Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

A candidate, John Calvin Dove, Jr., submitted a certificate of candidacy to run for the Democratic Party nomination for the Maryland House of Delegates in Legislative District 12B for the 2026 gubernatorial election. Gary Simmons challenged Dove’s qualifications, asserting that Dove was not a resident and did not maintain a place of abode in Legislative District 12B at the time he filed his candidacy certificate. Simmons further alleged that Dove had misrepresented his residency on his voter registration and his certificate of candidacy, arguing that these actions rendered Dove ineligible and his candidacy certificate invalid.The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County scheduled a hearing on Simmons’s petition, but Dove moved to dismiss, arguing that the constitutional residency requirement only needed to be met six months before the general election, a date which had not yet arrived. The circuit court agreed with Dove, finding the challenge premature and dismissing Simmons’s petition with prejudice, without taking evidence on Dove’s residency or place of abode.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. The court held that Simmons’s petition was not premature as to his claims under the Election Law Article, which require that a candidate be lawfully registered to vote and reside in the legislative district at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. The court found that such a challenge is ripe for adjudication at the time of filing. The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing and a decision on the merits of Simmons’s challenge before set deadlines. The costs were assessed against Dove. View "Simmons v. Dove" on Justia Law

Several individuals and two organizations challenged a Missouri law enacted in 2022, House Bill No. 1878 (HB 1878), which amended the state’s voting requirements by mandating that voters present specific forms of photo identification or cast a provisional ballot under certain conditions. The organizations—the Missouri State Conference of the NAACP and the League of Women Voters of Missouri—along with the individuals, claimed that these provisions unconstitutionally burdened the right to vote and violated equal protection guarantees.Their petition for declaratory and injunctive relief was filed in the Circuit Court of Cole County. After a bench trial, the circuit court found that none of the individual plaintiffs had shown an actual or threatened injury, as each had either successfully voted since the law’s enactment or their alleged difficulties were speculative. The court also determined that the organizations had not established standing, either through a diversion of resources or by identifying any specific member adversely affected by the law. Despite these findings, the circuit court proceeded to rule on the merits, concluding the law was constitutional.The Supreme Court of Missouri, which has exclusive jurisdiction in cases involving the validity of state statutes, reviewed the matter. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s determination that the appellants lacked standing—meaning none of the plaintiffs demonstrated a concrete, personal stake in the outcome. The Supreme Court held that, because there was no justiciable controversy before the court, the circuit court erred by reaching and deciding the merits of the constitutional claims. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed that portion of the judgment addressing the merits of the constitutional challenge. The case was thus resolved solely on the issue of standing. View "Missouri State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People vs. State" on Justia Law

In 2022, Missouri enacted new legislation that imposed several restrictions on activities related to voter registration and absentee ballot applications. The law prohibited the payment or compensation of individuals for soliciting voter registration applications unless they were government employees, required anyone who solicited more than ten voter registration applications to register with the state, and mandated that solicitors be at least eighteen years old and registered Missouri voters. Additionally, the law completely banned the solicitation of voters to obtain absentee ballot applications. These provisions affected organizations whose work involves encouraging and assisting individuals in registering to vote and informing them about absentee voting.The Circuit Court of Cole County reviewed a lawsuit brought by two civic organizations challenging these provisions as unconstitutional. The organizations argued the restrictions violated rights to free speech, association, and due process under the Missouri Constitution. The court issued a preliminary injunction, and after trial, permanently enjoined enforcement of the provisions, finding them to be facially unconstitutional restrictions on core political speech, overbroad, content- and viewpoint-based, and unconstitutionally vague. The court concluded the state had not shown the provisions were narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the statutory provisions imposed facially unconstitutional restrictions on core political speech protected by article I, section 8 of the Missouri Constitution. The Court found the provisions neither served a compelling state interest nor were narrowly tailored, and instead captured substantial amounts of protected speech unrelated to any compelling interest. The judgment declaring the provisions unconstitutional was affirmed. View "State vs. League of Women Voters" on Justia Law

