Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The Party brought a facial First Amendment challenge to Hawaii’s open primary system, seeking to limit the participants in its primary elections to its formal members or to voters who are otherwise willing publicly to declare their support for the Party. The Party claims that Hawaii’s open primary system, which allows registered voters to participate in any party’s primary without formally joining or declaring support for that party, severely burdens the Party’s associational rights. Under Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, the court concluded that the extent of the burden that a primary system imposes on associational rights is a factual question on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. In this case, the court concluded that the Party's preference for limiting primary participants to registered Party members, coupled with the fact that more people vote in Democratic primaries than are formally registered with the Party, is not sufficient to show that Hawaii’s open primary system severely burdens the Party’s associational rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Democratic Party of Hawaii v. Nago" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of certain contribution restrictions within New York City's campaign finance laws. Plaintiffs claimed that the laws’ restrictions on contributions unduly burdened their protected political speech in violation of the First Amendment and denied them equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief and dismissed their claims challenging the constitutionality of the contribution restrictions. Several years later, the Supreme Court issued its decision in McCutcheon v. FEC. Plaintiffs contend in their Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration that McCutcheon established, inter alia, a more rigorous standard of review with respect to the government’s burden of proof and what constitutes a permissible governmental interest, a standard under which the “pay to play” rules do not pass muster. The court concluded that neither of plaintiffs' purported effects, considered alone or in combination, satisfies the threshold requirement under the third clause of Rule 60(b)(5) that the judgment sought to be reconsidered apply prospectively. In this case, the February 2009 order at issue was immediately final and required nothing of the parties or the district court going forward; it did not apply prospectively. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion. View "Tapper v Hearn" on Justia Law

On January 27, 2016, the proponents of Initiative Petition No. 404, State Question 780 and Initiative Petition No. 405, State Question 781 (collectively Petitioners), filed both petitions and their ballot titles with the Secretary of State. The Petitioners assert both rewritten ballot titles misrepresent the effect of the measures and are contrary to Oklahoma law. Initiative 404 sought to amend statutes to reform criminal sentences for certain property and drug offenses, making certain ones misdemeanors, such as simple drug possession. Initiative 405 sought to create the "County Community Safety Investment Fund," taking costs saved by reclassifying misdemeanors and redistributing them to the counties to fund rehabilitative programs. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found the proposed and rewritten ballot titles deficient, and rewrote the ballot titles pursuant to 34 O.S. Supp. 2015, 10. View "Steele v. Pruitt" on Justia Law

PAG sought a preliminary injunction against FEC's rule prohibiting unauthorized political committees, like PAG, from using candidates’ names in the titles of their websites and social media pages. The district court denied PAG's motion. The court concluded that PAG is entitled to a preliminary injunction because there is a substantial likelihood that, as applied to PAG, the FEC’s naming restrictions in 11 C.F.R. 102.14(a) violate the First Amendment. In this case, the restriction, as applied to PAG, is a content-based ban on speech that likely violates the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s denial of PAG’s motion for a preliminary injunction and remanded for the district court to enter a preliminary injunction enjoining the application of section 102.14(a) against PAG’s websites and social media pages. View "Pursuing America's Greatness v. FEC" on Justia Law

Months before the 2012 presidential election, based on a change in state law, Ohio sought to undo a federal consent decree (Decree) that required Ohio to count provisional ballots cast by voters who appeared in the correct polling location but lacked certain identification and ballots cast in the right polling place but wrong precinct due to poll-worker error. In the NEOCH decision, the Decree was upheld and extended for one presidential cycle; the SEIU plaintiffs obtained injunctive relief requiring Ohio to count the votes. The plaintiffs sought attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988 for their 2012 work defending the Decree, their 2013 work obtaining an extension of the Decree, and the work performed to obtain a 2012 preliminary injunction and a 2013 permanent injunction. Using the lodestar method, the court awarded fees in both cases, limiting the fees for pursuing fees to 3% of the main case, citing the Sixth Circuit’s Coulter rule (capping fees for fees). The court awarded $2 million in fees to 25 attorneys for over 6,000 hours in the two cases. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, as reasonable, the hours and rates, except rates awarded to attorneys from California, and abrogated the Coulter 3% cap on fees for fees as inconsistent with intervening Supreme Court authority. View "NE Ohio Coal. v. Husted" on Justia Law

