Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Raji Rab contended that by allowing Los Angeles County workers to scan vote by mail ballots into the Voting Solutions for All People (VSAP) system (the computer hardware and software system used to capture and count votes in Los Angeles County) beginning 10 days before the March 2020 primary election, Dean Logan, the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk violated California Elections Code section 15101 (b)’s, prohibition on accessing and releasing a vote count prior to 8 p.m. on the day of an election. Rab alleged respondents the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors and its members (with Logan, the County) and the California Secretary of State, failed in their oversight of Logan, and, therefore, failed to protect the election process and aided and abetted in Logan’s alleged misconduct. Rab brought a petition for writ of mandate, seeking a manual recount of ballots from the March 2020 primary election, and claiming this matter was one “of [the] greatest public interest.” The trial court denied his petition. Specifically, in denying the petition, the trial court wrote, “[t]he Court interprets ‘machine reading’ to include, and thus to permit, scanning ballots. To leave no room for confusion in the future, the Court reiterates: Elections Code section 15101(b) allows the County to start scanning ballots on the 10th business day before the election.” Rab appealed, arguing the trial court misinterpreted Elections Code section 15101(b). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Rab v. Weber" on Justia Law

On November 3, 2020, the voters of San Bernardino County passed Measure K, amending the county charter so as to: (1) limit a supervisor to a single four-year term; and (2) limit a supervisor’s compensation to $5,000 a month. At the same time, the voters also elected three new supervisors. The trial court ruled that the one-term limit was unconstitutional, but that the compensation limit was constitutional. The court ruled that because Measure K was not severable, it, too, had to be struck down. Finally, it ruled that Measure K did not apply to the new supervisors (although it acknowledged that the issue was moot, in light of its other rulings). Nadia Renner, proponent of Measure K, appealed.The San Bernardino County Board of Suprervisors (Board) cross-appealed, contending: (1) Supervisors’ compensation could not be set by initiative; (2) the compensation limit violated minimum wage laws; alternatively, if it effectively forced supervisors to work part-time, it impaired governmental functions; and (3) the compensation limit improperly acted as a referendum on San Bernardino County Code section 13.0614. After determining the trial court’s ruling was appealable, the Court of Appeal concluded the one-term limit was constitutional. Further, the Court held that the supervisors’ compensation could be set by initiative, and the Board did not show the limit violated minimum wage laws. The Board also did not show the limit conflicted with section 13.0614. “Even assuming that it does, the voters can amend or abrogate an ordinance not only by referendum, but also by initiative.” Because the Court held the one-term and compensation limits were valid, the Court did not reach the issue of whether Measure K was severable. The Court was split as to whether Measure K applied to new supervisors: the term limit applied, but the compensation limit did not. View "San Bernardino County Bd. of Supervisors v. Monell" on Justia Law

In this case involving the proposed redevelopment of the Redondo Beach waterfront, the Second Appellate District reversed its previous order awarding attorney's fees to Defendant. After the court initially awarded attorney's feed to Defendant, Plaintiff appealed to the California Supreme Court, which held that a Defendant is only entitled to attorney's fees if the plaintiff brought or maintained an action without foundation.Revisiting the issue, the Second Appellate District reversed its previous decision in light of the Supreme Court's holding. Plaintiffs' claims "marshaled a foundation for their suit" sufficient to avoid paying attorney's fees. View "Travis v. Brand" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division concluding that the underlying challenge to Local Law No. 9-2014 was not time barred by either a four-month or a six-year statute of limitations, holding that there was no error.Local Law No. 9-2014 was adopted by the Town Board of the Town of Clarkstown in 2014 and purportedly set an eight-year term limit for all Clarkstown elected officials and required a supermajority vote of the Town Board to repeal. Appellees brought this action seeking a determination that the law was invalid because it was not subjected to a referendum of the Town's voters. Appellants filed a motion to dismiss based on statute of limitations grounds. The appellate division declined to dismiss the actions. The Court of Appeals affirmed in each case, holding that, under the circumstances, the actions were not time barred. View "Hoehmann v. Town of Clarkstown" on Justia Law

