Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The Magoffin County Board of Elections (the Board) and its members in their official capacities (Carson Montgomery, Susie Salyer, and Justin Williams, and Magoffin County Clerk Renee Arnett-Shepherd), and Democratic candidate for judge executive Charles Hardin, appealed a Court of Appeals decision to affirmed the setting aside the results of the November 4, 2014 election for Magoffin County judge executive and declaring the office vacant. The officially-tabulated vote count revealed that Republican candidate, Appellee John Montgomery, lost the election to Hardin by a mere twenty-eight votes. Montgomery filed this action to challenge the election results. Appellants contended: (1) that the trial court and the Court of Appeals nullified the election on grounds that were not set forth in Montgomery's petition to challenge the election, and thus deprived them of fair notice of such grounds; (2) that contrary to the trial court's conclusions, the election was conducted in substantial compliance with the applicable election laws; (3) that any violations of applicable election laws that occurred in the election were de minimus and had no impact on the result of the election; and (3) that Montgomery's evidence was insufficient to prove the illegalities he alleged and insufficient to prove that the result of the election was affected by any irregularities and improprieties which may have occurred. After review, the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that Appellant Hardin was entitled to occupy the office of Magoffin County judge executive in accordance with the tabulated results of the November 4, 2014 election. View "Hardin v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

In 2013, Shawn Valentine was elected trustee of Spencer Township in Lucas County. In 2015, Valentine, who serves in the Ohio Army National Guard, told the two other trustees of his military deployment but that he did not intend to resign his position as trustee. The two trustees subsequently voted to declare Valentine’s office vacant and then appointed one of the trustees, D. Hilarion Smith, to take Valentine’s trustee position. Relator, the Lucas County prosecuting attorney, sought a peremptory writ of quo warranto seeking to remove Smith from the office of township trustee and a declaration that Valentine was the rightful holder of that position. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) under the plain language of Ohio Rev. Code 503.241, Smith usurped the title and authority of Valentine’s office of township trustee; and (2) the board of township trustees violated the Open Meetings Act when it unlawfully appointed Smith to Valentine’s trustee position. View "State ex rel. Bates v. Smith" on Justia Law

Steven Glickman, a candidate for the office of New York State Senator, filed a petition seeking an order validating designating petitions naming him as a candidate in the September 13, 2016 Primary Election. Three objectors filed a petition seeking an order invalidating the designating petitions. Supreme Court invalidated the petitions, concluding that Glickman did not meet New York’s five-year constitutional residency requirement as a matter of law. The Appellate Division reversed and validated the petitions. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Glickman could not claim New York residency for the past five years as required by the New York Constitution, and therefore, Supreme Court properly invalidated the designating petitions on that basis. View "Glickman v. Laffin" on Justia Law

The Ohio election regulation at issue, Senate Bill 238, amends Ohio Revised Code section 3509.01, to allow early in-person voting for 29 days before Election Day. The law previously allowed 35 days for early voting, including six days during which a person could both register and vote. In one of many pending challenges to the state’s election laws, the district court found the provision invalid. The Sixth Circuit reversed, calling Ohio “a national leader when it comes to early voting opportunities.” The law is facially neutral; it offers early voting to everyone. The Constitution does not require any opportunities for early voting and as many as 13 states offer only Election Day voting. The regulation was the product of a bipartisan recommendation, as amended pursuant to a subsequent litigation settlement. It is the product of collaborative processes, not unilateral overreaching by the political party that happened to be in power. While the challenged regulation may slightly diminish the convenience of registration and voting, it applies even-handedly to all voters, and, despite the change, Ohio continues to provide generous, reasonable, and accessible voting options to all Ohioans. There is no cognizable injury under the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act. View "OH Democratic Party v. Husted" on Justia Law

Initiative No. 181 (I-181) proposed to enact the “Montana Biomedical Research Authority Act.” The Secretary of State determined that sufficient signatures had been submitted to qualify I-181 for the November 8, 2016 general election ballot. Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief requesting that the Supreme Court exercise its original jurisdiction to declare I-181 unconstitutional on its face and to enjoin its certification for the November 2016 general election ballot. The Supreme Court denied Petitioners’ request without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate civil action should the measure become law, as I-181 was not a “law.” View "Montana AFL-CIO v. McCulloch" on Justia Law

