Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arises from the denial of a motion for a default judgment. End Citizens United (“ECU”) sued the Federal Election Commission alleging the Commission unlawfully dismissed its administrative complaint. Although the Commission failed to enter an appearance or otherwise defend the lawsuit, the district court denied ECU’s motion based on the Commission’s after-the-fact explanation for its dismissal. The issue on appeal is whether the district court erred by relying on the non-contemporaneous explanation in light of well-established circuit precedent requiring the Commission to provide a timely explanation of its reason for dismissing an administrative complaint.   The DC Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case to it with instructions to return the case to the Commission. The court explained that here the Commission has not defended its decision in court, much less the reasoning in the Dickerson/Cooksey statement. Moreover, the Commission’s composition has apparently changed since its dismissal of ECU’s administrative complaint so that different “agency personnel” would consider the matter on remand. In any event, the Supreme Court has contemplated that “a reviewing court . . . will set aside” Commission action taken contrary to law and “remand the case,” even though the Commission might later “reach the same result exercising its discretionary powers lawfully.” View "End Citizens United PAC v. FEC" on Justia Law

Petitioner Bob Hickingbottom filed a Qualifying Statement of Intent, declaring his candidacy to be the Democratic Party’s nominee for governor. On February 10, 2023, Jim Newman sent a letter to the Democratic Party Executive Committee (DEC) to challenge Hickingbottom’s qualifications as a candidate. Specifically, Newman’s letter claimed that when running on the Constitution Party ticket in the 2019 gubernatorial election, Hickingbottom failed to file a statement of organization in violation of Mississippi Code Section 23-15-803 (Rev. 2018) and a statement of economic interest in violation of Mississippi Code Section 25-4-25 (Rev. 2018). On February 13, 2023, Tyree Irving, the chairman of the DEC, emailed Hickingbottom to notify him of Newman’s letter and to inform him that a hearing via Zoom would be conducted on February 14, 2023, to address Newman’s challenges. Then on February 14, 2023, the hearing was rescheduled to February 16, 2023, “to consider the challenges to the qualifications of several of the candidates running.” Hickingbottom was present and was given an opportunity to be heard by the DEC and to rebut Newman’s challenges to his qualifications. On February 17, 2023, Andre Wagner, the executive director of the DEC, emailed Hickingbottom to notify him that the DEC had voted and decided not to certify Hickingbottom because “[s]adly, [he] did not meet the statutory requirements[.]” Counsel for Hickingbottom sent a letter to the DEC seeking reconsideration of its decision, or in the alternative, a hearing on the disqualification. Hickingbottom ultimately filed suit in court seeking to overturn the disqualification. The court ultimately ruled in Hickingbottom's favor, ordering he be placed on the ballot. The DEC appealed. The issue before the Mississippi Supreme Court in this case was whether Hickingbottom's petition for judicial review was time barred. The Court found that because the petition for review was filed pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 23-15-961 (Rev. 2018)—which provided the exclusive procedure for such an appeal—Hickingbottom’s petition for judicial review was untimely filed and, therefore, his petition for judicial review was time barred. View "Mississippi State Democratic Party v. Hickingbottom" on Justia Law

In 1992, Voting Rights Act (52 U.S.C. 10301) Section 2 litigation challenging Alabama’s districting map resulted in Alabama’s first majority-black district and its first black Representative since 1877. Alabama’s congressional map has remained similar since then. Following the 2020 census, the state enacted a new districting map (HB1), which produced only one district in which black voters constituted a majority.The Supreme Court affirmed a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the use of HB 1.Section 2 provides that the right to vote “shall not be denied or abridged ... on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” A 1982 amendment incorporated an effects test and a disclaimer that “nothing” in Section 2 “establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.” The Supreme Court subsequently employed the “Gingles framework,” under which Section 2 plaintiffs must satisfy three preconditions and then show that, under the “totality of circumstances,” the challenged process is not “equally open” to minority voters.The district court correctly found that black voters could constitute a majority in a second district that was “reasonably configured” and that there was no serious dispute that Black voters are politically cohesive, nor that the challenged districts’ white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat Black voters’ preferred candidate. The court’s findings that “Black Alabamians enjoy virtually zero success in statewide elections” and concerning “Alabama’s extensive history of repugnant racial and voting-related discrimination” were unchallenged.The Court rejected Alabama’s arguments that a state’s map cannot abridge a person’s right to vote “on account of race” if the map resembles a sufficient number of race-neutral alternatives and that the plaintiffs must prove discriminatory intent. Section 2, as applied to redistricting, is not unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment. View "Allen v. Milligan" on Justia Law

Several current or former members of the North Dakota Legislative Assembly and a legislative aide petitioned for writ of mandamus, seeking relief from orders of the district court directing them to comply with subpoenas for documents or testimony in a civil case brought against the State of North Dakota.   The Eighth Circuit denied the writ and directed the district court to quash the subpoenas for petitioner Devlin to testify and for petitioners Holmberg, Wardner, Poolman, Nathe, Devlin, and Ness to produce documents and other information. The court concluded that the district court’s conclusion to the contrary was based on a mistaken conception of the legislative privilege. In its order enforcing the document subpoenas, the district court reasoned that legislative privilege did not apply because the subpoena sought communications between legislators and third parties. The legislative privilege, however, is not limited to a bar on the inquiry into communications among legislators or between legislators and their aides. The privilege is not designed merely to protect the confidentiality of deliberations within a legislative body; it protects the functioning of the legislature more broadly. Communications with constituents, advocacy groups, and others outside the legislature are a legitimate aspect of legislative activity. The use of compulsory evidentiary processes against legislators and their aides to gather evidence about this legislative activity is thus barred by the legislative privilege. View "In Re: North Dakota Legislative Assembly v." on Justia Law

