Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries
Michigan v. Seewald
Defendant Paul Seewald and alleged coconspirator Don Yowchuang worked in the district office of former Congressman Thaddeus McCotter during McCotter’s 2012 reelection campaign. Michigan election law required McCotter to submit at least 1,000 valid voter signatures before the Secretary of State could certify his placement on the ballot. Defendant and Yowchuang bore some responsibility for collecting those signatures and submitting them to the Secretary of State. The day before the nominating petitions were due, defendant and Yowchuang realized that several of the petitions had not been signed by their circulator, and agreed to sign the petitions as circulators, even though they had not circulated the petitions themselves. Defendant was charged with nine counts of falsely signing nominating petitions (misdemeanor), and one count of conspiring to commit a legal act in an illegal manner (felony). Following a preliminary examination, the trial court bound defendant over to the Wayne Circuit Court as charged. Defendant moved to quash the information on the felony charge. The circuit court granted his motion and dismissed the felony charge against him, concluding that there had been no conspiracy to commit a legal act. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, agreeing that the prosecution could not show an agreement to commit a legal act. The Supreme Court granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal. The issue before the Supreme Court reduced to what alleged conduct was sufficient to warrant a bindover on the peculiar charge of “conspiring to commit a legal act in an illegal manner.” In an "anomalous" reversal of roles, defendant argued that his aim was illicit through and through, that he never agreed to commit any legal act. Rather he conspired to commit an illegal act illegally; and that double illegality should have set him free. The prosecution argued that while defendant’s agreed-to means were illegal, his conspiratorial ends were legal; and that legality was sufficient to try him as a felon. The irony was not lost on the Supreme Court. After examining the conspiracy statute, the Court held that the conduct alleged provided probable cause for trial on the charge. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the Wayne Circuit Court for reinstatement of the district court's order to bind defendant over and for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Seewald" on Justia Law
In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2015-2016 #73
Proponents Mike Spalding and David Ottke proposed Initiative #73, which would amend article XXI of the Colorado Constitution to change the procedures leading to and the conduct of recall elections for state and local elective officials. A review and comment hearing was held before representatives of the Offices of Legislative Counsel and Legislative Legal Services. Thereafter, the proponents submitted a final version of their proposed initiative to the Secretary of State for purposes of submission to the Title Board. The Title Board conducted a hearing, concluded that the proposed initiative contained a single subject, and set a title. Petitioner Phillip Hayes filed a motion for rehearing, contending that the title comprised multiple subjects and was misleading, confusing, and inaccurate. Hayes petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for review The Supreme Court concluded that Initiative #73 contained one subject, namely, the manner in which recall elections are triggered and conducted; however, the title set by the Title Board did not satisfy the clear title requirement because it did not alert voters to central elements of the initiative; it was misleading as to other elements; and, as all parties agreed, it unnecessarily recited existing law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Title Board and returned this measure to the Board to fix a new title. View "In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2015-2016 #73" on Justia Law
Smallwood v. State
Plaintiff, a Hawaii resident, filed an election contest complaint arguing (1) Presidential candidate Ted Cruz was not qualified to run for President of the United States and, therefore, the Republican Part was guilty of election fraud; (2) the Office of Elections sponsors racism by serving “whites only”; and (3) Governor David Ige is responsible for rampant bigotry and discrimination within the State. The State moved to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court entered judgment dismissing the complaint, holding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over his complaint or the relief he sought. View "Smallwood v. State " on Justia Law
Cross v. Rosenblum
Petitioners sought review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 61 (2016) (IP 61), arguing that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035. IP 61 implicated the use of public funds to pay for abortions. As written, the Supreme Court found that the summary to the Initiative Petition did not address the limitation on access to abortion that would directly follow from the enactment of IP 61. "The Attorney General must revise the summary to describe that limitation." As written, the Court also found that the summary did not address the broad definition of the term “abortion,” but, with regard to contraception, it explained what the term abortion excluded, rather than what it included. "The summary provides that the measure '[d]efines ‘abortion’ to exclude termination of ectopic pregnancy, removing dead fetus/embryo, or contraceptives that ‘inhibit or prevent conception.’ In taking that approach, the Attorney General uses the literal terms of the measure, but obscures the meaning of the term 'abortion' rather than conveying the practical information that ORS 250.035 required. The Court referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Cross v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Election Law, Oregon Supreme Court
Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n
