Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

On December 9, 2021, the New York City Council passed a bill amending the New York City Charter to allow lawful permanent residents to vote in municipal elections. The bill became effective on January 9, 2022, as Local Law 11, after both outgoing Mayor Bill de Blasio and incoming Mayor Eric Adams neither signed nor vetoed it. Local Law 11 permitted certain noncitizens to vote in elections for New York City offices such as Mayor, Public Advocate, Comptroller, Borough President, and City Council Member.Plaintiffs, including current and former elected officials and New York City registered voters, filed a lawsuit against the New York City Council, Mayor Eric Adams, and the New York City Board of Elections. They sought to declare Local Law 11 null and void, arguing it violated the New York State Constitution, the New York State Election Law, and the Municipal Home Rule Law. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on all grounds, declaring Local Law 11 unconstitutional and enjoining its implementation. The Appellate Division modified the judgment regarding the Election Law claim but otherwise affirmed the decision, with one justice dissenting. The City Council and intervenors appealed to the Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals held that Article II, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution restricts voting to citizens, thus invalidating Local Law 11. The court found that the Constitution's language and historical context clearly limit the right to vote to U.S. citizens. The court rejected arguments that Article IX of the Constitution, which grants home rule powers to local governments, overrides this restriction. Consequently, the Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division's order and, as modified, affirmed the decision, maintaining the invalidation of Local Law 11. View "Fossella v Adams" on Justia Law

