Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

A man who was previously convicted of a felony in Virginia sought to have his voting rights restored after his release from prison. Under Virginia’s Constitution, individuals convicted of felonies lose the right to vote, but the Governor has the sole discretion to restore those rights. The restoration process requires applicants to submit a form, after which the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth reviews the application and makes a recommendation to the Governor, who then decides whether to grant restoration. The applicant in this case, who had never voted due to his conviction as a minor, submitted at least one application for restoration, but the Governor declined to restore his rights.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia reviewed the applicant’s claims, which were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The applicant argued that the Governor’s unfettered discretion in restoring voting rights, and the lack of a definite time limit for the process, violated the First Amendment’s unfettered-discretion doctrine. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Governor and Secretary, finding that the doctrine did not apply because the restoration process determines eligibility to reenter the franchise, rather than regulating the exercise of an existing right.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit held that Virginia’s discretionary system for restoring voting rights, which is rooted in the executive clemency power, does not facially violate the First Amendment’s unfettered-discretion doctrine. The court reasoned that the clemency power is fundamentally different from a licensing scheme subject to First Amendment prior restraint analysis, and that judicial review of such executive discretion is limited to narrow circumstances not present here. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Hawkins v. Youngkin" on Justia Law

A political committee sought to place a constitutional initiative on the Arizona general election ballot that would have replaced partisan primaries with an open primary system. To qualify, the committee needed to submit signatures from at least 15% of qualified electors, as required by the Arizona Constitution. The committee submitted more than the required number of signatures, but opponents challenged the initiative, alleging violations of the separate amendment rule, misleading petition summaries, and various deficiencies in the signature collection process, including claims of duplicate signatures.The Superior Court in Maricopa County consolidated the challenges and set an expedited schedule due to the impending ballot printing deadline. The court first rejected the legal challenges regarding the separate amendment rule and petition summary, a decision affirmed on appeal. After a hearing on the signature challenges, the trial court initially overruled the objections to alleged duplicate signatures, finding the evidence inadmissible, and determined the initiative had enough valid signatures. On further review, the Arizona Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration of the duplicate signature evidence. After further proceedings, including review by a special master, the trial court ultimately dismissed the challenge, finding the statutory method for signature validation unconstitutional as applied, and holding it lacked authority to grant the requested injunction.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and held that the statutory formula in A.R.S. § 19-121.04(A), which required double counting of some invalid signatures, was unconstitutional as applied to this initiative. The court found that this method effectively raised the constitutionally mandated 15% signature threshold for constitutional initiatives, contrary to the framers’ intent. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment dismissing the challenge, holding that the initiative would have qualified for the ballot absent the unconstitutional double counting. View "SMITH v FONTES" on Justia Law

Texas enacted a law in 2021 requiring voters who wish to vote by mail to provide an identification number—such as a driver’s license or the last four digits of their Social Security number—on both their mail-in ballot applications and the ballots themselves. This number must match the one provided during voter registration. If the numbers do not match or are missing, the application or ballot is rejected. The law was challenged by the United States and several private plaintiffs, who argued that these requirements violate the materiality provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits denying the right to vote due to errors or omissions on paperwork if those errors are not material to determining voter qualification.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas consolidated the lawsuits and denied Texas’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs had standing and that sovereign immunity did not bar the private plaintiffs’ claims. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that the identification number requirement was not material to voter eligibility and enjoined Texas from enforcing the number-matching provisions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first determined that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the private plaintiffs’ claims against the Secretary of State due to a pending appeal on sovereign immunity, but found no jurisdictional bar to reviewing the United States’ claims. The Fifth Circuit held that the identification number requirement is material to determining whether an individual is qualified to vote under Texas law, as it serves to confirm the voter’s identity and prevent fraud. The court concluded that the law complies with the materiality provision of the Civil Rights Act and reversed the district court’s judgment, rendering judgment for the defendants. View "USA v. Paxton" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two competing slates of candidates, the Airey slate and the Green slate, who sought to appear on the ballot for the Democratic Town Committee primary election for Hartford's seventh district. Hartford election officials initially certified both slates for the primary. However, the Airey slate filed a complaint to disqualify the Green slate, and the Green slate counterclaimed to disqualify the Airey slate. The trial court ruled that only the Airey slate qualified, leading to the cancellation of the primary. On appeal, the higher court determined that neither slate qualified for the primary.The trial court, on remand, denied the Green slate's motion for a new primary election, reasoning that it lacked the authority to order a new primary under General Statutes § 9-329a (b) (3) because neither slate had qualified for the primary. The court noted that the statute contemplates a contested primary election that either was held or will be held, but in this case, no primary was held, and no candidates qualified.The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the trial court correctly concluded it lacked authority under § 9-329a (b) (3) to order a new primary. The court reasoned that the statute does not authorize a new primary when no candidates qualified for the original primary, and any vacancies should be filled according to local party rules. The court also rejected the Green slate's claim that the trial court's decision violated the fundamental rights of Democratic voters, as the candidates' failure to qualify for the primary was the cause of the canceled primary, not the court's decision. Lastly, the court declined to overrule or narrow the imputed knowledge doctrine, which grants standing to candidates aggrieved by election officials' decisions. View "Airey v. Feliciano" on Justia Law