The Libertarian Party challenged Ohio’s ballot qualification law, Rev. Code 3501.38(E)(1), arguing selective enforcement and violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Under the law, a political party may qualify by obtaining at least “three percent of the total vote cast” for governor or president “at the most recent regular state election” or through a petition. A petition-formed party must nominate a candidate for the general election by petition, filed “[n]ot later than one hundred ten days before the” general election, and, for statewide offices, “signed by at least fifty qualified electors who have not voted as a member of a different political party at any primary election within the current year or the immediately preceding two calendar years.” For local office, five qualifying signatures are required. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Party did not establish state action with respect to its selective enforcement claim. The Party did not demonstrate that Ohio law deprives it of membership or affiliation in a general sense and was not severely burdened by the requirement that it select candidates by petition, rather than by primary. The state articulated a legitimate interest in its law, sufficient in light of the Party’s claimed burdens. View "Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases challenge provisions of a recently enacted North Carolina election law. Session Law 2013-381.2 imposed a number of voting restrictions. The law required in-person voters to show certain photo IDs, beginning in 2016, which African Americans disproportionately lacked, and eliminated or reduced registration and voting access tools that African Americans disproportionately used. Prior to the enactment of SL 2013-381, the legislature requested and received racial data as to usage of the practices changed by the proposed law. Upon receipt of the race data, the General Assembly enacted legislation that restricted voting and registration in five different ways, all of which disproportionately affected African Americans. The court concluded that the asserted justifications for the law cannot and do not conceal the State’s true motivation: taking away minority voters' opportunity because they were about to exercise it. Therefore, the court concluded that the General Assembly enacted the challenged provisions of the law with discriminatory intent. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to enjoin the challenged provisions of the law. View "N.C. State Conference v. McCrory" on Justia Law

On February 5, 2016, Governor Sam Brownback received statutorily required notice of District Magistrate Judge Tommy Webb’s departure from the bench. On June 15, 2016, three judges filed this petition for a writ of mandamus seeking a writ requiring the governor to immediately appoint an interim district magistrate judge for Haskall County. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that the governor failed to appoint a successor district magistrate judge in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 25-312a, which states that any “appointment made by the governor…shall be made within 90 days following receipt of notice….” The Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the ninety-day time limit for the governor’s appointment of a district magistrate judge is directory rather than mandatory under precedent and is thus a discretionary act not subject to mandamus. View "Ambrosier v. Brownback" on Justia Law

After MFA formed a campaign committee less than 30 days before the November 4, 2014, election and violated Missouri law section 130.011(8), MFA filed suit against the executive director of the Missouri Ethics Commission (MEC), in his official capacity, seeking to declare unconstitutional the 30-day formation deadline. The district court granted a temporary restraining order, but after the election, dismissed MFA’s suit as not ripe. The court concluded that MFA has Article III standing to challenge section 130.011(8) on First Amendment grounds where MFA’s self-censorship is objectively reasonable; although the 2014 election has passed, this case is not moot where MEC can at any time implement its policy and assess the fee for violation of the formation deadline in section 130.011(8) and, in the alternative, this action is not moot under the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness; and MFA’s case is ripe for review where MFA asserts the harm of self-censorship, based on its compliance with section 130.011(8). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Missourians for Fiscal Accountability v. Klahr" on Justia Law

In April 2015, the Missouri General assembly passed House Bill 150 (HB 150), which made changes to Missouri’s unemployment benefits compensation statutes. The Governor subsequently vetoed HB 150. In September 2015, during a veto session, the Missouri Senate reconsidered HB 150 and voted to override the governor’s veto. Appellants filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that HB 150 is unconstitutional and requested an injunction prohibiting HB 150 from being executed or enforced. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Senate lacked authority to vote to override the Governor’s veto during the veto session because only bills returned by the Governor on or after the fifth day before the end of the regular legislative session can be taken up during a September veto session. View "Pestka v. State" on Justia Law