Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Alaska’s United States Representative Don Young died unexpectedly in March 2022. Following his death, Alaska held a special primary election and a special general election to select a candidate to complete the remainder of his term. Those special elections were conducted using ranked-choice voting procedures adopted by voters through a 2020 ballot measure. After the 2022 special primary election but before the vote was certified, the candidate who then had the third-most votes withdrew. The Division of Elections (Division) determined that it would remove the withdrawn candidate’s name from the special general election ballot, but would not include on the ballot the candidate who had received the fifth-most votes in the special primary election. Several voters brought suit against the Division challenging that decision. The superior court determined the Division’s actions complied with the law and granted summary judgment in favor of the Division. The voters appealed. Due to the time-sensitive nature of election appeals, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court in a short order dated June 25, 2022. The Court explained that because the Division properly applied a statutorily mandated 64-day time limit that prevented the addition of the special primary’s fifth-place candidate to the special general election ballot, and because the statutory mandate did not violate the voters’ constitutional rights, summary judgment was affirmed in favor of the Division. View "Guerin, et al. v. Alaska, Division of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that partisan gerrymandering claims present a political question that is nonjusticiable under the North Carolina Constitution, thus overruling the Court's decision in Harper I and affirming the court of appeals' decision dismissing all of Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice.Plaintiffs brought an action alleging that legislative and congressional redistricting plans drawn by the General Assembly in 2021 and then on remand in 2022 are partisan gerrymanders in violation of specific provisions of the North Carolina Constitution. On rehearing, the Supreme Court held (1) this Court's previous holding in Harper v. Hall, 868 S.E.2d 499, 551 (N.C. 2022) that partisan gerrymandering presents a justiciable claim is overruled, and this Court's opinion in Harper v. Hall, 881 S.E.2d 156, 162 (N.C. 2022) is withdrawn and superseded by this opinion; and (2) the court of appeals correctly concluded that partisan gerrymandering claims present nonjusticiable, political questions and dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. View "Harper v. Hall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that S.B. 824 violates N.C. Const. art. I, 19 and permanently enjoining that law, holding that S.B. 824 does not violate the protections set forth in Article I, Section 19.Pursuant to S.B. 824, registered voters are required to present one of several acceptable forms of identification prior to casting a ballot and require the State to provide free voters identification cards to any registered voter. At issue was whether North Carolina's photo identification statute is constitutional. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin implementation and enforcement of S.B. 824. The trial court denied the injunction. The court of appeals reversed, holding that S.B. 824 violates Article I, Section 19 because it was enacted with discriminatory intent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that S.B. 824 was enacted with discriminatory intent or actually produces a "meaningful disparate impact along racial lines." View "Holmes v. Moore" on Justia Law

This appeal involves four recently enacted provisions of Florida’s election law, including provisions that regulate ballot drop boxes, the solicitation of voters at the polls, and the delivery of voter registration forms by third-party voter registration organizations. Several plaintiff organizations sued the Florida Secretary of State, the Florida Attorney General, and several Supervisors of Elections. The district court enjoined three provisions because it found they were adopted with the intent to discriminate against black voters in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as well as section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. And it imposed a preclearance requirement under section 3(c) of the Act. The district court also ruled that the solicitation provision was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Finally, it enjoined a provision that required third-party voter registration organizations to provide a disclaimer to voters who use their services to register to vote, but all parties agree that any appeal of the judgment as to that provision has been rendered moot by the repeal of the provision.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court reversed the judgment that the drop-box, solicitation, and registration-delivery provisions violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Further, the court reversed the imposition of a preclearance requirement. The court affirmed the judgment declaring unconstitutionally vague the second phrase in the solicitation provision’s challenged clause, but the court reversed the judgment invalidating the first phrase in the clause. Finally, the court vacated the judgment finding the registration-disclaimer provision unconstitutional. View "League of Women Voters of Florida Inc., et al. v. Florida Secretary of State, et al." on Justia Law

In early 2022, while Washington Governor Jay Inslee’s COVID-19 related mask mandate remained binding throughout the state, three of five Richland School District board (RSDB) members voted to make face coverings optional in Richland schools. This vote conflicted directly with the then effective statewide masking requirement. Two months later, a group of Richland voters filed petitions to recall those three RSDB members. The petitioners alleged that the three RSDB members violated the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971 (OPMA), chapter 42.30 RCW, and knowingly violated state law in different ways when they voted to lift the mask mandate from the Richland schools. The trial court agreed that many of the counts containing those allegations were factually and legally sufficient to be placed on the ballot for the voters to decide. The Washington Supreme Court agreed with most of the trial court’s decisions. The Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to uphold the counts that the trial court grouped into synopses 1, 3, and 5: petitioners sufficiently alleged that the RSDB members knowingly violated both the OPMA and the statewide mask mandate. But the Court reversed the trial court’s decision to uphold the counts that the trial court grouped into synopsis 4: the aspirational, nonbinding, RSDB “Code of Ethics” could not form the legal basis for a recall charge. View "In re Recall of Bird, et al." on Justia Law

independent-expenditure political action committees (super PACs) do not give money directly to candidates, party committees, or ballot-initiative movements. They spend money themselves to advocate for or against candidates, parties, or initiatives. The Fund wants to operate as an Indiana independent-expenditure PAC but fears that the state’s Election Code does not allow it to accept unlimited donations from corporations, in violation of the First Amendment. Indiana’s election officials say they do not believe their laws could be enforced that way.Indiana’s campaign finance laws allow corporations to make contributions "to aid in the election or defeat of a candidate or the success or defeat of a political party or a public question.” Section 4 imposes limits on direct corporate contributions to candidates and party committees but imposes no cap on contributions to committees unaffiliated with a political party, such as PACs. Section 5 ensures that corporations cannot use PACs as a loophole to avoid contribution caps by requiring corporations to designate their contributions to PACs “for disbursement to a specific candidate or committee listed under section 4.” Section 5 does not address how or whether a corporation could earmark a contribution for a PAC's independent expenditure for or against a candidate or party.The Seventh Circuit certified to the Indiana Supreme Court Does the Indiana Election Code—in particular, sections 3-9-2-3 to -6—prohibit or otherwise limit corporate contributions to PACs or other entities that engage in independent campaign-related expenditures? View "Indiana Right to Life Victory Fund v. Morales" on Justia Law

