Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries
White v. Ind. Democratic Party
Almost two million Indiana voters cast their ballots for Secretary of State in November 2010. The Indiana Democratic Party sought to have the winner in the election, Republican Charlie White, declared ineligible to assume office because he had not been registered to vote at the address at which he resided in July 15, 2010, the deadline for certifying candidates for state office. The Indiana Recount Commission dismissed the petition and later denied it. The circuit court reversed, directing that the Commission declare White ineligible. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and affirmed the Commission's dismissal, holding that the the Commission's action was not arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law because the Indiana Democratic Party's challenge was untimely. View "White v. Ind. Democratic Party" on Justia Law
Kole v. Faultless
Several hundred citizens of the Town of Fishers, including Plaintiffs, filed a petition with the Fishers Town Clerk seeking a referendum on whether the Town should convert itself from a town into a second class city. The Town Council subsequently passed a resolution proposing a reorganization with Fall Creek Township that would merge the two entities into a reorganized city. Plaintiffs filed suit in U.S. District Court, seeking to compel the Town Council to schedule their petition for a referendum. Thereafter, the Fishers Town Council and the Township held a public meeting during which both entities adopted the final reorganization plan. A referendum on the plan was scheduled for the November 2012 general election. The Town Council subsequently passed a resolution ordering a referendum on Plaintiffs' proposal in the general election. Defendants then moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint, which the federal district court denied. The Supreme Court accepted certification to address a question of state law and held that a political unit may reorganize into a city under Indiana's Reorganization Act in a manner that eliminates voting rights recognized under Indiana law, including reorganization as a city with a council elected entirely at large and a mayor appointed by that council. View "Kole v. Faultless" on Justia Law
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Election Law, Indiana Supreme Court
Green/Harmon v. Kroger
Two petitioners sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition (IP) 28 (2012). Before 2009, Oregon imposed a 6.6 percent tax rate on a corporation's "taxable income." In 2009, the voters approved Ballot Measure 67, which modified the marginal tax rate that corporations pay on their taxable income. Petitioner Patrick Green raised a single challenge to the caption, the "yes" vote result statement, the "no" vote result statement, and the summary. He contended that each part of the ballot title was defective because it referred to a tax on "corporate income" rather than a tax on corporate "profits" or "taxable income." He reasoned that the use of the phrase "corporate income" was misleading because it failed to communicate that the tax would fall only on corporate profits. Petitioner Dan Harmon raised a similar challenge, noting that what the IP would have modified was a corporate excise tax and that the ballot title should have either referred to an excise tax or used the phrase "taxable income." In his view, either phrase would have been more accurate and less misleading than the use of the unmodified term "income." In each instance, the certified ballot title used the term "income," even though that term can refer to more than one type of income and even though those differing types of income may have significantly different tax consequences. The Supreme Court concluded the Attorney General advanced no legitimate reason for not using a more accurate term, which would reduce the potential for misleading the voters that the certified ballot title currently presents. The Court agreed with Petitioners that referring to a tax on corporate "income" was, without more, misleading. Accordingly, the Court referred the caption, the "yes" result statement, the "no" result statement, and the summary to the Attorney General for modification. View "Green/Harmon v. Kroger" on Justia Law
Leag. of Untd. Latin Amer. Ctzn. v. City of Boerne, et al.
LULAC filed suit against the City alleging that the voting method adopted by the City Charter diluted minority voting strength, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973. The City and LULAC settled in December 1996, and the district court entered a consent decree in accordance with the parties' settlement. At issue on appeal was whether the district court properly granted a joint motion by the City and LULAC to modify temporarily the consent decree. Because the court concluded that the district court erred in approving the temporary modification without following the procedures mandated by an earlier panel, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Leag. of Untd. Latin Amer. Ctzn. v. City of Boerne, et al." on Justia Law
Angle, et al. v. Miller
The Nevada Constitution authorized the citizens of Nevada to enact statutes and amend the Nevada Constitution through the initiative process. To place an initiative on the ballot, proponents must obtain signatures from a number of registered voters equal to 10 percent of the votes cast in the previous general election. This signature requirement was also subject to a geographic distribution requirement known as the All Districts Rule. Plaintiffs sought an order declaring the All Districts Rule unconstitutional and enjoining the state from enforcing it. The court held that plaintiffs have not demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue on their claims that the All Districts Rule violated either the Equal Protection Clause or the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Angle, et al. v. Miller" on Justia Law
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm.
