Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by North Canton City Council ordering Stark County Board of Elections to place two proposed levies on the May 2, 2023 primary-election ballot, holding that the Board properly determined that the proposed levies were ineligible for consideration at the 2023 primary election.Because the Board did not approve the proposed (street and storm-water) levies as amended for placement on the May 2 primary election ballot the Council filed this expedited election action seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the Board to place the resolutions on the May 2 ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) the proposed levies may not be presented to North Canton voters as "renewal" levies before the November 2024 election; and (2) the Board did not abuse its discretion or act contrary to law in rejecting the placement of the proposed levies on the ballot. View "State ex rel. North Canton City Council v. Stark County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Lewisville Independent School District (“LISD”) and seven school board members, alleging that the district’s at-large election system violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) and seeking injunctive relief. The district court determined that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring his Section 2 claim because he is white. The district court then granted Defendants’ motion for sanctions against Plaintiff, his attorneys, and their law firm based on the findings that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was frivolous under 52 U.S.C. Section 10310(e) and his attorneys multiplied proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously under 28 U.S.C. Section 1927.   
The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s sanctions order and remanded to determine the extent to which the order is footed upon specific contemptuous conduct in the attorneys’ prosecution of the case. The court held that Plaintiff’s lawsuit did not merit sanctions. The court concluded that sanctions against Plaintiff were unwarranted because precedent in the circuit did not squarely foreclose his legal argument and because he sought to extend existing law. Critically, LISD points to no precedent in the circuit considering whether a voter in his position has standing under the VRA, let alone “squarely controlling precedent.” Further, as Plaintiff’s s lawsuit was not frivolous and relied on an “unsettled legal theory,”  his attorneys cannot be sanctioned under Section 1927 simply for filing the action. View "Vaughan v. Lewisville Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a judgment against him following a jury trial where he was convicted of one count of conspiring to illegally donate  monies to a political campaign and one count of aiding and abetting over $25,000 of such donations. Defendant argued that the district court erred in giving the standard jury instruction on willfulness: that “a person acts ‘willfully’ when he acts with a ‘bad purpose’ to disobey or disregard the law. Further, Defendant challenged the district court’s refusal to 1) instruct the jury that for count one, a co-conspirator must knowingly and willfully join the conspiracy with the “intent of achieving [the alleged conspiracy’s] unlawful objectives, namely violation of the federal election laws;” and 2) to provide e a good faith defense charge.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained it is not necessary for the government to prove that the defendant was aware of the specific provision of the law that he is charged with violating.” Further, the district court charged the jury that the government needed to prove  Defendant acted willfully, knowingly, and voluntarily. As the district court aptly noted, “to have found that Defendants acted willfully, the jury had to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that they intentionally did something that the law forbids, the opposite of good faith.” Where, as here, the district court correctly instructed the jury as to knowledge and willfulness and the defendant’s theory was thus “effectively presented elsewhere in the charge,” its refusal to provide a separate “good faith defense” instruction is not reversible error. View "United States v. Kukushkin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the superior court could adjudicate the challenge brought by Legacy Foundation Action Fund to the subject matter jurisdiction of the Clean Elections Commission in a collateral proceeding and that issue preclusion did not apply under the circumstances.The issues raised in this appeal stemmed from a 2014 election-related dispute between Legacy and the Commission. Legacy failed timely to appeal the final administrative decision of the Commission assessing a penalty for Legacy's violation of the Citizens Clean Elections Act. Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the superior court lacked appellate jurisdiction to decide the issue of whether the Commission acted within its subject matter jurisdiction. At issue before the Supreme Court here was whether the superior court could adjudicate the issue of the Commission's jurisdiction in a collateral proceeding. The Supreme Court answered (1) because a judgment entered by a tribunal lacking subject matter jurisdiction was void the superior court could adjudicate Legacy's challenge to the Commission's subject matter jurisdiction in a collateral proceeding; and (2) because the Commission did not serve as a neutral decision maker in deciding its own jurisdiction, Legacy was deprived of a full and fair adjudication of the issue, and therefore, issue preclusion did not apply. View "Legacy Foundation Action Fund v. Citizens Clean Elections Comm'n" on Justia Law

