Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, Utah voters passed Proposition 4 in 2018, a citizen initiative designed to reform the state’s redistricting process and address partisan gerrymandering. Before the next redistricting cycle, the Utah Legislature repealed Proposition 4 and replaced it with Senate Bill 200 (S.B. 200), which eliminated the key reforms established by the initiative. Several organizations and individuals challenged this legislative action, arguing that the repeal violated Utahns’ constitutional right to alter or reform their government through the initiative process.The Third District Court initially dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim that the Legislature’s repeal of Proposition 4 was unconstitutional. On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Utah held that the people’s right to reform their government via initiative is constitutionally protected and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding that S.B. 200 unconstitutionally impaired the reforms enacted by Proposition 4 and was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The court declared Proposition 4 to be the law, enjoined the use of the 2021 Congressional Map enacted under S.B. 200, and established a remedial process for creating a compliant map. The Legislature’s request to stay the injunction on the 2021 map during the remedial process and any appeals was denied by the district court.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the Legislature’s emergency petition for extraordinary relief, which challenged only the district court’s denial of the stay. The Supreme Court held that the Legislature had not shown the district court abused its discretion in denying the stay, as their arguments focused on the remedial process rather than the legal standard for granting a stay. The petition for extraordinary relief was therefore denied. View "State Legislature v. League of Women Voters" on Justia Law

Two nonprofit organizations challenged the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute that made it a felony for individuals with felony convictions to vote before their rights were restored, regardless of whether those individuals mistakenly believed they were eligible. The statute, originally enacted in the late 19th century, was shown to have been motivated by racial animus and to have a disproportionate impact on Black North Carolinians. In 2023, the North Carolina General Assembly amended the statute to add a requirement that a person must “know” their rights had not been restored to be prosecuted, effective January 1, 2024.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina considered the plaintiffs’ claims under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. After the statute was amended, a magistrate judge recommended dismissal for lack of standing, but the district court found the case was not moot because prosecutions under the old statute for pre-2024 conduct could still occur, potentially chilling voter participation and requiring the plaintiffs to divert resources. The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding the statute unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the case was not moot because prosecutions under the prior version of the statute could still proceed, and the plaintiffs retained a concrete interest in the outcome. On the merits, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the challenged statute violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court found that the statute’s original enactment and reenactment were motivated by racial discrimination, and that subsequent legislative changes did not “cleanse” the statute of its discriminatory origins, as the statute itself had not been substantively reenacted or amended in a way that would warrant a presumption of legislative good faith. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "A. Philip Randolph Institute v. North Carolina State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

A nonprofit advocacy organization challenged an amendment to New Mexico’s Campaign Reporting Act (CRA), which requires certain political committees to disclose the names and addresses of donors who contribute above specified thresholds when the committee makes independent expenditures on advertisements referring to candidates or ballot questions shortly before an election. The organization argued that these disclosure requirements burdened its First Amendment rights and would chill potential donors from contributing, citing concerns about possible harassment or retaliation.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico granted summary judgment to the Secretary of State, finding that the disclosure requirements were substantially related and narrowly tailored to the state’s interest in informing the public about the sources of funding for large, election-related advertisements. The district court concluded that advertisements covered by the law—those referring to candidates or ballot questions and disseminated shortly before elections—were made for a political purpose, and that the law’s temporal, monetary, and geographic limitations, as well as an opt-out provision for donors, ensured the requirements were not overly broad.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment decision de novo. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that the challenged disclosure provision withstands exacting scrutiny. The court determined that the law is substantially related to the important governmental interest of transparency in election-related advocacy and is narrowly tailored through its thresholds and opt-out mechanism. The court also found that the evidence presented by the organization did not establish a reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals sufficient to invalidate the law on its face. The judgment for the Secretary of State was affirmed. View "Rio Grande Foundation v. Oliver" on Justia Law

