Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

During the November 2008 election season, parties Senate Majority Fund, LLC (SMF) and Colorado Leadership Fund (CLF) were registered with the I.R.S. as so-called "527" tax-exempt political organizations. In the run-up to the November 2008 election, SMF distributed eight printed political ads and one television ad and CLF distributed eight printed ads that were the subject of this dispute. None of the seventeen ads contained words or phrases that specifically directed the viewer to "vote for," "elect," "support," "vote against," "defeat," or "reject." Similarly, none of the ads included the phrase "[candidate] for [office]." The court of appeals affirmed dismissal of this case by an administrative law judge (ALJ) for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. At issue is the meaning of "expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate," as that phrase is used within the definition of "expenditure" in article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution, the Campaign and Political Finance provision. The parties contended that "express advocacy" encompassed only those advertisements that explicitly exhort the viewer, listener, or reader to vote for or against a candidate in an upcoming election. This included the use of so-called "magic words," as set forth in "Buckley v. Valeo," (424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976)), as well as substantially similar synonyms of those words. Appellant Colorado Ethics Watch (Ethics Watch) argued that the category of advertisements that "expressly advocate" is more expansive and encompasses any advertisement that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy. The court of appeals rejected Ethics Watch's argument and held that, given the settled definition of express advocacy at the time that article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution was adopted, the category of advertisements that constitute express advocacy was intentionally limited to include only those ads that use the magic words or those that explicitly advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate. After reviewing article XXVIII and the legal context in which it was adopted as a citizen's initiative in 2002 (known as Amendment 27), the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that "expenditure" was intentionally and narrowly defined in article XXVIII to include only "express advocacy," so that it covers only those communications that explicitly advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate in an upcoming election. The Court affirmed the appellate court and remanded the case to the court of appeals to return to the ALJ to enter judgment consistent with the Court's opinion. View "Colorado Ethics Watch v. Senate Majority Fund, LLC" on Justia Law

Two appeals arose out of a lawsuit filed against New Mexico state officials that sought declaratory and injunctive relief to redress alleged violations of New Mexico’s obligations under Sections 7 and 5 of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973gg et seq. The Section 7 claim was resolved on summary judgment, with the district court concluding that the Defendant officials responsible for overseeing New Mexico’s Human Services Department (HSD) violated the NVRA by failing to provide voter registration forms to those applicants for public assistance who left the Section 7-mandated declination form blank. The Section 5 claim, which alleged that New Mexico’s motor vehicle authority offices failed to provide necessary voter registration services, was resolved by written settlement agreement. Although two of the settling agencies reimbursed Plaintiffs for a portion of the attorneys' fees and expenses plaintiffs incurred in litigating the Section 5 claim, the New Mexico Secretary of State refused to contribute. Plaintiffs subsequently sought and were granted attorneys' fees and expenses related to the Section 5 claim against the Secretary of State. In Appeal No. 11-2063, Defendants appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the Section 7 claim. In Appeal No. 11-2084, the Secretary of State appealed the district court’s order granting Plaintiffs' application for attorneys' fees and expenses arising out of the Section 5 claim. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court in all respects. View "Valdez v. Duran" on Justia Law

This was an original action in which Relators, thirty-six electors living in various districts for the Ohio House of Representatives as reapportioned by the Ohio Apportionment Board on September 30, 2011, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against Respondents, the four republic members of the five-member Ohio Apportionment Board. Relators sought (1) a declaration that the apportionment plan adopted by the Board was invalid because the Board failed to comply with Ohio Const. art. XI, which governs the decennial apportionment of districts in the General Assembly and the Open Meetings Law, Ohio Rev. Code 121.22; and (2) a prohibitory injunction preventing those Board members from calling, holding, supervising, administering, or certifying any elections under their apportionment plan. The Supreme Court (1) dismissed Relators' open-meetings claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) denied Relators' Article XI claims based on laches insofar as they attempted to challenge the use of the apportionment plan for the 2012 election cycle; and (3) held that Relators' remaining Article XI claims were not barred by laches. The Court stated that it would issue a separate order for further briefing and oral argument on those claims. View "Wilson v. Kasich" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case arose from the November 8, 2011 election of Gabriela Mosquera to the fourth Legislative district of the General Assembly. Shelley Lovett, who received the next highest number of votes, challenged the election alleging that Mosquera was ineligible because she failed to meet the one-year durational residency requirement set forth in Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 2 of the New Jersey Constitution. Complicating the matter was the decision and accompanying order in "Robertson v. Bartels," (150 F. Supp.2d 691 (D.N.J. 2001)), wherein a federal trial court had concluded that the durational residency requirement of the State Constitution violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and had enjoined the New Jersey Attorney General and Secretary of State from enforcing the provision’s one-year durational residency requirement for eligibility for General Assembly office. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that The New Jersey Constitution's durational residency requirement for members of the General Assembly does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; this decision was not a new ruling and the Court therefore declined to limit its judgment to prospective application. Because Mosquera was the incumbent at the time of the vacancy, the Democratic Party, with which Mosquera was affiliated at the time of the election, could select an interim successor for the vacant seat. Further, in construing the vacancy-filling provisions the Court recognized that Mosquera would meet eligibility requirements for appointment as interim successor, if she were selected by her party. View "In re: Contest of November 8, 2011 General Election" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 26 (2012), arguing that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). Initiative Petition 26 would amend a number of statutory provisions pertaining to the commercial harvest and sale of fish caught in Oregon waters. As the Supreme Court noted in reviewing the ballot title for a different initiative petition concerning commercial fishing, those statutes "exist[ed] as part of a complex web of laws," including an interstate compact between Oregon and Washington, statutes and regulations of both states, federal law, treaties with Native American tribes, and various court orders. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the initiative's caption overstated the effect of the proposed measure by asserting that it would eliminate "non-tribal commercial fishing." Petitioners argued, and the Attorney General did not appear to disagree, that some commercial fishing -- of some species, in some Oregon waters, using some gear -- has occurred or was then occurring and that it would not be prohibited by Initiative Petition 26. Accordingly, the reference in the caption to the "elimination" of non-tribal commercial fishing needed to be changed. The caption also referred to only the Columbia River, thus understating the scope of the proposed measure, which would ban non-tribal commercial gillnetting of all fish in all Oregon "inland waters." That description, too, needed to be changed. The Court did not address petitioners' other challenges to the caption, and remanded the matter back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Girod v. Kroger" on Justia Law