Heritage Action for America appeals the denial of its post-judgment motion to intervene as of right, in Campaign Legal Center’s challenge to the Federal Election Commission’s failure to act on its administrative complaint. The district court found the motion was untimely because prior to judgment, it became clear Heritage Action’s interests would not be protected and delay in considering the complaint would prejudice Campaign Legal to the detriment of Congress’ enforcement scheme.   The DC Circuit affirmed the denial of intervention and dismissed the merits appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court explained that Heritage Action had not yet received the Commission’s response to a Freedom of Information Act request filed 41 months after the administrative complaint, but the record supports the district court’s findings upon applying the test in Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center, 142 S. Ct. 1002, 1012 (2022). Further, Heritage Action was not a party to the default judgment in Campaign Legal’s lawsuit against the Commission and would not be prevented from arguing that Section 30109(a)(8)(C)’s prerequisites have not been met. View "Campaign Legal Center v. FEC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court ruling that a bylaw adopted by the Uinta County Republican Party governed who could vote in its 2021 officer and state committee-person election, holding that the voting procedure used in the election and the Party's bylaw violated the clear and unambiguous language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 22-4-105.In making its decision, the district court ruled that the bylaw did not violate the relevant provision of the Wyoming Election Code, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 22-4-105, and that the Party's constitutional right to freedom of association would be unduly burdened if it was prohibited from adopting and utilizing the bylaw. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that the Party acted within its statutory authority by enacting the bylaw and using it for the 2021 election; and (2) the issue of whether section 22-4-15 infringed on the Party's constitutional right to freedom of political association was not properly before the Court. View "Conrad v. Uinta County Republican Party" on Justia Law

After the Texas Legislature amended the Election Code in 2021, the United States and others sued, alleging the changes were racially discriminatory. When Plaintiffs sought discovery from individual, nonparty state legislators, those legislators withheld some documents, citing legislative privilege. The district court largely rejected the legislators’ privilege claims, and they filed this interlocutory appeal.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court explained that for their part, the legislators rely on the privilege for each of the disputed documents. Plaintiffs, too, do not argue that the documents are non-legislative. Instead, they argue only that the privilege either “was waived” or “must yield.” The court wrote that the legislators did not waive the legislative privilege when they “communicated with parties outside the legislature, such as party leaders and lobbyists.” The district court’s contrary holding flouts the rule that the privilege covers “legislators’ actions in the proposal, formulation, and passage of legislation.” Finally, the court reasoned that Plaintiffs’ reliance on Jefferson Community Health Care Centers, Inc. v. Jefferson Parish Government is misplaced. That decision stated that “while the common-law legislative immunity for state legislators is absolute, the legislative privilege for state lawmakers is, at best, one which is qualified.” But that case provides no support for the idea that state legislators can be compelled to produce documents concerning the legislative process and a legislator’s subjective thoughts and motives. View "LULAC Texas v. Hughes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court declined to address the merits of these appeals challenging the Attorney General's (AG) decision denying Plaintiffs' initiative petition that would have instituted limits on contributions to independent expenditure political action committees, holding that the appeals were moot.The AG determined that the proposed law conflicted with the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights' right of free speech and, therefore, addressed an excluded subject under article 48. Ultimately, the AG concluded that the proposed limitation on campaign contributions was precluded under United States Supreme Court precedent. Plaintiffs appealed. Thereafter, the AG offered to agree to a stipulated order, but Plaintiffs refused to agree with the order. Before the Supreme Judicial Court, the AG argued that the appeals were moot because Plaintiffs did not gather the first round of signatures set forth in article 48. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the cases as moot, holding that Plaintiffs failed to meet the deadline to file additional signatures with the Secretary of the Commonwealth. View "Herrmann v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the challenges to the victim's rights amendment termed "Marsy's Law" that was brought by Wisconsin Justice Initiative, Inc. and several citizens (WJI) failed and that the amendment was validly ratified and properly part of the Wisconsin Constitution.In April 2020, the people of Wisconsin ratified Marsy's Law. In this action, WJI argued that the ballot question for Marsy's Law that was submitted to Wisconsin voters violated Wis. Const. art. XII, 1 because it misled voters by neglecting the amendment's impact on the rights of criminal defendants. The circuit court granted declaratory judgment for WJI, concluding that the ballot question failed to meet requirements as to content and form. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Mary's Law was validly submitted to and ratified by voters, as required by the constitution. View "Wis. Justice Initiative, Inc. v. Wis. Elections Comm'n" on Justia Law

Kia Jones filed a letter of intent with the Mississippi Democratic Party to seek that party’s nomination for a seat in the Mississippi House of Representatives for District 64 on February 1, 2023. Shanda Yates filed a residency challenge to determine whether Jones qualified to seek office. Because Jones did not reside in the district for two years, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision disqualifying her. View "Jones v. Yates" on Justia Law