Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Doralee Chandler, a registered voter, filed an amended petition for issuance of a writ of mandamus and for declaratory judgment, alleging that Judge Harrison G. Foster II was not a qualified or eligible candidate for circuit judge because he was not a “licensed attorney” for the constitutionally mandated six-year time period preceding the assumption of the office. The circuit court denied Chandler’s petition and granted Foster’s third-party complaint, determining (1) Foster was not “unlicensed” pursuant to Rule VII(C) of the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar despite his failure to timely pay his licensing fee four of the six consecutive years prior to the time for taking office, if elected; (2) the suspension of Foster’s license to practice law due to Foster’s failure to timely renew his licensing fee violated his due process rights; and (3) Rule VII(C) was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in determining that Foster was not “unlicensed” pursuant to Rule VII and in finding that he was qualified to seek the position of circuit judge; and (2) Rule VII(C) is unconstitutional in that it provides for an automatic suspension of a lawyer’s license without procedural due process.View "Chandler v. Martin" on Justia Law

Appellant, a registered voter, petitioned the circuit court for a declaratory judgment that Angela Byrd, a filed candidate for circuit judge, was unqualified and ineligible for that office because she was not a licensed attorney for a six-year time period immediately preceding the assumption of office for circuit judge. Specifically, Appellant alleged that Byrd failed to timely pay her annual bar license fee for the year 2014, and while her license was suspended, she was no longer licensed pursuant to Rule VII of the Arkansas Supreme Court’s Rules Governing Admission to the Bar. In response, Byrd filed a third-party complaint against the Clerk of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, alleging that Rule VII(C) was unconstitutional. The circuit court denied Williams’s petition and granted Byrd’s third-party complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of Kelly v. Martin and Chandler v. Martin, concluding that Byrd was an eligible candidate for circuit judge.View "Williams v. Martin" on Justia Law

On March 3, 2014, Valerie Bailey filed as a candidate for the position of circuit judge in the May 20, 2014 election. Kristen Hulse filed a petition for writ of mandamus and a declaration judgment, alleging that Bailey was not qualified and was ineligible to be a candidate for circuit court judge. On March 19, 2014, the circuit court entered an order granting Hulse’s requested relief, declaring that Bailey was not eligible to seek the office of circuit judge. The deadline for printing ballots was March 21, 2014. On April 22, 2014, Bailey filed an amended notice of expedited appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the basis of mootness, concluding that any decision by the Court would amount to an advisory opinion because the ballots had been printed, mailed to absentee voters, and presented to early voters.View "Bailey v. Martin" on Justia Law