Texas enacted Senate Bill 1, which included several provisions regulating how individuals may assist voters, particularly those who are blind, disabled, or illiterate. The challenged provisions required assistors to disclose personal information, amended the oath assistors must take, and prohibited compensated assistance or paid ballot harvesting. Various organizations with members who require or provide voting assistance argued that these provisions were preempted by Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act, which allows eligible voters to receive assistance from a person of their choice, with certain exceptions.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas found that at least one plaintiff organization had standing to challenge each provision. The court held that Section 208 preempted all the challenged provisions, reasoning that the federal law did not permit states to impose additional limitations or exceptions beyond those stated in Section 208. As a result, the district court permanently enjoined state officials and certain district attorneys from enforcing the relevant sections of Senate Bill 1.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Fifth Circuit concluded that none of the plaintiff organizations had standing to challenge the disclosure and oath provisions, as their fears of prosecution were speculative and did not constitute an actual or imminent injury. However, the court agreed that two organizations had standing to challenge the compensation provisions, as there was a credible threat of prosecution for their ongoing activities.Addressing the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act does not preempt Texas’s compensation-related restrictions. The court found no clear and manifest congressional intent to preempt such state regulations and rejected the district court’s broader reading of Section 208. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, vacated the permanent injunction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott" on Justia Law

A group of Latino voters from Washington State’s Yakima Valley challenged the state’s legislative district map, arguing that the configuration of one district diluted their votes and denied them an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The state’s bipartisan redistricting commission had drawn the map following the 2020 Census, but the plaintiffs contended that the map “cracked” their community, undermining their voting power. After a bench trial, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington agreed with the plaintiffs, enjoined the enacted map, and, when the commission declined to draw a new map, imposed its own remedial map.Three Yakima Valley voters, who had intervened in the district court, appealed. They challenged both the district court’s finding of a Section 2 violation and the remedial map, arguing that the new map violated the Equal Protection Clause and Section 2, and that the district court lacked jurisdiction because a three-judge panel was not convened.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction, ruling that 28 U.S.C. § 2284 requires a three-judge court only for constitutional, not statutory, challenges to legislative apportionment. The court found that the intervenors lacked standing to appeal the Section 2 liability finding and to challenge the remedial map under Section 2, as they failed to show traceable or redressable injuries or vote dilution. However, one intervenor had standing to bring an equal protection challenge to the remedial map.On the merits, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the remedial map did not constitute an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, as race was not the predominant factor in its design. The court dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction except for the equal protection claim, which it affirmed, upholding the district court’s remedial map. View "PALMER V. TREVINO" on Justia Law

A Pennsylvania resident, along with several organizations, challenged the state’s requirement that mail-in ballots be discarded if the return envelope is missing a handwritten date or contains an incorrect date. The plaintiffs argued that this “date requirement” led to thousands of otherwise valid ballots being rejected in recent elections, often without notice to the affected voters or an opportunity to cure the error. The date field on the return envelope does not determine whether a ballot is timely or whether the voter is eligible, and the state’s election system already records the actual receipt date of each ballot.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania reviewed the case after extensive discovery. Only two county election boards defended the date requirement, while most did not. The District Court found that the date requirement was not justified by the state’s interests in election efficiency, solemnity, or fraud prevention. The court noted that the requirement imposed a minimal but real burden on voters, as it led to the rejection of thousands of ballots, and that the state had not shown the requirement meaningfully advanced its asserted interests. The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and enjoined enforcement of the date requirement, but did not prohibit the inclusion of a date field on return envelopes.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Third Circuit held that, under the Anderson-Burdick framework, the date requirement imposed a minimal burden on the right to vote, but that burden was not justified by the state’s interests. The court found no meaningful connection between the date requirement and election administration, solemnity, or fraud prevention, and concluded that discarding ballots for minor date errors was unconstitutional. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Eakin v. Adams County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

A prospective candidate for the 2025 New York City mayoral election, who had not been affiliated with any political party since 2006, sought to run as the nominee of an independent body named the “Independence Party.” New York election law prohibits both political parties and independent bodies from using certain words, including “Independence” and “Independent,” in their names. The candidate argued that these naming restrictions, as applied to him, violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and association.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York reviewed the candidate’s request for a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the naming restrictions. The district court found that the candidate had standing to sue but denied the injunction. The court concluded that the naming provisions did not impose a severe burden on the candidate’s First Amendment rights, as they did not prevent him from communicating his political message or engaging in petitioning activity. Applying the Anderson-Burdick balancing test, the court determined that the restrictions were reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and justified by the state’s interest in preventing voter confusion.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Second Circuit held that the naming restrictions apply to independent bodies, that the candidate had standing, and that the state officials were not entitled to sovereign immunity. The court further held that the naming provisions did not impose a severe burden on the candidate’s First Amendment rights and were reasonable and viewpoint-neutral regulations justified by the state’s interest in avoiding voter confusion. The denial of the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Walden v. Kosinski" on Justia Law