The Institute for Free Speech (IFS), a nonprofit organization that provides pro bono legal services for First Amendment litigation, sought to represent a Texas politician and a political committee in challenging a Texas election law. This law requires political advertising signs to include a government-prescribed notice. IFS refrained from entering into representation agreements due to fear of prosecution under the Texas Election Code, which prohibits corporations from making political contributions, including in-kind contributions such as pro bono legal services.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed IFS's complaint for lack of Article III standing, concluding that IFS's claims were not ripe and that qualified immunity barred the individual-capacity claims. The district court assumed IFS had standing but found that the claims were not ripe because the prospective clients did not yet qualify as a candidate and a political committee. The court also concluded that sovereign immunity did not bar the official-capacity claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that IFS had standing to pursue its claims. The court found that IFS had demonstrated a serious intent to engage in constitutionally protected conduct, that its proposed conduct would violate Texas law, and that there was a substantial threat of enforcement. The court also concluded that IFS's claims were ripe for adjudication, as the prospective clients qualified as a candidate and a political committee under Texas law.The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of standing and ripeness. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the individual-capacity claims based on qualified immunity, as the right to provide pro bono legal services in this context was not clearly established. The court also affirmed that the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity applied, allowing the official-capacity claims to proceed. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Institute for Free Speech v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2009, Arkansas enacted a law limiting the number of voters one person could assist to six, with violations classified as misdemeanors. Arkansas United, a non-profit organization, and its founder, L. Mireya Reith, challenged this law, arguing it conflicted with Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which allows voters needing assistance to choose anyone to help them, except their employer or union representative.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas denied an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order but later granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, enjoining the enforcement of the six-voter limit. The court also awarded attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs. The State sought and obtained a stay of the injunction from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, allowing the six-voter limit to remain in effect for the 2022 General Election.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Section 208 of the VRA does not create a private right of action. The court found that enforcement of Section 208 is intended to be carried out by the Attorney General, not private parties. The court also rejected the argument that the Supremacy Clause provided a basis for a private right of action. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs, vacated the permanent injunction and the award of attorney fees and costs, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Arkansas United v. Thurston" on Justia Law

A challenge was brought against the Alaska Division of Elections for including Eric Hafner, a federal prisoner, as one of the four candidates on the 2024 general election ballot for the U.S. House of Representatives. Hafner, who finished sixth in the primary, was elevated to the general election ballot after two of the top-four candidates withdrew. The Alaska Democratic Party and Anita Thorne argued that Alaska law only allows the fifth-place candidate to replace a withdrawn candidate, not the sixth-place candidate.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, rejected the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. The court found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate irreparable harm and sided with the Division's interpretation of the law, which required successive replacements for withdrawn candidates. The court also concluded that Hafner was not constitutionally disqualified and that he was an indispensable party to the litigation.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court's decision. The court held that AS 15.25.100(c) requires the Division to replace successive withdrawn candidates on the general election ballot if additional primary candidates are available. The court found that the statute's language and the purpose of Ballot Measure 2, which aimed to increase voter choice, supported this interpretation. The court also noted that its precedent favors resolving ambiguities in election laws in favor of greater ballot access. Thus, the judgment of the superior court was affirmed. View "Alaska Democratic Party v. Beecher" on Justia Law