Respondents, Legends Bank and John Klebba, filed a declaratory judgment action asserting that S.B. 844 (the Bill), which the Legislature passed in 2010, (1) violated the single subject requirement and original purpose requirement of the Missouri Constitution, and (2) violated the First Amendment insofar as it barred political action committees from receiving money from state chartered banks but allowed political action committees to receive money from other entities and individuals. The trial court sustained Respondents' motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding (1) procurement was the original controlling purpose of the Bill, (2) the Bill was enacted in violation of the single subject requirement of the state Constitution, and (3) the Bill violated the First Amendment. The court then voided S.B. 844 except for the procurement provisions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Bill violated Mo. Const. art III, 21, which prohibits changes in the original purpose of a bill, as (1) the original purpose of the Bill related to procurement, and (2) the vast majority of the provisions in the final version related to ethics and campaign finance, which were not germane to the original purpose of the Bill. View "Legends Bank v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in these consolidated appeals was the redistricting legislation adopted by the Legislature in 2011. Petitioners, several individuals and groups, challenged the constitutionality of H.B. 201, which was redistricting legislation regarding the House of Delegates, and S.B. 1006, which was redistricting legislation regarding the Senate. The constitutional challenges were before the Supreme Court as petitions for writs of prohibition and mandamus. The Court denied the requested writs, holding that the redistricting plans for the House of Delegates and the Senate were securely within the realm of constitutional mandates, as (1) in regards to H.B. 201, the constitution did not prohibit splitting counties or a plan containing multi-member delegate districts, the delegate residency dispersal requirement served a valid purpose, and no unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering occurred in this matter; and (2) S.B. 1006 did not violate the equality in population provisions of the state Constitution, did not unconstitutionally divide certain election precincts and cross county boundary lines, and did not violate the compactness requirement of the state Constitution insofar as it established certain senatorial districts. View "State ex rel. Cooper v. Tennant" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the Chief of Police Services for the City of San Clemente, sued defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after plaintiff was placed on administrative leave after he ran for, and lost, the election of Orange County Sheriff-Coroner. Plaintiff claimed that his placement on administrative leave and subsequent demotion were in unconstitutional retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. The district court concluded that plaintiff's campaign speech was not protected by the First Amendment because he fell into the narrow "policymaker" exception to the general rule against politically-motivated dismissals. Although the court determined that the district court erred in this conclusion, the court agreed that the district court's alternative holding that Michael Carona, the incumbent Orange County Sheriff who won the election at issue, was entitled to qualified immunity because a government official in his position "reasonably but mistakenly" could have believed that political loyalty was required by someone with plaintiff's job responsibilities at the time he ran against Carona. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hunt v. County of Orange, et al." on Justia Law

Having lost his bid for a Maine Senate seat, plaintiff sued Republican party leadership for defamation libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and publicly placing him in a false light. The complaint referred to flyers, brochures, and radio and TV ads days before the election that conjured up imaginary wrongs that he had supposedly done as a selectman for the town of Blue Hill, primarily concerning discontinuance of fireworks on the Fourth of July. The complaint referred to "actual malice." The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that false statements were made negligently, not with actual malice. Defamation law "does not require that combatants for public office act like war-time neutrals, treating everyone evenhandedly and always taking the high road. Quite the contrary. Provided that they do not act with actual malice, they can badmouth their opponents, hammering them with unfair and one-sided attacks" View "Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm." on Justia Law

In twelve separate matters, Commonwealth citizens, acting singly or in groups, filed appeals from the Final Plan for legislative redistricting of the Commonwealth, which was devised by Appellee 2011 Pennsylvania Legislative Reapportionment Commission (the "LRC"), in response to the U.S. decennial census. Fourteen days after the appeals were filed, seven days after the matters were briefed, and two days after the appeals were argued, the Supreme Court issued its mandate in a per curiam order filed January 25, 2012. That order declared that the Final Plan was contrary to law under Article II, Section 17(d) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and with the directive in that constitutional provision, the Court remanded the matter to the LRC to reapportion the Commonwealth in a manner consistent with this opinion. View "Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm'n" on Justia Law