “Black Alabamians enjoy virtually zero success in statewide elections” and concerning “Alabama’s extensive history of repugnant racial and voting-related discrimination” were unchallenged.The Court rejected Alabama’s arguments that a state’s map cannot abridge a person’s right to vote “on account of race” if the map resembles a sufficient number of race-neutral alternatives and that the plaintiffs must prove discriminatory intent. Section 2, as applied to redistricting, is not unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment. View "Allen v. Milligan" on Justia Law

During his 2018 Senate reelection campaign, Cruz loaned his campaign committee $260,000. Section 304 of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act restricts the use of post-election campaign contributions, 52 U.S.C. 30116(j). Federal Election Commission regulations establish that a campaign may repay up to $250,000 in candidate loans using contributions made at any time and may use pre-election contributions to repay any portion exceeding $250,000 only within 20 days of the election; after that deadline, any portion above $250,000 is treated as a campaign contribution, precluding repayment. The Committee began repaying Cruz’s loans after the 20-day post-election window, leaving $10,000 unpaid. Cruz and the Committee challenged Section 304.The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had standing. An injury resulting from the application or threatened application of an unlawful enactment remains fairly traceable to such application, even if the injury was "willingly incurred." The present inability of the Committee to repay and Cruz to recover the final $10,000 is traceable to Section 304.The loan-repayment limitation abridges First Amendment rights by burdening candidates who wish to make expenditures on behalf of their own candidacy through personal loans. It increases the risk that such loans will not be repaid in full, which deters candidates from making loans. Debt is a ubiquitous tool for financing electoral campaigns, especially for new candidates and challengers. Section 304 raises a barrier to entry. The only permissible ground for restricting political speech is the prevention of “quid pro quo” corruption or its appearance. The government failed to identify a single case of quid pro quo corruption in this context, even though most states do not impose any similar limitations. View "Federal Election Commission v. Cruz" on Justia Law

The 2020 census revealed that Wisconsin’s State Assembly and Senate districts were no longer equally apportioned. The Governor vetoed new maps passed by the legislature. The Wisconsin Supreme Court invited proposed maps and selected the Governor's proposed maps; the Assembly map created seven majority-black districts—one more than the current map. The court stated there were “good reasons” to think that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 52 U.S.C. 10301 “may” require the additional majority-black district.The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Under the Equal Protection Clause, districting maps that sort voters on the basis of race cannot be upheld unless they are narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling state interest, such as compliance with the VRA. Preconditions to demonstrating a VRA violation require showings that the minority group is sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district, the minority group is politically cohesive, and a majority group votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to usually defeat the minority group’s preferred candidate. If the preconditions are established, a court considers the totality of circumstances.The Governor’s main explanation for the seventh majority-black district was that there is now a sufficiently large and compact population of black residents to fill it. Strict scrutiny requires more. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s analysis of the preconditions improperly relied on generalizations and “made virtually no effort” to parse data at the district level or respond to criticisms of expert analysis. The court improperly reduced the totality-of-circumstances analysis to a single factor–proportionality--and failed to address whether a race-neutral alternative that did not add another majority-black district would deny black voters equal political opportunity. View "Wisconsin Legislature v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

Arizona voters may cast their ballots on election day in person at a traditional precinct or a “voting center” in their county of residence, may cast an “early ballot” by mail, or may vote in person at an early voting location in each county. Arizonans who vote in person on election day in a county that uses the precinct system must vote in the precinct to which they are assigned based on their address; if a voter votes in the wrong precinct, the vote is not counted. For Arizonans who vote early by mail, Arizona HB 2023 makes it a crime for any person other than a postal worker, an elections official, or a voter’s caregiver, family member, or household member to knowingly collect an early ballot.A suit under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. 10301, challenged Arizona’s refusal to count ballots cast in the wrong precinct and its ballot-collection restriction. The Ninth Circuit invalidated both restrictions. The Supreme Court reversed, characterizing Arizona's restrictions as “generally applicable time, place, or manner” voting rules and declining to apply the disparate-impact model to displace “the totality of circumstances.” The Court also rejected a “least-restrictive means” analysis as having “the potential to invalidate just about any voting rule.”The core of section 2(b) is “equally open” voting. Any circumstance that bears on whether voting is equally open and affords equal “opportunity” may be considered. Voting necessarily requires some effort and compliance with rules. Having to identify one’s polling place and travel there to vote does not exceed the “usual burdens of voting.” A rule’s impact on members of different racial or ethnic groups is important but the existence of some disparity does not necessarily mean that a system is not equally open. A procedure that apparently works for 98% or more of voters to whom it applies, minority and non-minority alike, is unlikely to render a system unequally open. The degree to which a voting rule departs from standard practices is relevant. The policy of not counting out-of-precinct ballots is widespread. The strength of the state interests served by a challenged rule is important. Precinct-based voting helps to distribute voters more evenly, can put polling places closer to voter residences, and helps to ensure that each voter receives a ballot that lists only the relevant candidates and public questions. Courts must consider the state’s entire system of voting; a burden associated with one voting option must be evaluated in the context of the other available means.HB 2023 also passes muster. Arizonans can submit early ballots in several ways. Even if the plaintiffs could demonstrate a disparate burden, Arizona’s “compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election procedures” would suffice under section 2. Third-party ballot collection can lead to pressure and intimidation and a state may take action to prevent election fraud without waiting for it to occur within its own borders. View "Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee" on Justia Law