During the 1981 New Jersey gubernatorial election, the Democratic National Committee and others sued the Republican National Committee, and others, alleging that defendants targeted minority voters for intimidation, in violation of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1971, 1973, and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. RNC allegedly mailed sample ballots to individuals in precincts with a high percentage of minority registered voters and included individuals whose postcards were returned as undeliverable on a list of voters to challenge at the polls and enlisted off-duty officers to intimidate voters by standing at minority precinct polling places, wearing “National Ballot Security Task Force” armbands. Some allegedly wore visible firearms. In 1982, RNC and DNC entered into a consent decree, national in scope, limiting RNC's participation in voter fraud prevention without advance court approval. The decree was modified in 1987 and was the subject of enforcement actions in 2000, 2004, and 2008. The district court denied, in part, a motion to modify or vacate the decree, but made modifications. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that if RNC does not hope to engage in conduct that would violate the decree, it is puzzling that it would pursue vacatur so vigorously. despite significant modifications. View "Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm." on Justia Law
State ex inf. Hensley v. Young
Herschel Young was sworn in as presiding commissioner of Cass County in 2011. Teresa Hensley, the prosecuting attorney for the county, subsequently filed a quo warranto action in reliance upon Mo. Rev. Stat. 115.350, alleging that Young usurped the office of presiding commissioner because he was not qualified to be a candidate for elective public office due to a 1995 felony conviction. The circuit court granted Hensley's petition and ordered Young's ouster from office. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 115.350, as applied to Young, did not operate retrospectively in violation of the state constitution; (2) quo warranto was the appropriate remedy, and the petition was based on applicable law; and (3) section 115.350 does not violate the equal protection clause of the state constitution because it had a rational basis under the law. View "State ex inf. Hensley v. Young" on Justia Law
Hall v. Moreno
"Judicial redistricting is a truly 'unwelcome obligation.'" This case involved the redistricting of Colorado's congressional districts following the results of the 2010 census. The Supreme Court held that the district court adopted a lawful redistricting scheme in accordance with constitutional criteria, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in balancing the non-constitutional factors as set forth in C.R.S. 2-1-102 (2011). Furthermore, the Court held that the balancing was reasonable and supported by the evidence that was heard through the district court’s "thorough, inclusive and non-partisan proceedings." The Court affirmed the district court’s order that the secretary of state implement the adopted redistricting scheme in future congressional elections. View "Hall v. Moreno" on Justia Law
Large v. Freemont County
The issue on appeal to the Tenth circuit centered on what level of deference (if any) must be afforded to a local governmental entity's proffered plan to remedy an adjudged violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 1973), when that proposed remedy unnecessarily conflicted with state law. The Court surmised that when such plans in effectuating their remedial purposes do not adhere as closely as possible to the contours of the governing state law, they are not eligible for the deference customarily afforded legislative plans. Consequently in this case, the Court affirmed the district court's order that rejected the Fremont County Board of Commissioners' proposed remedial plan, and held under settled Supreme Court precedent that strongly favors single-member districts in court-ordered plans, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a remedial plan solely consisting of single-member districts.
View "Large v. Freemont County" on Justia Law
Maestas v. Hall
This issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the appointment of the New Mexico House of Representatives following the 2010 federal census. It was undisputed that the House was unconstitutionally apportioned. The Legislature then passed House Bill 39 to reapportion the House during a 2011 Special Session. The Governor vetoed the bill. Because lawmakers failed to create constitutionally-acceptable districts, the burden fell on the courts to draw a reapportionment map for the House. The Court appointed a retired district judge to oversee the judiciary's process. Petitioners filed petitions for a writ of superintending control to ask the Supreme Court to take jurisdiction over the case, and to reverse the district court to adopt an alternative plan or remand the case with instructions regarding the legal standard that should be applied. After reading the parties' briefs and listening to oral argument, the Court entered an order articulating the legal principles that should govern redistricting litigation in New Mexico and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.
View "Maestas v. Hall" on Justia Law