Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner and Albuquerque resident David Crum was registered to vote in New Mexico as a qualified voter who declined to designate or state his political party affiliation (DTS). He sought to vote during the 2014 primary election by selecting either a Democratic or a Republican ballot without having to amend his voter registration. Crum was not permitted to vote during the June 3, 2014 primary election because he was not registered as either a Democrat or a Republican1 on or before May 6, 2014. Crum contended that the Free and Open Clause of Article II, Section 8 of the New Mexico Constitution entitled him to vote during primary elections without registering with a major political party because he was a qualified voter under Article VII, Section 1. The Supreme Court disagreed: “[a]lthough the Free and Open Clause is intended to promote voter participation during elections, the Legislature has the constitutional power to enact laws that ‘secure the secrecy of the ballot and the purity of elections and guard against the abuse of [the] elective franchise.’” The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Crum’s complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Crum v. Duran" on Justia Law

Ian Schlakman and Frank Richardson (Appellees) filed suit challenging the decisions of the Baltimore City Board of Elections to certify Dan Sparaco as an eligible candidate and the State Board of Elections to include him as a candidate for the District Twelve seat on the 2016 General Election ballot. The court held that the temporary restraining order the Circuit Court granted was in error because Appellees’ state court challenges to the Boards’ actions were untimely and are barred by laches; Appellees have not explained this delay, or explained why they did not institute a parallel action in the Circuit Court within the statutorily-mandated time limits; where the federal court dismissed Appellees’ action because Appellee’s counsel was not admitted to practice before that court, the savings provision under Maryland Rule 2-101(b) did not apply to toll Appellees’ obligation to file in the appropriate circuit court, as instructed by ELEC. LAW 12-202(b)(1); and Appellees have not demonstrated any basis for relief on the merits under any theory of action or avenue for relief. The court explained that the plain language of ELEC. LAW 5-703(d)(1) does not require candidates to submit the required filings until the first Monday in August preceding the General Election. In this case, the City Board’s certification of Mr. Sparaco as a qualified candidate, and the State Board’s listing of his candidacy, complied with the provisions of the Election Law Article. Accordingly, the court vacated the temporary restraining order and remanded. View "Lamone v. Schlakman" on Justia Law

A self-employed real estate broker, James Studley, ran as a candidate for local elective office. The broker sought a blanket exemption from Alaska’s financial disclosure requirements to avoid reporting his clients’ identities and the income earned from them. The Alaska Public Offices Commission denied the broker’s request and assessed a $175 civil penalty for his failure to comply with the candidate reporting requirements. On appeal the superior court upheld the Commission’s ruling. The broker appealed, contending the disclosure requirements violated his duty to maintain client confidentiality, infringe his clients’ privacy rights under the Alaska Constitution, and impair several personal constitutional rights. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision upholding the Commission’s ruling. View "Studley v. Alaska Public Offices Comm'n" on Justia Law

Appellants brought this action just weeks before the 2016 general election seeking to compel the State Board of Elections and the Baltimore City Board of Elections (collectively, Appellees) to establish a special system for “inmate voting” in the City for the general election. The circuit court denied the request for a broadly worded temporary restraining order (TRO), concluding that the complaint had been untimely filed. One day before the 2016 general election, the expedited appeal was argued before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that even if the Court were to find that Appellants were entitled to a TRO with respect to the 2016 general election, there was no way such an order could have been implemented as a practical matter. View "Voters Organized for the Integrity of City Elections v. Baltimore City Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Relators were the members of the committee that nominated Gary Johnson and William Weld to appear on Ohio’s November 2016 ballot as independent candidates for president and vice president of the United States. Johnson and Weld jointly received 3.17 percent of the total votes cast in Ohio for president and vice president. Relators subsequently brought this action in mandamus seeking to require the Ohio Secretary of State to recognize Relators as a political party under Ohio Rev. Code 3517.01. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Relators were not entitled to the writ because they do not qualify as a political party, as their candidates were nominated as independent candidates without any political-party affiliation, and section 3517.01 and Ohio Rev. Code 3501.01 permit only established political parties to retain ballot access if they receive at least three percent of the vote. View "State ex rel. Fockler v. Husted" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a proposed ordinance establishing a minimum wage for Kansas City. The City of Kansas City filed an action seeking to have the trial court order the Kansas City Board of Election Commissioners and other election authorities serving the City to remove from the November 3, 2015 ballot the proposed ordinance, arguing that, if enacted, the ordinance would conflict with Mo. Rev. Stat. 285.055. Several individuals (collectively, the Committee), who proposed the ordinance using the initiative petition provisions of the Kansas City Charter, intervened in the City’s action, arguing that the proposal should remain on the ballot. The trial court entered judgment for the City and ordered that the measure be removed, concluding that the proposed ordinance was inconsistent with section 285.055. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the claims of the City and the Committee were premature. View "City of Kansas City v. Kansas City Board of Election Commissioners" on Justia Law