A man who was previously convicted of a felony in Virginia sought to have his voting rights restored after his release from prison. Under Virginia’s Constitution, individuals convicted of felonies lose the right to vote, but the Governor has the sole discretion to restore those rights. The restoration process requires applicants to submit a form, after which the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth reviews the application and makes a recommendation to the Governor, who then decides whether to grant restoration. The applicant in this case, who had never voted due to his conviction as a minor, submitted at least one application for restoration, but the Governor declined to restore his rights.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia reviewed the applicant’s claims, which were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The applicant argued that the Governor’s unfettered discretion in restoring voting rights, and the lack of a definite time limit for the process, violated the First Amendment’s unfettered-discretion doctrine. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Governor and Secretary, finding that the doctrine did not apply because the restoration process determines eligibility to reenter the franchise, rather than regulating the exercise of an existing right.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit held that Virginia’s discretionary system for restoring voting rights, which is rooted in the executive clemency power, does not facially violate the First Amendment’s unfettered-discretion doctrine. The court reasoned that the clemency power is fundamentally different from a licensing scheme subject to First Amendment prior restraint analysis, and that judicial review of such executive discretion is limited to narrow circumstances not present here. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Hawkins v. Youngkin" on Justia Law

A political committee sought to place a constitutional initiative on the Arizona general election ballot that would have replaced partisan primaries with an open primary system. To qualify, the committee needed to submit signatures from at least 15% of qualified electors, as required by the Arizona Constitution. The committee submitted more than the required number of signatures, but opponents challenged the initiative, alleging violations of the separate amendment rule, misleading petition summaries, and various deficiencies in the signature collection process, including claims of duplicate signatures.The Superior Court in Maricopa County consolidated the challenges and set an expedited schedule due to the impending ballot printing deadline. The court first rejected the legal challenges regarding the separate amendment rule and petition summary, a decision affirmed on appeal. After a hearing on the signature challenges, the trial court initially overruled the objections to alleged duplicate signatures, finding the evidence inadmissible, and determined the initiative had enough valid signatures. On further review, the Arizona Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration of the duplicate signature evidence. After further proceedings, including review by a special master, the trial court ultimately dismissed the challenge, finding the statutory method for signature validation unconstitutional as applied, and holding it lacked authority to grant the requested injunction.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and held that the statutory formula in A.R.S. § 19-121.04(A), which required double counting of some invalid signatures, was unconstitutional as applied to this initiative. The court found that this method effectively raised the constitutionally mandated 15% signature threshold for constitutional initiatives, contrary to the framers’ intent. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment dismissing the challenge, holding that the initiative would have qualified for the ballot absent the unconstitutional double counting. View "SMITH v FONTES" on Justia Law

Texas enacted a law in 2021 requiring voters who wish to vote by mail to provide an identification number—such as a driver’s license or the last four digits of their Social Security number—on both their mail-in ballot applications and the ballots themselves. This number must match the one provided during voter registration. If the numbers do not match or are missing, the application or ballot is rejected. The law was challenged by the United States and several private plaintiffs, who argued that these requirements violate the materiality provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits denying the right to vote due to errors or omissions on paperwork if those errors are not material to determining voter qualification.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas consolidated the lawsuits and denied Texas’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs had standing and that sovereign immunity did not bar the private plaintiffs’ claims. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that the identification number requirement was not material to voter eligibility and enjoined Texas from enforcing the number-matching provisions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first determined that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the private plaintiffs’ claims against the Secretary of State due to a pending appeal on sovereign immunity, but found no jurisdictional bar to reviewing the United States’ claims. The Fifth Circuit held that the identification number requirement is material to determining whether an individual is qualified to vote under Texas law, as it serves to confirm the voter’s identity and prevent fraud. The court concluded that the law complies with the materiality provision of the Civil Rights Act and reversed the district court’s judgment, rendering judgment for the defendants. View "USA v. Paxton" on Justia Law