Daniel Moulton filed an affidavit of candidacy for Third Judicial District Seat 16 in the 2016 primary election. With his affidavit of candidacy, Moulton included proof that he was licensed to practice law in Minnesota. The Secretary of State and Attorney General allowed a county auditor to strike Moulton’s name from the primary election ballot on the grounds that Moulton had failed to comply with the requirements of Minn. Stat. 204B.06(8) because he did not provide a copy of his attorney license during the filing period. Moulton subsequently filed a petition asking the Supreme Court to direct the Secretary of State to include his name on the primary election ballot. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that Moulton complied with the statutory requirements for filing as a candidate for judicial office. View "Moulton v. Simon" on Justia Law

Michigan has offered “straight-party” voting since 1891. Previous attempts to eliminate straight-party voting were defeated by referendum. In 2015, the Michigan legislature passed PA 268, eliminating straight-party voting and appropriating $5 million to purchase voting equipment to implement the change. Because PA 268 includes an appropriation, it cannot be repealed by referendum. Opponents alleged that PA 268 violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10301, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132. Plaintiffs’ expert report prepared by a demographer and former U.S. Census Bureau Regional Information Specialist, included a statistical analysis demonstrating “that African Americans are more likely to use the straight party voting option and that its elimination will disproportionately affect African-American voters.”The plaintiffs attached declarations from county election administrators, indicating that the elimination of straight-party voting would cause a demonstrable increase in wait times for voting. The court granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their ADA claim, but were likely to succeed on their Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act claims. The Sixth Circuit denied an emergency motion for a stay of the injunction, stating that the case does not involve the potential disruption of complicated election administration procedures on the eve of Election Day; denying the request for a stay here will merely require Michigan to use the same straight-party procedure that it has used since 1891. View "Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson" on Justia Law

On December 22, 2015, Respondents submitted part-petitions in support of an initiative to enact the "Ohio Drug Price Relief Act." On February 29, 2016, the Ohio Manufacturers’ Association and others commenced this original protest action identifying three alleged defects in the part-petitions that they claimed should cause the part-petitions to be discounted in their entirety. The Supreme Court sustained the challenge in part, holding that 10,303 signatures, including the signatures on all part-petitions circulated by two petition circulators in particular, were erroneously validated because either the circulators submitted false information in their circulator statements or the part-petitions had overcounts. View "Ohio Manufacturers' Ass’n v. Ohioans for Drug Price Relief Act" on Justia Law

The Party brought a facial First Amendment challenge to Hawaii’s open primary system, seeking to limit the participants in its primary elections to its formal members or to voters who are otherwise willing publicly to declare their support for the Party. The Party claims that Hawaii’s open primary system, which allows registered voters to participate in any party’s primary without formally joining or declaring support for that party, severely burdens the Party’s associational rights. Under Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, the court concluded that the extent of the burden that a primary system imposes on associational rights is a factual question on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. In this case, the court concluded that the Party's preference for limiting primary participants to registered Party members, coupled with the fact that more people vote in Democratic primaries than are formally registered with the Party, is not sufficient to show that Hawaii’s open primary system severely burdens the Party’s associational rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Democratic Party of Hawaii v. Nago" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of certain contribution restrictions within New York City's campaign finance laws. Plaintiffs claimed that the laws’ restrictions on contributions unduly burdened their protected political speech in violation of the First Amendment and denied them equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief and dismissed their claims challenging the constitutionality of the contribution restrictions. Several years later, the Supreme Court issued its decision in McCutcheon v. FEC. Plaintiffs contend in their Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration that McCutcheon established, inter alia, a more rigorous standard of review with respect to the government’s burden of proof and what constitutes a permissible governmental interest, a standard under which the “pay to play” rules do not pass muster. The court concluded that neither of plaintiffs' purported effects, considered alone or in combination, satisfies the threshold requirement under the third clause of Rule 60(b)(5) that the judgment sought to be reconsidered apply prospectively. In this case, the February 2009 order at issue was immediately final and required nothing of the parties or the district court going forward; it did not apply prospectively. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion. View "Tapper v Hearn" on Justia Law