Melvin Brown, who lost his Republic Primary election for the Utah House of Representatives by nine votes, contested the results of the primary election under Utah Code 20A-4-403(2) - Utah’s election contest statute - arguing that certain ballots were improperly disqualified. Logan Wilde, the winner of the primary election, argued that the election contest statute is an unconstitutional expansion of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. The Supreme Court agreed and issued a per curiam order holding that Utah Code 20A-4-403(2)(a)(ii), which purports to provide the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over multi-county election contests, was unconstitutional. The Court then issued this opinion to more fully explain the basis for the order, holding that section 20A-4-403(2)(a)(ii) cannot extend the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to adjudicate multi-county election disputes, and that provision of the elections code is struck as unconstitutional. View "Brown v. Cox" on Justia Law

Petitioners Representative Donald Turner, Jr. and Senator Joseph Benning, sought to enjoin respondent Governor Peter Shumlin (whose last day in office was January 5, 2017), from appointing a successor to the office held by Associate Justice John Dooley, whose term was set to expire April 1, 2017. Justice Dooley did not file a declaration with the Office of the Secretary of State indicating that he would seek retention for another term beyond March 31, 2017, the last day of his then-current six-year term. On December 21, 2016, Representative Turner filed a petition for quo warranto contesting the Governor's authority to appoint Justice Dooley's successor, asserting that although the Vermont Constitution authorized the Governor to fill a vacancy on the Court, no vacancy would exist until Justice Dooley left office nearly three months after Governor Shumlin left his office. The Supreme Court concluded that the Vermont Constitution did not authorize the Governor to appoint an Associate Justice in anticipation of a vacancy that was not expected to occur until the expiration of the justice's term of office, which would occur months after the Governor left office. "In so holding, we emphasize that our decision today rests entirely upon the meaning and purpose of the Vermont Constitution. We reach our decision having in mind the overarching principles of our democracy: the integrity of our governing institutions and the people's confidence in them. The particular identity of the parties or potential nominees to the Office of Associate Justice have no bearing on our decision. Our sole responsibility in this, as in any, case is to apply the law evenhandedly, regardless of the identity of the litigants, the sensitivity of the issues, or the passing political interests of the moment." View "Turner v. Shumlin" on Justia Law

Johnson filed a referendum petition seeking to place on the November 2016, general election ballot the question of imposing term limits on the elected office of Broadview village president. The Broadview electoral board invalidated the referendum as vague and ambiguous “because it is not clear whether the Referendum applies retroactively as well as prospectively.” The circuit court concluded the referendum was self-executing, not vague or ambiguous, and ordered the referendum to appear on the ballot. The appellate court affirmed. The proposition appeared on the ballot, but the results were not released, in compliance with an appellate court injunction. The Illinois Supreme Court ordered that the injunctive order be vacated and took judicial notice that the referendum was approved, then affirmed. While the proposition did not provide an express date marking the relevant timeframe for the prior terms of office, it is directed at that those “who seek election to or hold the office of Village President” beginning with the April 2017 election who have “been previously elected” to that office for two consecutive full terms. When read in its entirety, the language adequately explains that the initial starting point for determining whether candidates were “previously elected” village president is the April 2017 election. View "Johnson v. Ames" on Justia Law

After declaring his write-in candidacy for President of the United States for the 2016 general election, Steve Carlson filed a request with the Secretary of State asking him to count the votes cast for his candidacy. The Secretary of State refused to accept the request because Carlson did not “include the name of a candidate for vice-president of the United States” with the request pursuant to Minn. Stat. 204B.09, subdivision 3(b). Carlson then filed this petition with the Supreme Court asking the Court to direct the Secretary of State to accept his request because requiring him to name a vice-presidential candidate burdens the First Amendment associational rights of write-in candidates and the voters who support those candidates. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the requirement for write-in candidates to designate a vice-presidential candidate does not violate the associational rights protected by the First Amendment. View "Carlson v. Simon" on Justia Law