Ja’nekia Barton sought to disqualify Jennifer Adams-Williams as a candidate for county prosecutor in Bolivar County, Mississippi, for failing to meet the two-year residency requirement set forth by Mississippi Code Section 23-15-300 (Supp. 2022). The Bolivar County Circuit Court denied Barton’s petition, finding that Adams-Williams was clearly a resident of Bolivar County and had been for the required two-year residency period. Finding that the trial court applied the proper legal standard in its analysis and did not manifestly err in its factual findings, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "Barton v. Adams-Williams" on Justia Law

In January 2023, Joel Garner received a letter from the Perry County, Mississippi Election Commission, co-signed by the lone member of the Perry County Republican Executive Committee. The letter notified him that he did not meet the two-year residency requirement to run in the upcoming Republican primary for Perry County Supervisor, District 2. Garner petitioned for judicial review with the Perry County Circuit Court. The Mississippi Supreme Court appointed a special trial judge, who tried the qualification question de novo. After two days of evidentiary hearings, the circuit judge made thorough findings of fact and conclusions of law. The judge ordered that Garner’s name be placed on the primary election ballot. Garner’s opponent, District 2 Supervisor Kevin Shows, and the Perry County Republican Executive Committee (collectively, the Executive Committee) appealed that decision. Because substantial evidence supported the trial judge’s conclusion that Garner changed his residency in January 2021—more than two years before the District 2 Supervisor election—the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment directing that Garner’s name be placed on the ballot for the Republican primary to be held August 8, 2023. View "Shows, et al. v. Garner" on Justia Law

In this action arising from an initiative petition proposing a constitutional amendment entitled "The Right to Reproductive Freedom with Protections for Health and Safety" the Supreme Court held that Relators, registered Ohio voters, were not entitled to a writ of mandamus.The Ohio Ballot Board and its members determined that the initiative petition proposed a single constitutional amendment to the Ohio Constitution that would protect an individual's "right to make and carry out one's own reproductive decisions." Relators commenced this action ordering the Board to issue a determination that the petition contained more than one amendment. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the ballot board did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law in determining that petition at issue contained a single constitutional amendment. View "State ex rel. DeBlase v. Ohio Ballot Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dan Hynes appealed two superior court orders granting in part the motion to dismiss filed by defendants the New Hampshire Democratic Party (NHDP) and Raymond Buckley, and granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff was a New Hampshire attorney. In 2009, plaintiff was convicted of theft by extortion, which was later annulled. As a result of the conviction, plaintiff was temporarily suspended from the practice of law, but not disbarred. In 2018, plaintiff was “the Republican nominee for New Hampshire State Senate District 9.” During the course of plaintiff’s campaign, defendants “contracted with Bridge Communications to prepare mail pieces for certain state senate candidates,” including plaintiff’s opponent for the state senate seat. With the aid of an NHDP staffer, Bridge prepared a political message that was distributed by mail which mentioned plaintiff's extortion conviction, but also held that he was disbarred. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against defendants based on the content of the mailer, claiming that the statements there constituted: (1) defamation per se; (2) defamation per quod; (3) libel; (4) invasion of privacy — false light; and (5) violation of RSA 651:5 (2016). Defendants moved to dismiss, asserting, inter alia, that the statements were “true or substantially true” and were not made “with knowledge of [their] falsity or with reckless disregard of the truth.” Defendants further argued that RSA 651:5 did not create a private right of action and that plaintiff failed to state a claim for invasion of privacy. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in part, dismissing the defamation and libel claims as they related to the statement that plaintiff had been convicted of theft by extortion, and dismissed counts four and five, determining that plaintiff failed to state a claim for false light, and that RSA 651:5 did not create a civil cause of action. It did not, however, dismiss the defamation and libel claims as they related to the statement over plaintiff's disbarrment, finding that whether the statement was substantially true was a question for the jury. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. The flyer did not refer to plaintiff's annulled conviction, nor did it accurately convey he was not disbarred from the practice of law. The Court concluded the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the issues resolved by summary judgment. View "Hynes v. New Hampshire Democratic Party, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals concluding that Minnesota Rule 8210.2450, subparts 2 and 3 (the rule) does not conflict with Minn. Stat. 203B.121 (the statute) and that the challenged rule was therefore invalid, holding that subpart 3 of the rule conflicted with subdivision 2(b)(3) of the statute.Appellants brought this declaratory judgment action seeking a prospective declaration that the administrative rule, which governed the acceptance of absentee ballots, was invalid because the rule subparts conflicted with the statute by infringing on discretion the legislature gave to ballot board members. The court of appeals determined that there was no conflict between the rule and the statute. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Minn. R. 8210.2450, sub. 3, which authorized any ballot board member to review signatures in the event of an identification number mismatch, was invalid to the extent that the rule conflicted with Minn. Stat. 203B.121, subd.2(b)(3), which required that election judges conduct that review; and (2) the other challenged parts of the rule did not conflict with the statute. View "Minn. Voters Alliance v. Office of Minn. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that an unconstitutional provision in a proposed charter amendment was not severable, holding that the provision was not severable from the remainder of the proposed charter amendment.On August 8, 2022, the Bloomington City Council voted to reject the entirety of a proposed charter amendment based on its conclusion that the last of the proposed amendment's four sections, section 4.08, was manifestly unconstitutional. Appellants filed a petition seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to sever section 4.08 and submit the remaining valid provisions to voters. The district court denied the petition, concluding that it would be improper to sever section 4.08 from the remainder of the proposed charter amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 4.08 could not properly be severed from the proposed city-charter amendment. View "Kranz v. City of Bloomington" on Justia Law