Greater Birmingham Ministries (“GBM”), an Alabamian non-profit organization dedicated to aiding low-income individuals, and several Alabamian felons (collectively “Appellants”) appealed the district court’s summary judgment denying their Equal Protection Clause challenge to Amendment 579 of the Alabama state constitution, their Ex Post Facto Clause, challenge to Amendment 579’s disenfranchisement provisions, and their National Voting Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”), challenge to the format of Alabama’s mail voting registration form.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that (1) Amendment 579 successfully dissipated any taint from the racially discriminatory motives behind the 1901 Alabama constitution; (2) Amendment 579 does not impose punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause; and (3) Alabama’s mail voting registration form complies with the NVRA. The court wrote that it rejects Appellants’ invitation to review the extent the Alabama legislature debated the “moral turpitude” language of Amendment 579. Further, the court explained that Section 20508(b)(2)(A) is a notice statute enacted for the convenience of voting registrants. Alabama’s mail-in voting form has provided sufficient notice by informing registrants that persons convicted of disqualifying felonies are not eligible to vote and providing an easily accessible link whereby voters convicted of felonies can determine their voter eligibility. Accordingly, Alabama has complied with the requirements of Section 20508(b)(2)(A). View "Treva Thompson, et al. v. Secretary of State for the State of Alabama, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court ruling that one of two proposed amendments to the City of Houston's charter approved by voters restricted the effectiveness of the other ballot measure, holding that on amendment included a "primary clause" that was void because it conflicted with state law.One of the amendments at the issue was submitted at the behest of the City Council, and the other was initiated by local citizens. The election ordinance included a "primacy clause" providing that the Council's proposition would prevail over the citizen-initiated proposition if voters approved the Council’s proposition by more votes than the citizens’ proposed amendment. The voters approved both amendments. The City brought suit, arguing that the second amendment did not become effective upon its adoption due to the primacy clause. Relying on the primacy clause, the trial court granted summary judgment for the City. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) the primacy conflicts with state law requiring that a city must adopt a charter amendment upon its approval by a majority vote; and (2) therefore, the City may not rely on the primacy clause to avoid complying with the citizen-initiated proposition. View "Hotze v. Turner" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Secretary of the Commonwealth decertified certain voting equipment that Fulton County acquired from Dominion Voting Systems, Inc. (“Dominion”) in 2019 and used in the 2020 general election. The Secretary decertified the voting equipment after learning that, following the 2020 election, Fulton County had allowed Wake Technology Services, Inc. (“Wake TSI”), to perform a probing inspection of that equipment as well as the software and data contained therein. The Secretary maintained that Wake TSI’s inspection had compromised the integrity of the equipment. Fulton County and the other named Petitioner-Appellees petitioned in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction to challenge the Secretary’s decertification authority generally and as applied in this case. During the pleading stage, the Secretary learned that Fulton County intended to allow another entity, Envoy Sage, LLC, to inspect the allegedly compromised equipment. The Secretary sought a protective order from the Commonwealth Court barring that inspection and any other third-party inspection during the litigation. The court denied relief. The Secretary appealed that ruling to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which entered a temporary order on January 27, 2022, to prevent the inspection and to preserve the status quo during the Court's review of the Secretary’s appeal. Months later—and with no public consideration, official proceedings, or notice to the courts or other parties to this litigation—the County allowed yet another party, Speckin Forensics, LLC to inspect the voting equipment and electronic evidence at issue in this litigation. Upon learning of this alleged violation of the temporary order, the Secretary filed an “Application for an Order Holding [the County] in Contempt and Imposing Sanctions.” The Supreme Court found Fulton County willfully violated the Supreme Court's order. The Court found Fulton County and its various attorneys engaged in a "sustained, deliberate pattern of dilatory, obdurate, and vexatious conduct and have acted in bad faith throughout these sanction proceedings." Taken as a whole, that behavior prompted the Court to sanction both the County and the County Attorney. View "County of Fulton, et al. v. Sec. of Com." on Justia Law

The question presented for the Court of Appeal in this case was whether California could lawfully require anyone who seeks to vote in a presidential primary for a candidate of a particular political party to associate with that party as a condition of receiving a ballot with that candidate’s name on it. Plaintiffs contended that the answer was no, making Elections Code section 13102 unconstitutional. Defendants California Secretary of State and the State of California disputed this conclusion, asserting that the United States Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative on multiple occasions. Defendants pointed out, that when plaintiffs discuss a “right” to cast an expressive ballot simply for the sake of doing so, rather than to affect the outcome of an election, they have ceased talking about voting. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that elections have some “generalized expressive function.” California Court of Appeal concluded Plaintiffs’ inventive theories therefore did not supply a constitutional basis for evading binding legal precedent that foreclosed their arguments. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling sustaining the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend. View "Boydston v. Padilla" on Justia Law