After the 2010 census, Arizona’s Redistricting Commission, with two Republicans, two Democrats, and one Independent, redrew legislative districts. The initial plan had a 4.07% maximum population deviation from absolute equality of districts, but a statistician reported that the Justice Department might not approve the plan under the Voting Rights Act requirement that a new plan, compared to the existing plan, not diminish the number of districts in which minority groups can elect their preferred candidates. The Commission adopted a revised plan with an 8.8% deviation on a 3-to-2 vote, with Republican members dissenting. Under the final plan, a Republican-leaning district became more competitive. The Justice Department approved the plan as consistent with the Act. The Supreme Court upheld the plan, concluding that the “deviations were primarily a result of good-faith efforts to comply with the Voting Rights Act . . . though partisanship played some role.” Mathematical perfection is not required. Deviations may be justified by legitimate considerations, including compactness and contiguity, and state interests in maintaining the integrity of political subdivisions, competitive balance among political parties, and, before the Supreme Court’s 2013 Shelby County decision, compliance with the Act. Because the deviation here is under 10%, objectors cannot rely on numbers to show a constitutional violation, but must show that it is more probable than not that the deviation reflects predominantly illegitimate reapportionment factors. Objectors failed to meet that burden: the deviations reflected efforts to achieve compliance with the Act, not to secure advantage for the Democratic Party. View "Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n" on Justia Law
Benjamin v. Walker
Petitioner was a Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia and a candidate seeking re-election to the Court. Petitioner began his election campaign as a “traditional candidate” - a candidate financed by contributions from supporters - but subsequently decided to enter the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Public Campaign Financing Program (the Act) and became a “participating candidate” under the Act. The West Virginia State Elections Commission certified Petitioner’s campaign for public funding under the Act. Respondent, a traditional candidate seeking election to the Court, appealed the Commission’s decision. The circuit court ruled in favor of Respondent, concluding that the Commission’s certification of Petitioner was clearly erroneous and violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights to free speech and substantive due process. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and reinstated the decision of the Commission, holding that the Commission correctly concluded that Petitioner satisfied all statutory requirements to be certified for public funding under the Act. View "Benjamin v. Walker" on Justia Law
Wooten v. Walker
Petitioner was a candidate seeking election to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia and was a “participating candidate” under the west Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Public Campaign Financing Program. In his application to the West Virginia State Elections Commission to be certified to receive public financing, Petitioner timely filed his final report and all required substantive information but filed his sworn statement one day late. The Commission certified Petitioner’s campaign for public financing. Respondent, a non-participating candidate seeking election to the Court, challenged Petitioner’s certification. The circuit court concluded that the Commissioner’s certification of Petitioner for public financing of his candidacy under West Virginia Code 3-12-1 was not valid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission has discretion to certify a participating candidate for public financing notwithstanding the candidate’s failure to meet the time deadlines set forth in the West Virginia Code of State Rules where the candidate has substantially complied with all requirements set forth in the Act and the Rules and where there is no showing of prejudice. View "Wooten v. Walker" on Justia Law
Mainers for Fair Bear Hunting v. Dep’t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife
Mainers for Fair Bear Hunting (MFBH) is a Maine ballot question committee that was a proponent of November 2014 Ballot Question 1 concerning bear hunting and trapping. As early as September 2013, the Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife used agency resources to communicate with the public in opposition to Question 1. MFBH filed a complaint against the Department alleging that the Department’s campaign activities constituted an ultra vires expenditure of public funds. In November 2014, Maine voters defeated the ballot question. The Department subsequently filed a motion to dismiss MFBH’s complaint on the grounds of mootness and standing. In March 2015, the superior court dismissed the complaint as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the case is moot and that no exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. View "Mainers for Fair Bear Hunting v. Dep’t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife" on Justia Law
Frank v. Walker
In 2011 Wisconsin enacted a statute requiring voters to present photographic identification. A federal district judge found violation of the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act and enjoined its application. The Seventh Circuit reversed. After the Supreme Court declined review, the state amended Act 23 to require acceptance of veterans’ IDs. The district court declined to address plaintiffs' remaining argument that some persons qualified to vote are entitled to relief because they face daunting obstacles to obtaining acceptable photo ID. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part; it did not previously hold that persons unable to get a photo ID with reasonable effort lack a serious grievance. The right to vote is personal and is not defeated by the fact that 99% of other people can secure the necessary credentials easily. Under Wisconsin’s law, people who do not have qualifying photo ID cannot vote, even if it is impossible for them to get such an ID. Plaintiffs want relief from that prohibition, not from the general application of Act 23. The district court should permit the parties to explore how the state’s system works today before considering plaintiffs’ remaining substantive contentions. View "Frank v. Walker" on Justia Law
Utah Republican Party v. Cox
The United States District Court for the District of Utah certified questions of law to the Supreme Court regarding Qualified Political Parties (QPP). The first question asked whether Utah law requires that a QPP permit its members to seek its nomination by either or both of the methods set forth in Utah Code 20A-9-407 and 20A-9-408 or whether a QPP may preclude a member from seeking the party’s nomination by gathering signatures under section 20A-9-408. The second question asked whether the Lieutenant Governor must treat a registered political party (RPP) that has selected to be designated as a QPP as a RPP under Utah law. The Supreme Court answered (1) Utah Code 20A-9-101 requires that QPP party members may choose the method of candidacy qualification; and (2) the certified question regarding the Lieutenant Governor’s obligations is hypothetical and not ripe for decision. View "Utah Republican Party v. Cox" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Election Law, Utah Supreme Court