Chris Shamro sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Delaware County Board of Elections to place a zoning referendum on the May 6, 2025 primary-election ballot. The referendum concerned a zoning amendment for a property in Brown Township owned by Henmick Brewery, L.L.C. The board of elections decertified the referendum from the ballot, finding that the petition did not contain the correct name of the zoning amendment, had a misleading summary, and was accompanied by a misleading map.The board of elections held a protest hearing and voted to sustain the protest and decertify the referendum. Shamro filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the board of elections abused its discretion. The board of elections and Henmick argued that the petition failed to comply with statutory requirements, including providing an accurate summary of the zoning amendment and modifications approved by the board of trustees.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that the board of elections did not abuse its discretion or act in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions. The court concluded that the referendum petition’s summary was misleading because it did not include approved modifications to the zoning amendment. Therefore, the court denied the writ and Shamro’s request for attorney fees and expenses. View "State ex rel. Shamro v. Delaware County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Densil Porteous sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Franklin County Board of Elections to place his name on the May 5, 2025 primary-election ballot for Columbus City Council or to reconsider its decision at a public meeting. Porteous had submitted a nominating petition with approximately 332 signatures, but the board validated only 230, falling short of the required 250 signatures. Porteous requested reconsideration, claiming some signatures were wrongly invalidated and offered unsworn statements from signatories as proof.The board initially rejected Porteous's petition due to insufficient valid signatures. Porteous's subsequent requests for reconsideration were denied, and he was informed that the board's verification process was consistent with standards applied to all candidates. Porteous then sought a public hearing for reconsideration, which the board also denied.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that Porteous failed to demonstrate that the board abused its discretion or acted in clear disregard of the law. The court noted that the board has broad discretion to verify signatures and is not required to accept unsworn statements as proof of authenticity. The court also found no statutory requirement for the board to hold an evidentiary hearing to contest invalidated signatures. Additionally, the court determined that Porteous did not provide clear and convincing evidence that the board treated him differently from similarly situated individuals. Consequently, the court denied the writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Porteous v. Franklin County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Christopher Nardi submitted an APRA request to the Indiana Election Division for documents related to Indiana’s voter-registration system. He requested three specific documents: the latest standard operating procedures, build notes, and the latest contract with third-party vendors. The Division denied the requests, citing security concerns, but directed Nardi to an online portal for the contract, which he accessed but failed to save. Nardi then filed a complaint with Indiana’s Public Access Counselor (PAC), which recommended partial disclosure. The Division refused, leading Nardi to file a lawsuit in Marion Superior Court.The Marion Superior Court conducted an in-camera review and ordered the Division to provide a redacted version of the contract but denied the other requests. Nardi petitioned for attorney’s fees, claiming he substantially prevailed. The trial court awarded him one-third of the requested fees, reasoning he prevailed on one of three requests. Both parties appealed. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the partial summary judgment but reversed the fee award, concluding Nardi did not substantially prevail.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case, holding that Nardi substantially prevailed by obtaining a wrongfully withheld public record. The Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this determination. However, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s mechanical reduction of attorney’s fees to one-third. The case was remanded for the trial court to recalculate the fees, considering the time spent on the successful claim and whether the time spent on unsuccessful claims was indivisible from the successful claim. The Indiana Supreme Court emphasized that APRA should be liberally construed to promote transparency and accountability in government. View "Nardi v. King" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Arizona district court challenging the state's voting system, claiming it did not adequately protect voters' rights and should be replaced with a hand-counted paper ballot system. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Subsequently, the district court imposed sanctions on the plaintiffs' attorneys, including Alan Dershowitz, for filing a frivolous complaint.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint and granted the defendants' motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The district court found that the complaint contained false and misleading statements and ordered the plaintiffs' attorneys to pay a portion of the defendants' legal fees. Dershowitz, who signed the complaint as "of counsel," was held jointly and severally liable for a portion of the sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's holding that "of counsel" attorneys can be sanctioned under Rule 11 for signing frivolous complaints. The Ninth Circuit rejected Dershowitz's argument that the sanctions violated the First Amendment and found that the district court imposed sanctions to deter frivolous actions, not to silence speech. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the imposition of sanctions on Dershowitz, as the liability of "of counsel" attorneys under Rule 11 had not been clearly articulated in previous case law. The court declined to apply the rule retroactively but stated that it would apply to any signed pleadings after the publication of this opinion. View "Lake v. Gates" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Arizona district court challenging the state's electronic voting system, arguing it should be replaced with a system using exclusively hand-counted paper ballots. They also sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit the use of computerized equipment in elections. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of Article III standing, and the dismissal was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Lake v. Fontes. Subsequently, the district court granted the defendants' motion for sanctions against the plaintiffs' lead attorneys, Andrew J. Parker and Kurt Olsen, and their law firms, holding them liable for $122,200.00 in fees.The district court found that the lead attorneys made false, misleading, and unsupported factual assertions in their first amended complaint and motion for preliminary injunction, and did not conduct a reasonable pre-filing inquiry. Key false allegations included claims that Arizona does not use paper ballots and that its voting machines are not tested. The district court concluded that these misleading statements rendered the complaint factually insufficient and open to sanction. Additionally, the court found that the attorneys acted recklessly and in bad faith, particularly in the timing and nature of their motion for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's imposition of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees, as the lead attorneys' actions were both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry. The court also upheld the finding of bad faith, noting that the attorneys' behavior and timing in bringing the motion for a preliminary injunction were reckless. View "Lake v. Gates" on Justia Law

The incumbent candidate, Vern Gavin, lost the election to challenger Wanda Evers. Gavin filed a petition for judicial review in the Hinds County Circuit Court, claiming Evers was an unqualified elector due to her residency outside the district and citing several voting irregularities. The circuit court granted summary judgment on the election irregularities and dismissed the residency claim under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Gavin's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to his appeal.The Hinds County Circuit Court initially reviewed the case. Gavin challenged Evers's residency, noting her voting address was transferred outside the district and back within it, and she claimed a homestead exemption at a Jackson address. The Hinds County Executive Committee certified Evers as a candidate despite Gavin's challenge. Evers defeated Gavin in the runoff election. Gavin filed a contest of the election and a petition for judicial review, requesting a special election due to alleged irregularities and disputing Evers's residency qualification. The circuit court granted summary judgment on the election irregularities and dismissed the residency claim, finding Evers met the two-year residency requirement.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. The court affirmed the circuit court's rulings, finding no error. The court held that Gavin received proper notice of the summary judgment motion and that the circuit court did not err in considering both the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment. The court also upheld the exclusion of certain affidavits as hearsay and irrelevant. The court found that Gavin failed to present evidence of election irregularities affecting the outcome and that Evers met the residency requirement. The court also affirmed the denial of Gavin's motion for reconsideration, finding the new evidence presented was cumulative and for impeachment purposes only. View "Gavin v. Evers" on Justia Law

