Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), 52 U.S.C. 20302(a)(8)(A), includes a variety of measures that states are required to adopt in order to accommodate military voters when they administer federal elections. At issue is section 20302(a)(8)(A)'s requirement that, when a qualifying military or overseas voter requests an absentee ballot for a federal election, a state must transmit a ballot to that voter forty-five days before the federal election. The United States filed suit against Alabama seeking to enjoin the State from holding federal runoff elections forty-two days after federal primary elections. When the court looked at the text of section 20302(a)(9), the court found that it directs states only to "establish a written plan" in preparation for runoff elections, and makes no claim that it abrogates the mandatory forty-five day transmission timeline. In light of the plain language of this substantive command - and Congress's clear intent to prioritize the empowerment of military voters through clear and accessible absentee voting procedures - the court concluded that section 20302(a)(9) does not alter the court's interpretation. Therefore, the court held that the State must transmit validly requested absentee ballots to eligible UOCAVA voters forty-five days before each federal election, whether that election is primary, general, special, or runoff. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the United States. View "United States v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Appellant, a student at Brown University, was suspended for three semesters after a number of students and staff submitted complaints regarding his behavior. Appellant filed an eleven-count complaint in the district court of Rhode Island against the University, numerous individuals associated with the University, and its police department (collectively, Appellees), alleging, among other claims, that Appellees’ conduct during his disciplinary proceeding and during his removal from campus violated his constitutional rights and state law. The district court entered judgment in favor of Appellees. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) finding that the University was not a state actor subject to federal jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 1983; (2) granting Appellees’ motion to amend their answer to include a statute of limitations defense; and (3) disposing of Appellant’s claims on Appellees’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, as the Rhode Island tolling statute did not toll Appellant’s claims. View "Klunder v. Brown University" on Justia Law

Appellants Richard Hughes, the Alaska Miners Association, and the Council of Alaska Producers challenged Lieutenant Governor Mead Treadwell's certification of a ballot initiative that would require final legislative approval for any large-scale metallic sulfide mining operation located within the Bristol Bay watershed. Appellants argued that the initiative violated the constitutional prohibitions on appropriation and enacting local or special legislation by initiative. Following oral argument, the Alaska Supreme Court issued an order affirming the superior court's summary judgment order in favor of the State and the initiative sponsors, and allowing preparation of ballots to proceed. View "Hughes v. Treadwell" on Justia Law

Three small political parties and several party members and candidates sought to invalidate California’s electoral system for statewide and legislative offices, contending the system, which consists of an open nonpartisan election followed by a runoff between the top-two candidates, deprives them of equal protection and associational and voting rights secured by the state and federal Constitutions. According to plaintiffs, because “minor” party candidates are typically eliminated in the primary election, they are denied the constitutional right to participate in the general election upon a showing of substantial public support. Plaintiffs also contend their associational rights are violated by the effective limitation of their participation to the primary election, when voter participation is typically less than half that of the general election; that the electoral system denies them equal protection because they are no longer able to regularly participate in the general election, as they were under the prior electoral system; and that the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint, without permitting them a hearing on the evidentiary support for their claims. The court of appeal affirmed The dismissal. View "Rubin v. Padilla" on Justia Law

Former county administrators of elections from eight Tennessee counties in Tennessee filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that after the 2008 statewide elections and a shift in the controlling political party in the state assembly, they were ousted from their positions by the defendants, county election commissioners, because of their actual or perceived political party affiliation. The district court held that the statutory position of county administrator of elections in Tennessee is lawfully subject to patronage dismissal under Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. All of the identified duties of the administrator that involve policy matters are matters of political concern. Administrators spend a significant portion of time advising the commissioners on how to exercise their statutory policymaking authority, including apprising the commissioners of current laws and changes in the law, assisting in reapportionment matters, preparing the annual budget, and overseeing election operations, and control the lines of communications to the commissioners. View "Peterson v. Dean" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-retired justices Robert Utter and Faith Ireland sued the Building Industry Association of Washington (BIAW), alleging that BIAW violated Washington's Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA), chapter 42.17 A RCW, in part by failing to register as a political committee during the 2007-2008 campaign season. The trial court granted BIAW' s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case on the ground that there was no material factual dispute and BIAW was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but it denied BIAW's request for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed, stating in dicta that there was an issue of fact as to whether BIAW met the statutory definition of a "political committee," but held only that the plaintiffs' case did not meet the procedural prerequisites to filing a citizen suit. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court's denial of BIAW's request for attorney fees. Plaintiffs petitioned the Washington Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that: (1) plaintiffs' suit was not procedurally barred under Washington's citizen suit provision; and (2) plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact about whether BIAW met the statutory definition of a "political committee." View "Utter v. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of Wash." on Justia Law

Robert Gillam and two of his business ventures filed suit, alleging that the Alaska Public Offices Commission should not have been allowed to investigate and decide whether Gillam and his businesses had committed certain campaign finance violations. Gillam alleged that both the Executive Director and the Chair of the Commission were biased and that further consideration by the Commission would violate his right to due process protected by the Alaska and federal constitutions and his Alaska constitutional right to a fair investigation. The superior court concluded that Gillam’s claims were not ripe and that Gillam has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Upon review, the Alaska Supreme Court agreed that there was an administrative recusal procedure for Gillam’s state law claims and that Gillam needed to exhaust that remedy before bringing his state law claims to court. The Court also agreed that Gillam’s federal due process claim was not ripe because the recusal procedure might resolve that claim. View "RBG Bush Planes, LLC v. Kirk" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that Fayette County's at-large election system violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10301, by effectively guaranteeing that no African-American would be able to participate in the political process through election to the Board of Commissioners (BOC) and the Board of Education (BOE), nor would African-American voters be able to elect representatives of their choice to either entity. The district court granted summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor, finding that the at-large election method used by both the BOC and BOE resulted in impermissible vote dilution. However, the court concluded that the district court failed to notice the BOE that it was considering awarding summary judgment against it; the district court weighed the evidence submitted by the moving parties, accepting the support proffered by plaintiffs and rejecting the contrary evidence presented by the BOC; and, therefore, without opining as to the correctness of the district court's substantive conclusions, the district court erred in its Section 2 determination on summary judgment. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Georgia State Conference of the NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint contesting the second special election for councilmember for District IV, City and County of Honolulu, alleging errors in the counting of the votes and the handling of the ballots. Plaintiff, a nonpartisan candidate for the District IV councilmember seat, had lost the election by forty-one votes. The Supreme Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants, the Chief Election Officer and the State Office of Elections, holding that Plaintiff failed to show in his pleadings actual information of errors, mistakes, or irregularities sufficient to change the outcome of the election. View "Waters v. Nago " on Justia Law

Following the census conducted in 2010, the General Assembly enacted redistricting plans for the North Carolina Senate and House of Representatives and for the North Carolina districts for the United States House of Representatives. Plaintiffs sought to have the redistricting plans declared invalid on constitutional and statutory grounds. The trial court concluded that the General Assembly applied traditional and permissible redistricting principles to achieve partisan advantage and that no constitutional violations occurred. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed as to the twenty-six districts drawn to comply with the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, holding that the trial court erred when it applied strict scrutiny before making adequate findings of fact, but because the trial court correctly found that each of the twenty-six districts survived strict scrutiny, the case need not be remanded for reconsideration under what may be a less demanding standard of review; and (2) affirmed as to the remaining challenged districts. View "Dickson v. Rucho" on Justia Law