Delaware’s Constitution contains a political balance requirement for appointments to the state’s major courts. No more than a bare majority of judges on any of its five major courts “shall be of the same political party.” Art. IV, section 3. On three of those courts, those members not in the bare majority “shall be of the other major political party.” Adams, a Delaware lawyer and political independent, sued, claiming that those requirements violate his First Amendment right to freedom of association by making him ineligible to become a judge unless he joins a major political party.The Supreme Court held that because Adams has not shown that he was “able and ready” to apply for a judicial vacancy in the imminent future, he failed to show a “personal,” “concrete,” and “imminent” injury necessary for Article III standing. A grievance that amounts to nothing more than abstract and generalized harm to a citizen’s interest in the proper application of the law is not an “injury in fact.” Adams must at least show that he is likely to apply to become a judge in the reasonably foreseeable future if not barred because of political affiliation. Adams’ only supporting evidence is his statements that he wanted to be, and would apply to be, a judge on any of Delaware’s courts. The evidence fails to show that, when he filed suit, Adams was “able and ready” to apply for a judgeship in the reasonably foreseeable future. Adams’ statements lack supporting evidence, like efforts to determine possible judicial openings or other preparations. Adams did not apply for numerous existing judicial vacancies while he was a registered Democrat. He then read a law review article arguing that Delaware’s judicial eligibility requirements unconstitutionally excluded independents, changed his political affiliation, and filed suit. View "Carney v. Adams" on Justia Law

When Americans cast ballots for presidential candidates, their votes actually go toward selecting members of the Electoral College, whom each state appoints based on the popular returns. With limited exceptions, states appoint a slate of electors selected by the political party whose candidate has won the state’s popular vote. Most states compel electors to pledge to support that party's nominee and remove a “faithless elector” from his position; a few impose a monetary fine on any elector who flouts his pledge.Three Washington electors violated their pledges to support Hillary Clinton in 2016 and were fined $1,000 apiece. The Electors challenged their fines, arguing that the Constitution gives members of the Electoral College the right to vote however they please. The Washington Supreme Court rejected their claims.The Supreme Court affirmed. A state may enforce an elector’s pledge to support his party’s nominee—and the state voters’ choice—for President. Article II, Section 1 gives the states the authority to appoint electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.” The power to appoint an elector includes the power to condition his appointment, including requiring that electors pledge to cast their Electoral College ballots for the party’s presidential nominee. States can demand that an elector actually live up to that pledge, on pain of penalty.Nothing in the Constitution expressly prohibits states from taking away presidential electors’ voting discretion. Article II’s use of the term “electors” and the Twelfth Amendment’s requirement that the electors “vote,” “by ballot,” do not establish that electors must have discretion. From the first elections under the Constitution, states sent electors to the College to vote for pre-selected candidates, rather than to use their own judgment. The electors rapidly settled into that non-discretionary role. Ratified at the start of the 19th century, the Twelfth Amendment acknowledged and facilitated the Electoral College’s emergence as a mechanism not for deliberation but for party-line voting. View "Chiafalo v. Washington" on Justia Law

Reversing the Tenth Circuit, the Court held that states may impose a sanction on "faithless electors" who pledge to vote for the nominee of their political party in the presidential election and fail to do so. The Court cited its contemporaneous opinion, Chiafalo v. Washington. View "Colorado Dept. of State v. Baca" on Justia Law