The Pulaski County Election Commission and some of its commissioners and the Pulaski County Circuit/County Clerk (collectively, “PCEC”) filed a petition for a declaratory judgment, claiming that certain emergency rules promulgated by the Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners (“ASBEC”) relating to absentee voters were unconstitutional. The circuit court concluded (1) Act 595 of 2013, which amended the State election code to require that voters provide proof of identity when voting, was unconstitutional; and (2) the emergency rules were also unconstitutional because they were derived from the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in finding that the rules relating to absentee voters promulgated by the ASBEC were unconstitutional; but (2) erred in declaring Act 595 unconstitutional because that issue was not pled or developed before the circuit court.View "Ark. State Bd. of Election Comm'rs v. Pulaski County Election Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged Wisconsin’s campaign-finance law in light of the Supreme Court decision, Citizens United (2010), alleging that laws concerning groups that spend money for political speech independently of candidates and parties are vague and overbroad and unjustifiably burden the free-speech rights of independent political speakers in violation of the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit previously invalidated section 11.26(4), which capped at $10,000 the aggregate annual amount a donor could give to state and local candidates, political parties, and political committees. Remaining claims challenge a ban on political spending by corporations, interlocking definitions that determine “political committee” status, “noncoordination” oath and disclaimer requirements for independent political messages, among other provisions. The district court enjoined the ban on corporate political spending, partially enjoined a regulatory disclaimer rule, and denied an injunction on other challenges. The Seventh Circuit vacated with instructions to enter a new injunction to conform to the specificity requirements of FRCP Rule 65(d). On the merits, the court stated that the First Amendment requires a heightened degree of regulatory clarity and close fit between the government’s means and its end; some forms of regulation are categorically impermissible. Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 11 has not been updated to reflect new Supreme Court doctrine; administrative rules do not cohere with the statutes and the state elections agency has given conflicting signals about its intent to enforce some provisions. Certain provisions (the ban on corporate political spending and the cap on the amount a corporation may spend to raise money for an affiliated PAC) are obviously unconstitutional under Citizens. Others fail First Amendment standards as applied to independent political speakers. Some provisions are valid.View "WI Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an unsuccessful candidate for judicial office in Mohave County, Arizona, filed suit challenging the facial and as-applied constitutionality of certain provisions of the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct. The court held that Rule 4.1(A)(6) (the solicitation clause) is unconstitutional as applied to non-judge judicial candidates because it restricts speech that presents little to no risk of corruption or bias towards future litigants and is not narrowly tailored to serve those state interests. The court held that Rules 4.1(A)(2)-(5) - prohibiting speechifying, endorsements, and fundraising - are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest in an impartial judiciary, and are therefore unconstitutional restrictions on political speech of non-judge candidates for judicial office. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.View "Wolfson v. Concannon, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the ballot title for Initiative Petition 38 (2014) (IP 38), arguing that the ballot title does not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). IP 38, if adopted, would alter the Oregon primary election process for certain partisan offices, denominated "voter choice offices" (United States Senator, Congressional Representative, Governor, Secretary of State, State Treasurer, Attorney General, state Senator, state Representative, and any state, county, city, or district partisan office for which the law currently authorizes political party nominations to the general election). In addition, IP 38 would have modified the process for filling vacancies in partisan offices. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2), and referred the title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Dixon v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the ballot title for Initiative Petition 44 (2014) that if adopted, would have enacted statutory provisions to impose certain requirements on food manufacturers and retailers concerning the labeling of genetically engineered foods. The Supreme Court considered the various challenges to the certified ballot title that each petitioner advanced and concluded that only one had merit. The ballot title error that the Court identified in this proceeding was an acknowledged scrivener's error, the correction of which was straightforward and ministerial. The Supreme Court corrected the error and certified the corrected ballot title to the Secretary of State. View "Bates v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

The Indianapolis Marion County City-County Council and Mayor Gregory Ballard agreed on an ordinance dividing Marion County into legislative districts. Three members of the Council (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the ordinance failed to comply with the Redistricting Statute for Marion County, which assigns the task of redrawing the County’s legislative districts to the judiciary if the County’s legislative and executive branches become deadlocked over required redistricting. The trial court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and then drew new legislative districts, concluding that because the Council divided the County by ordinance in 2011, not during 2012 as required by the Redistricting Statute, the ordinance failed to satisfy the requirement for “mandatory redistricting” during 2012. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that this case did not present a redistricting impasse that required judicial intervention.View "Ballard v. Lewis" on Justia Law

After plaintiff, who was twenty-seven years old at the time, was excluded from the presidential primary ballot under California law, she filed suit under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Twentieth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The court concluded that the case was not moot because it was "capable of repetition, yet evading review." The court concluded that age requirements, like residency requirements and term limits, are neutral candidacy qualifications which the State had the right to impose; any burden on plaintiff's speech and association rights were minimal; and the burden was justified by California's asserted interest in protecting the integrity of the election process and avoiding voter confusion. The court rejected plaintiff's Equal Protection claim; because including ineligible candidates on the ballot could easily cause voter confusion, treating ineligible candidates differently from eligible ones was rationally related to the state's interest in maintaining the integrity of the election process; and the Secretary did not violate the Equal Protection Clause by excluding from the ballot candidates who are indisputably ineligible to serve, while listing those with a colorable claim of eligibility. Even if the Twentieth Amendment gave rise to a private right of action, nothing in the Twentieth Amendment states or implies that Congress has the exclusive authority to exclude a candidate with a known ineligibility from the presidential ballot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Lindsay v. Bowen" on Justia Law