A voter in Sarasota County, Florida, who is not affiliated with any political party, challenged Florida's closed primary election system. He argued that the system forces him to either join a political party to have a meaningful vote or forfeit his right to vote in primary elections, which he claimed was unconstitutional. The district court dismissed his case, concluding that he lacked standing and failed to state a claim for relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the voter had standing to sue the Sarasota County Supervisor of Elections because his exclusion from primary elections was traceable to the Supervisor and could be redressed by a court order. However, the court determined that the voter lacked standing to sue the Florida Secretary of State, as the Secretary did not have direct control over the Supervisor's actions.On the merits, the court applied the Anderson-Burdick framework to evaluate the voter's First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court concluded that the burdens imposed by Florida's closed primary system on the voter's rights were minimal. The court found that the state's interests in preserving political parties as viable and identifiable interest groups and enhancing candidates' electioneering efforts outweighed the minimal burdens on the voter's rights.The court vacated the district court's order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the claims against the Florida Secretary of State without prejudice and to dismiss the claims against the Sarasota County Supervisor of Elections with prejudice. View "Polelle v. Florida Secretary of State" on Justia Law

In this case, the Governor of Minnesota issued a writ of special election on December 27, 2024, to fill a vacancy in the office of State Representative for District 40B in Ramsey County. The writ scheduled the special election for January 28, 2025. The Minnesota Voters Alliance, two voters from House District 40B, and the Republican Party of Minnesota challenged the writ, arguing it was issued prematurely.The Ramsey County District Court had previously ruled on December 20, 2024, in an election contest brought by Paul Wikstrom against Curtis Johnson, the elected representative for House District 40B. The court found that Johnson did not meet the residency requirement to serve as the district's representative. No appeal was filed against this decision. Johnson subsequently sent a letter to the Governor on December 27, 2024, stating he would not accept his seat and resigned effective immediately.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the writ of special election was issued prematurely. The court held that Minnesota Statutes section 204D.19, subdivision 4, which governs the timing of special elections following a successful election contest, required the writ to be issued 22 days after the start of the legislative session unless the house passed a resolution regarding the court's determination. The court found that Johnson's letter did not create a vacancy that allowed for the writ's issuance on December 27, 2024, as he was not an incumbent and could not resign from an office he did not hold.The Minnesota Supreme Court granted the petition, quashed the writ of special election, and ordered the cancellation of the special election scheduled for January 28, 2025. View "Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Walz" on Justia Law

Robin M. McNabb, a former Municipal Court Judge for Lenoir City, filed an election contest against Gregory H. Harrison, who won the election for the same position in 2022. McNabb argued that Harrison was ineligible to serve because he had not resided within the Lenoir City corporate limits for the year preceding the election, as required by Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution.The Chancery Court for Loudon County found that the term "district" in Article VI, Section 4 referred to the modern-day judicial district. Since Harrison resided in the Ninth Judicial District, the court ruled him eligible to serve. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision but modified the judgment, stating that "district" referred to Loudon County, not the Ninth Judicial District, because the Lenoir City Municipal Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Loudon County General Sessions Court.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower courts. It held that Article VI, Section 4 requires a candidate for a municipal judgeship to be a resident of the same municipality to which they will be assigned. Therefore, Harrison needed to reside in Lenoir City for one year prior to the election. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the Chancery Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "McNabb v. Harrison" on Justia Law