After the results of the 2020 United States census were certified to the governor of Missouri in August 2021, the Missouri General Assembly established new congressional districts in 2022, as required by the state constitution. In September 2025, the General Assembly passed House Bill 1 (“HB 1”), which repealed the 2022 congressional districts and established new ones, even though no new census had been certified. The governor signed HB 1 into law. A group of plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of HB 1, arguing that article III, section 45 of the Missouri Constitution restricts the General Assembly to one redistricting following each decennial census certification.The Circuit Court of Cole County heard the case on stipulated facts and rejected the plaintiffs’ claim, finding that HB 1 was a valid exercise of the General Assembly’s legislative authority. The circuit court declared that article III, section 45 does not prevent the General Assembly from redistricting more frequently than once per decade.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the constitutional question de novo. The Court held that article III, section 45 obligates the General Assembly to redistrict upon certification of the decennial census but does not expressly prohibit mid-decade or more frequent congressional redistricting. The Court explained that, absent express constitutional restraint, the General Assembly’s legislative power remains plenary. The Court also found that the word “when” in section 45 acts as a trigger for mandatory redistricting but does not serve as a limitation on the legislature’s authority to redistrict at other times.The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, upholding HB 1 as constitutional and concluding that article III, section 45 does not restrict the General Assembly’s power to conduct mid-decade congressional redistricting. View "Luther vs. Hoskins" on Justia Law

An individual submitted a written objection to a county board of elections, challenging a candidate’s petition to appear on the primary-election ballot for county commissioner. The objection claimed that one part-petition supporting the candidate’s declaration of candidacy contained elector signatures not properly witnessed by the circulator, as required by law. The individual provided a photograph as evidence and referenced relevant election statutes. The part-petition in question, however, accounted for only 17 signatures, and the candidate’s overall petition still contained more than the 50 valid signatures required for ballot qualification, regardless of the challenged signatures.After receiving the objection, the Clermont County Board of Elections did not schedule or conduct a protest hearing. At a special meeting, the board determined that the objection did not meet the statutory requirements for a valid protest under Ohio Revised Code sections 3501.39 and 3513.05. The board reasoned that even if all signatures on the challenged part-petition were invalidated, the candidate would still qualify for the ballot. The board informed the objector that a hearing was not warranted.The objector then filed a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Ohio, seeking to compel the board to hold a protest hearing. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the objector failed to establish a clear legal right to a mandatory hearing or a corresponding legal duty for the board because the protest, on its face, could not have resulted in the candidate’s removal from the ballot. The court further concluded that granting mandamus would compel a vain act. The court denied the writ of mandamus, denied the board’s request for sanctions, and granted the board’s motion for leave to file amended evidence. View "State ex rel. Hicks v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

A candidate seeking the Republican Party nomination for U.S. Representative from the Sixth Ohio Congressional District submitted a petition with signatures from several counties, including Stark and Carroll. The Stark County Board of Elections, after reviewing the signatures and receiving certified determinations from other relevant county boards, initially validated one additional signature beyond those accepted by the Carroll County Board, enabling the candidate to meet the minimum requirement for ballot access. A protest was filed arguing the board lacked authority to revisit other counties’ signature determinations and that not enough valid signatures existed. At a protest hearing, both parties presented evidence about specific disputed signatures.The Stark County Board of Elections held a hearing on the protest, as required by Ohio law. At this stage, the board considered evidence regarding the validity of disputed signatures, including some that had previously been declared invalid by the Carroll County Board. The board found three additional signatures valid (including two from Carroll County), bringing the total valid signatures above the threshold. The board accordingly denied the protest and certified the candidate for the primary ballot.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. The court held that while the Stark County Board could not, during the initial precertification review, override other counties’ signature determinations, the board did have authority during a formal protest hearing to consider evidence and make its own determinations regarding the validity of any signatures, including those from other counties. The court found that the board did not abuse its discretion or clearly disregard applicable law in denying the protest and certifying the candidate. The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the requested writ of prohibition. View "State ex rel. Spencer v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

An individual submitted a candidate filing form to appear on the ballot for Douglas County sheriff in the May 2026 primary election. Alongside his filing, he provided a letter from the director of the Nebraska Law Enforcement Training Center certifying that he possessed an “inactive” Nebraska law enforcement officer certificate. His certificate had been active from 1984 to 2009 but was inactive at the time of filing. The Douglas County Republican Party objected to his candidacy, arguing that Nebraska law required a candidate to hold an “active” certificate. The objection was supported by a memorandum and legislative materials suggesting legislative intent to require active certification.The Douglas County election commissioner reviewed the objection and determined that the candidate did not meet the requirements to run for sheriff, based on the inactive status of his law enforcement certificate. The candidate then filed an emergency application for special proceedings with the Nebraska Supreme Court, seeking to overturn the commissioner’s decision and compel his placement on the ballot. The Republican Party intervened, asserting that legislative history and statutory context supported the requirement of an active certificate.The Supreme Court of Nebraska heard the case as a special, summary proceeding under state election law. The court held that the relevant statute required only that a candidate “possess a law enforcement officer certificate,” and made no distinction between active and inactive status. The court found the statutory text to be unambiguous and declined to consider legislative history or administrative regulations. Accordingly, the court concluded that possession of an inactive certificate satisfied the statutory qualifications for candidacy. The judgment ordered that the candidate’s name appear on the ballot for the sheriff’s office. View "Martinez v. Jensen" on Justia Law

