Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus compelling the Delaware County Board of Elections to place a township-zoning referendum petition on the May 2, 2023 ballot or, alternatively, the November 7, 2023 ballot, holding that Relator was entitled to the writ.In sustaining a protest to the referendum petition at issue, the Board determined that the petition failed to satisfy Ohio Rev. Code 519.12(H) because, among other things, it failed adequately to describe the nature of the requested zoning change. Relator then filed this expedited election action. The Supreme Court granted relief and ordered the Board of Elections to place the referendum on the May 2, 2023 ballot, holding that the Board abused its discretion and disregarded applicable law in deciding that the petition summary was deficient. View "State ex rel. Pinkston v. Delaware County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by Relator ordering the Washington County Board of Elections to place his name on the May 2, 2023 primary election ballot as a Democratic candidate for mayor of Marietta and a motion to strike the Board's brief as untimely, holding that the Board did not abuse its discretion.On January 17, 2023, Relator filed his nominating petition and declaration of candidacy with the Board. The Board voted not to certify Relator's candidacy for the primary-election ballot after determining that Ohio Rev. Code 3513.06 required Relator to list his former name on his nominating petition because the name change had occurred within the last five years. The Supreme Court denied Relator's ensuing petition seeking a writ of mandamus, holding that the Board did not abuse its discretion or clearly disregard applicable law in declining to certify Relator's name to the ballot. The Court further denied Relator's motion to strike the Board's brief as untimely. View "State ex rel. Gold v. Washington County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court holding that Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law 8-103(b)(1) is constitutional, determining that the State Board of Elections had proven the existence of emergency circumstances, and permitting the State Board to begin canvassing absentee ballots on Oct. 1, 2022, holding that there was no error.In connection with the November 8, 2022 general election the State Board petitioned the circuit court to authorize local boards of election to begin canvassing absentee ballots on October, 2022, seeking the authority under section 8-103(b)(1). The State Board alleged that emergency circumstances existed that interfered with the electoral process because the State's combined experience with absentee ballots and elections led to the conclusion that the volume of absentee ballots it was likely to receive during the 2022 general election could not be processed in a timely manner if local board could not start canvassing the ballots until after the election. Daniel Cox intervened and opposed the petition, arguing that section 8-103(b)(1) violates separation of powers principles and that the forecasted problems did not constitute "emergency circumstances." The circuit could granted judgment for the State Board. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Cox was not entitled to relief on his assignments of error. View "In re Petition for Emergency Remedy of Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

In May 2017, La’Shadion Shemwell was elected to the McKinney City Council. Shemwell’s term was cut short when the voters recalled him in November 2020. Shemwell claimed that the McKinney recall election procedures violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  Six months after dismissing his first lawsuit and two months before his recall election, Shemwell filed this suit on September 13, 2020. He asserted the same claims, this time with an additional Plaintiff— a Latina District 1 voter. The district court held the case moot, declined to apply the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception, and granted the City’s motion to dismiss. The sole issue on appeal is whether the November 2020 recall election mooted Plaintiffs’ claim for prospective declaratory relief.   The Fifth Circuit found that the November 2020 election mooted this case and held that Plaintiffs’ failed to satisfy the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” mootness exception. The court explained that Shemwell—in his official capacity—failed to claim or prove that he was likely to run again for District 1, win, and face the allegedly unlawful recall provisions. And Plaintiffs’—in their capacity as voters—failed to claim or prove that there was more than an “abstract or hypothetical” possibility that they would ever vote in another recall election of a District 1 Council Member. Thus, any judgment issued after the recall election would have been an impermissible advisory opinion. Further, Plaintiffs repeatedly abandoned their claims for injunctive relief—and never pursued expedited relief. View "Shemwell v. McKinney, Texas" on Justia Law

In 2016, Gill ran as an independent candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives in Illinois’s 13th Congressional District. He was 2,000 signatures short of qualifying for the general election ballot. Gill sued members of the Illinois State Board of Elections, claiming that portions of the Illinois Election Code violated the U.S. Constitution. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to evaluate the ballot access provisions for independent candidates under the fact-intensive balancing test set forth in Supreme Court precedent. The district court did so and again granted the defendants summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal as moot. While the litigation was pending, Illinois adopted a redistricting plan that changed the boundaries of the 13th District so that the suit can no longer offer Gill any effectual relief. Any declaratory or injunctive relief would speak to a congressional district that no longer exists. Gill’s circumstances are not capable of repetition yet evading review. View "Gill v. Linnabary" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus filed by a prospective voter in the City of San Antonio's May 2023 election, holding that sufficient post-election remedies existed that permitted the voter to challenge any weakness in the proposed amendment and its placement on the ballot.At issue was a proposed amendment that, if adopted, would amend the City Charter. Relators brought this action requesting that the Court enjoin the City from holding the special election in May, order the City Clerk or Council to separate the policy into single-issue amendments, and to amend the proposition's ballot language. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding (1) Relators' claimed injury was not a reason to remove the proposition from the ballot; (2) to dismantle the policy into pieces in advance of the election deprived the petition signatories of their right to have their amendment considered by the voters as it was proposed; and (3) Relators failed to show that they were entitled to relief in the form of amending the proposition's ballot language. View "In re Morris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by North Canton City Council ordering Stark County Board of Elections to place two proposed levies on the May 2, 2023 primary-election ballot, holding that the Board properly determined that the proposed levies were ineligible for consideration at the 2023 primary election.Because the Board did not approve the proposed (street and storm-water) levies as amended for placement on the May 2 primary election ballot the Council filed this expedited election action seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the Board to place the resolutions on the May 2 ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) the proposed levies may not be presented to North Canton voters as "renewal" levies before the November 2024 election; and (2) the Board did not abuse its discretion or act contrary to law in rejecting the placement of the proposed levies on the ballot. View "State ex rel. North Canton City Council v. Stark County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Lewisville Independent School District (“LISD”) and seven school board members, alleging that the district’s at-large election system violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) and seeking injunctive relief. The district court determined that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring his Section 2 claim because he is white. The district court then granted Defendants’ motion for sanctions against Plaintiff, his attorneys, and their law firm based on the findings that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was frivolous under 52 U.S.C. Section 10310(e) and his attorneys multiplied proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously under 28 U.S.C. Section 1927.   
The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s sanctions order and remanded to determine the extent to which the order is footed upon specific contemptuous conduct in the attorneys’ prosecution of the case. The court held that Plaintiff’s lawsuit did not merit sanctions. The court concluded that sanctions against Plaintiff were unwarranted because precedent in the circuit did not squarely foreclose his legal argument and because he sought to extend existing law. Critically, LISD points to no precedent in the circuit considering whether a voter in his position has standing under the VRA, let alone “squarely controlling precedent.” Further, as Plaintiff’s s lawsuit was not frivolous and relied on an “unsettled legal theory,”  his attorneys cannot be sanctioned under Section 1927 simply for filing the action. View "Vaughan v. Lewisville Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a judgment against him following a jury trial where he was convicted of one count of conspiring to illegally donate  monies to a political campaign and one count of aiding and abetting over $25,000 of such donations. Defendant argued that the district court erred in giving the standard jury instruction on willfulness: that “a person acts ‘willfully’ when he acts with a ‘bad purpose’ to disobey or disregard the law. Further, Defendant challenged the district court’s refusal to 1) instruct the jury that for count one, a co-conspirator must knowingly and willfully join the conspiracy with the “intent of achieving [the alleged conspiracy’s] unlawful objectives, namely violation of the federal election laws;” and 2) to provide e a good faith defense charge.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained it is not necessary for the government to prove that the defendant was aware of the specific provision of the law that he is charged with violating.” Further, the district court charged the jury that the government needed to prove  Defendant acted willfully, knowingly, and voluntarily. As the district court aptly noted, “to have found that Defendants acted willfully, the jury had to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that they intentionally did something that the law forbids, the opposite of good faith.” Where, as here, the district court correctly instructed the jury as to knowledge and willfulness and the defendant’s theory was thus “effectively presented elsewhere in the charge,” its refusal to provide a separate “good faith defense” instruction is not reversible error. View "United States v. Kukushkin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the superior court could adjudicate the challenge brought by Legacy Foundation Action Fund to the subject matter jurisdiction of the Clean Elections Commission in a collateral proceeding and that issue preclusion did not apply under the circumstances.The issues raised in this appeal stemmed from a 2014 election-related dispute between Legacy and the Commission. Legacy failed timely to appeal the final administrative decision of the Commission assessing a penalty for Legacy's violation of the Citizens Clean Elections Act. Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the superior court lacked appellate jurisdiction to decide the issue of whether the Commission acted within its subject matter jurisdiction. At issue before the Supreme Court here was whether the superior court could adjudicate the issue of the Commission's jurisdiction in a collateral proceeding. The Supreme Court answered (1) because a judgment entered by a tribunal lacking subject matter jurisdiction was void the superior court could adjudicate Legacy's challenge to the Commission's subject matter jurisdiction in a collateral proceeding; and (2) because the Commission did not serve as a neutral decision maker in deciding its own jurisdiction, Legacy was deprived of a full and fair adjudication of the issue, and therefore, issue preclusion did not apply. View "Legacy Foundation Action Fund v. Citizens Clean Elections Comm'n" on Justia Law