Lori Elmore and the City of Whitehall filed a protest against the candidacy of Holly Stein for the Ward 4 seat on the Whitehall City Council, arguing that Stein did not meet the two-year residency requirement specified in Section 3(a) of the Whitehall Charter. Stein had filed her declaration of candidacy in January 2025, but Elmore contended that Stein had not lived in Ward 4 for the two years immediately preceding the election, as required by the charter. Stein admitted to living outside Ward 4 in 2023 but argued that the charter only required her to have lived in Ward 4 for any two-year period before the election.The Franklin County Board of Elections held a hearing on Elmore’s protest in March 2025 and ultimately denied the protest, allowing Stein’s name to remain on the ballot. Elmore and the City of Whitehall then sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Ohio to prevent the board from placing Stein’s name on the ballot.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that the phrase “next preceding” in Section 3(a) of the Whitehall Charter means “immediately preceding.” The court concluded that the two-year residency requirement applies to both ward and at-large candidates for the Whitehall City Council. Since Stein did not meet this requirement, the court held that the board’s denial of Elmore’s protest was unauthorized by law. Consequently, the court granted the writ of prohibition, preventing the board from placing Stein’s name on the November 4, 2025 general-election ballot. View "State ex rel. Elmore v. Franklin County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Seven petitions were filed with the Lucas County Board of Elections to recall the mayor and six members of the Maumee city council under R.C. 705.92. The board found the petitions valid and certified the recall questions for a special primary election. The City of Maumee and a citizen, Glenn Rambo, protested, arguing that the city’s charter does not provide for recall, R.C. 705.92 does not apply to the city, and the petitions did not comply with the statute. The board denied the protests.The relators sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the board from placing the recall questions on the ballot and a writ of mandamus to order the board to grant their protests. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. The court found that Maumee’s charter allows for the removal of elected officials as provided by the Constitution or laws of Ohio, but R.C. 705.92 does not apply to Maumee because it was not adopted under R.C. 705.03. The court held that the board erred in deeming R.C. 705.92 applicable to Maumee.The Supreme Court of Ohio granted the writ of prohibition, preventing the board from placing the recall questions on the ballot, and denied the writ of mandamus as moot. The court concluded that the recall procedure in R.C. 705.92 is not generally applicable to municipalities and can only be adopted as part of a statutory plan of government under R.C. 705.03, which Maumee did not do. View "State ex rel. Maumee v. Lucas County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Florida’s 2022 congressional districting plan. The plaintiffs, consisting of civic organizations and individual voters, argue that the plan violates the Florida Constitution's Fair Districts Amendment (FDA) by failing to retain a two-hundred-mile-long congressional district that previously enabled black voters in North Florida to elect representatives of their choice. The plaintiffs claim that the new plan diminishes this ability, contrary to the FDA's Non-Diminishment Clause.The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the Enacted Plan unconstitutional under the FDA, enjoining its use, and ordering the Legislature to adopt a remedial map. The First District Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of a sufficiently compact minority community in North Florida to merit protection under the FDA. The appellate court also questioned the binding nature of the Florida Supreme Court’s precedents on the Non-Diminishment Clause.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and upheld the Enacted Plan. The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proving the possibility of drawing a North Florida district that complies with both the Non-Diminishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. The court emphasized that compliance with the Equal Protection Clause is a superior obligation and that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that a non-diminishing district could be drawn without subordinating traditional race-neutral districting principles to racial considerations. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeal, though not its reasoning. View "Black Voters Matter Capacity Building Institute, Inc. v. Secretary, Florida Department of State" on Justia Law