In consolidated ballot-title review cases, three sets of electors-- petitioner Wilhelms, petitioners Wise, Mason, and Selvaggio (Wise petitioners), and petitioners Delk, Gladstone, and Kafoury (Delk petitioners)—challenged the Oregon Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 9 (2024) (IP 9). If adopted, IP 9 would effect various changes to Oregon’s campaign-finance and elections-related laws. Currently, federal and state law required some reporting of campaign contributions and certain disclosures in political advertising. However, state law imposed no limits on campaign contributions. Among other things, IP 9 would limit the amounts of contributions that individuals could make to candidate committees and that candidate committees could accept from individuals and other candidate committees, it would add disclosure requirements for political advertisements (including requiring that advertisements disclose the four largest sources of funding), and it would establish a new enforcement system for elections-related violations (including violations of the new campaign-finance requirements). After review of the challenges, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that several of petitioners’ arguments that the ballot title did not substantially comply with ORS 250.035(2) were well taken; the Court therefore referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification. View "Wilhelms v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Yasha Clark and Morgan Walker petitioned to disqualify defendant Stephanie Bridges as a candidate for the office of Orleans Parish Civil District Court Judge, Division B. Plaintiffs alleged that Bridges falsely certified that she had filed her state and federal income taxes for the prior five years. The specific issue before the Louisiana Supreme Court in this matter was whether Bridges' 2021 state tax returns were electronically filed at the time she filed her notice of candidacy. Bridges used a tax preparation business, Mobile Tax, LLC, to have her 2021 federal and state tax returns filed electronically. Mobile Tax gave Bridges a letter on company letterhead that the tax returns were filed. Approximately one hour later, Bridges filed a sworn notice of candidacy to declare her intent to run for District Court Judge. In a letter from the Louisiana Department of Revenue (LDR), the agency indicated it did not have a 2021 tax return on file for Bridges; a representative testified she did not know if the LDR was capable of seeing the mechanism by which the tax returns were filed or how long it takes the LDR to process and record the filing of electronically filed returns. The federal Internal Revenue Service was able to confirm receipt of the electronically filed federal return. After review, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the judgment sustaining an objection to candidacy. Defendant's candidacy was reinstated because, at the time of her candidacy, she complied with the statutory law and administrative regulations related to filing her income tax return. View "Clark, et al. v. Bridges, et al." on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Election code stated that a voter who submits an absentee or mail-in ballot must complete, date and sign a declaration printed on the envelope in which the ballot is returned. Petitioners contended that failure to comply with this instruction rendered a ballot invalid, and they challenged guidance from the Acting Secretary of the Commonwealth that instructed county boards of elections to canvass and pre-canvass “[a]ny ballot return-envelope that is undated or dated with an incorrect date but that has been timely received by the county.” Petitioners asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: (1) to declare that absentee and mail-in ballots which were “undated or incorrectly dated” could not be included in the pre-canvass or canvass of votes; (2) to segregate such ballots; and (3) to direct the Acting Secretary to withdraw her guidance. For the November 8, 2022 election, the Supreme Court ordered the county boards of elections to refrain from counting any absentee or mail-in ballots that arrived in undated or incorrectly dated envelopes. The Court also directed county boards to segregate and preserve such ballots. And the Court dismissed Voter Petitioners from the case for lack of standing. The Court was evenly divided on the issue of whether failing to count undated or incorrectly dated ballots violated federal law, and accordingly issued no decision on that question. The Court issued this opinion to explain its reasoning from its November 1 per curiam order. View "Ball, et al. v. Chapman, et al." on Justia Law

Camden County, Georgia appealed a superior court's denial of its “Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Other Relief” concerning an order entered by Camden County Probate Judge Robert Sweatt, Jr., setting a special election for a referendum on whether resolutions authorizing the County’s purchase of land for a rocket launch facility should have been repealed (the “Referendum”). The County claimed the Referendum was not authorized under Subsection (b) (2) of Article IX, Section II, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution, which established home rule for counties (the “Home Rule Paragraph”) and that the results of the Referendum are a nullity. As a result, the County argued that the superior court erred in denying its petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus against Judge Sweatt and its petition for a judgment declaring that the Referendum was not authorized under the Constitution. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the superior court. View "Camden County v. Sweatt, et al." on Justia Law

The Town of McBee Municipal Election Commission overturned the results of the town's September 2020 mayoral and town council elections after finding Sydney Baker violated a previous version of section 7-15-330 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2021)2 by requesting applications to vote by absentee ballot on behalf of other voters. The circuit court found there was no evidence to support the election commission's decision and reversed. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. View "Odom v. McBee Municipal Election Commission" on Justia Law

The Fund appealed the dismissal of its challenge to Indiana’s prohibition on corporate contributions to political action committees (PACs) for independent expenditures. Following oral argument, the Fund filed a “Motion Requesting Judicial Notice,” explaining that Morales has succeeded Sullivan as Indiana’s Secretary of State and has replaced Sullivan as a party to the case. Under Fed.R.App.P. 43(c)(2) the substitution happens automatically without any motion. The Fund sought judicial notice of the fact that there is no record evidence that Morales has taken any steps to disavow enforcement of Indiana’s Election Code prohibition on corporate contributions to PACs for purposes of independent expenditures.The Seventh Circuit denied the motion as “unnecessary” and “improper.” Nothing about Morales becoming Secretary of State calls jurisdiction into question. Nor does it materially alter anything about the issues. The Fund’s motion seeks one of two things, neither of which would be an appropriate use of judicial notice. It may attempt to define the likelihood that Secretary Morales will enforce the Election Code or it might attempt to highlight what it sees as a gap in the evidentiary record—that Secretary Morales has yet to make a statement regarding state regulation of independent-expenditure PACs. Judicial notice is only permitted for adjudicative facts “not subject to reasonable dispute.” View "Indiana Right to Life Victory Fund v. Morales" on Justia Law