A candidate filed to run in the Democratic primary for city marshal in Okolona, Mississippi, listing an in-city address. His opponent contended that the candidate did not truly reside within the city limits for the two years required before the election. Evidence was presented suggesting the candidate held homestead exemptions outside the city and had not lived at the addresses he claimed. The candidate argued he met the residency requirement, providing some documentation and his own testimony. Additional testimony from a city official cast doubt on whether the candidate had actually lived at the in-city address before the qualifying deadline.The Okolona Democratic Executive Committee initially found the candidate qualified. The opponent then petitioned the Chickasaw County Circuit Court for review. A special judge presided and, after a hearing, found the candidate failed to prove two years’ residency in the city as required by law, giving weight to evidence of out-of-city homestead properties and the lack of credible proof of in-city residence. The judge disqualified the candidate from the primary ballot.The candidate appealed the disqualification order to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. Meanwhile, both the primary and general elections took place, and the candidate was not on either ballot. The candidate also attempted a post-primary challenge, but did not pursue an appeal in time. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the candidate’s appeal under the preprimary-qualification statute was moot since the elections had already occurred and the statute provides no remedy after the fact. The Court also found that substantial evidence supported the judge’s finding that the candidate did not meet the two-year residency requirement. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the lower court’s decision. View "Randle v. Ivy" on Justia Law

A group of petitioners proposed a constitutional amendment, designated as Ballot Issue 8 (BI-8), which would add a new section to the Montana Constitution. This amendment would explicitly recognize a fundamental right to initiative and referendum and set forth procedural protections to ensure the timely, impartial, and unburdened exercise of those rights. BI-8 also contains limits on governmental interference, including a prohibition on the use of government resources to support or oppose ballot measures. The Attorney General determined that BI-8 was legally insufficient, arguing it violated the Montana Constitution’s separate-vote requirement by effecting multiple, unrelated constitutional changes. The Attorney General also appended a fiscal statement to BI-8, based on speculative litigation costs, despite the fiscal note indicating zero fiscal impact.The Montana Attorney General’s legal-sufficiency determination was challenged in the Supreme Court of the State of Montana under its original jurisdiction. The main arguments centered on whether BI-8 improperly combined multiple unrelated constitutional subjects and whether the Attorney General had statutory authority to append a fiscal statement when the fiscal note showed no fiscal impact.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that BI-8 constituted a single constitutional amendment because its provisions were closely related and collectively served to define and protect the right to initiative and referendum. The Court explained that procedural protections and government-resource limitations were integral components of the proposed right, not separate constitutional subjects. The Court further held that the Attorney General lacked authority to append a fiscal statement since the fiscal note did not indicate a fiscal impact. As a result, the Court reversed the Attorney General’s determination, struck the fiscal statement, and ordered the Attorney General to prepare ballot statements for submission to the Secretary of State. View "Kendrick v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

A candidate for town council in South Windsor challenged the town clerk’s decision regarding the application of newly approved charter revisions following the November 2025 municipal election. The charter revisions, approved by referendum on election day, reduced the maximum number of town council members from any one party from six to five. During the election, six Democratic candidates received more votes than any Republican candidate. The plaintiff, a Democrat, received the sixth highest total among his party’s candidates. After the election, the town clerk determined that the newly approved “bare majority” rule applied immediately, which resulted in a Republican candidate, who received fewer votes, being seated instead of the plaintiff.The plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Hartford, claiming he was aggrieved by the town clerk’s application of the charter revisions to the 2025 election results. He argued that this constituted a ruling of an election official under Connecticut General Statutes §§ 9-328 and 9-371b. The trial court dismissed the case, holding that the town clerk’s actions did not constitute a “ruling of an election official” as required by the statutes, reasoning that the clerk was merely applying the law after votes were tallied.On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed whether the town clerk’s decision constituted a ruling of an election official for purposes of expedited judicial review under the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court held that the town clerk’s decision to apply the new charter revisions in determining the outcome of the election was indeed a ruling of an election official. The court concluded that this action involved interpreting and applying legal requirements central to the election process. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Amadasun v. Armstrong" on Justia Law