Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Adrian Perkins, the then-current mayor of Shreveport, Louisiana, sought reelection to that office. On July 22, 2022, Perkins signed and filed a notice of candidacy form, as required by La. R.S. 18:461 to become a candidate in a primary election. The requirements for the notice of candidacy set forth in La. R.S. 18:463 include a requirement that the candidate certify nine items. It was undisputed Perkins signed the form certifying all required statements and that his certification as to Item 8 on the notice of candidacy form, was incorrect. Perkins has two residences–Stratmore Circle and Marshall Street– both within the city of Shreveport. Although Perkins was registered to vote at the Stratmore Circle address at the time of his qualification, it was undisputed he maintained a homestead exemption at the Marshall Street residence. The two residences were in different voting precincts. Francis Deal, a qualified elector, filed a “Petition in Objection to Candidacy” asserting Perkins’ false certification on the notice of candidacy form disqualified him from being a candidate for mayor pursuant to La. R.S. 18:492. Deal also asserted that pursuant to La. R.S. 18:101(B), Perkins was required to be registered to vote in the precinct where he claimed his homestead exemption, and his failure to do so caused him to be an unqualified elector and candidate. After considering the evidence, the district court disqualified Perkins as a candidate in the primary election for the office of the Mayor of the city of Shreveport. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that only those false certifications specifically listed in La. R.S. 18:492(A)(5) through (7) constituted grounds for objecting to a candidate. Because the certification at issue in this case was not specifically listed in La. R.S. 18:492, it could not serve as a basis to disqualify the candidate here. View "Deal v. Perkins et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by F. Patrick Cunnane and Mary E. Cunnane to compel Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose to certify their names to the ballot, holding that the Cunnanes failed to establish that they were entitled to the writ.The Cunnanes filed a joint nominating petition to appear on Ohio's general election ballot in November 2022 as independent candidates for the offices of governor and lieutenant governor. Secretary of State Frank LaRose rejected their nominating petition on the grounds that, in his view, they could not claim to be unaffiliated from a political party when they each cast a partisan ballot in the May 2022 primary election. The Cunnanes subsequently brought this mandamus action. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the Cunnanes did not meet their burden of proving that Secretary LaRose abused his discretion when he declined to certify them as independent candidates. View "State ex rel. Cunnane v. LaRose" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court ruling in favor of Plaintiffs on cross-motions for summary judgment and enjoining the Montana Secretary of State from placing House Bill (HB) 325 on Montana's 2022 general election ballot, holding that the referendum proposal violates the Montana Constitution.In approved, HB 325 will establish seven Supreme Court districts in Montana and requires that Supreme Court justices be elected district by district, rather than statewide. Plaintiffs brought this challenge to the constitutionality of the measure. The district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that the question of the constitutionality of the referendum proposed by HB 325 is ripe for judicial resolution; and (2) the district court did not err in enjoining the Secretary from placing HB 325 on the ballot in the 2022 general election. View "McDonald v. Jacobsen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court ruling in favor of Plaintiffs on cross-motions for summary judgment and enjoining the Montana Secretary of State from placing House Bill (HB) 325 on Montana's 2022 general election ballot, holding that the referendum proposal violates the Montana Constitution.If approved, HB 325 will establish seven Supreme Court districts in Montana and requires that Supreme Court justices be elected district by district, rather than statewide. Plaintiffs brought this challenge to the constitutionality of the measure. The district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that the question of the constitutionality of the referendum proposed by HB 325 is ripe for judicial resolution; and (2) the district court did not err in enjoining the Secretary from placing HB 325 on the ballot in the 2022 general election. View "McDonald v. Jacobsen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by Brian Ames, a candidate for the Republican Party State Central Committee for Senate District 28 in the August 2022 primary election, holding that Ames was not entitled to the writ.Ames brought this expedited election matter asking for a writ of mandamus requiring Secretary of State Frank LaRose to direct three count boards of elections to "challenge" electors who requested a ballot for a party other than the other for which the elector voted in the May 2022 primary election. Ames further requested that ballots cast in the August primary be "segregated according to the party for which the elector voted in May" and that ballots cast for a different party not be counted. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) the writ was moot as to Secretary LaRose; and (2) as to the boards of elections, the writ is denied because Ames was not entitled to the relief he sought. View "State ex rel. Ames v. LaRose" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this action challenging the conduct of the Lake County Election Board, holding that the Election Board did not violate Joseph Hero's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.Hero, a registered republican for forty years, opposed the decision of his town council to exercise its eminent-domain authority to seize the property of predominantly lower-income homeowners. Hero backed two independent candidates for town council running against two incumbent, pro-development candidates. Thereafter, the Indiana Republican Party banned Hero from the Republican Party for ten years. In 2019, Hero attempted to appear as a Republican candidate in the 2019 election, but the Election Board concluded that Hero could not run. Hero subsequently filed a complaint arguing that the Election Board violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Hero had standing to sue; and (2) the Election Board did not violate Hero's constitutional rights. View "Hero v. Lake County Election Bd." on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered a question of whether the General Assembly overstepped its constitutional authority by enacting legislation that allowed for universal mail-in voting. Among other things, "Act 77" effected major amendments to the Pennsylvania Election Code, including universal, state-wide mail-in voting. On November 21, 2020, eight petitioners – including a Republican congressman and Republican candidates for the United States House of Representatives and the Pennsylvania House of Representatives – filed a petition for review with the Commonwealth Court seeking to halt the certification of the 2020 General Election, and including a facial challenge to the portions of Act 77 that established universal mail-in voting. The Supreme Court exercised extraordinary jurisdiction over the matter, and found a “complete failure to act with due diligence in commencing [the] facial constitutional challenge, which was ascertainable upon Act 77’s enactment[,]” as the petitioners waited until the ballots from the General Election were in the process of being tallied, and the results were becoming apparent, to raise their claim. Thus, the Court found the claim barred by the doctrine of laches. The Court found no restriction in the Pennsylvania Constitution on the General Assembly's ability to create universal mail-in voting. View "McLinko v. Penna. Dept. of State, et al." on Justia Law

In this case concerning the printing and distribution of an initiative petition concerning the establishment of a medical loss ratio for dental insurance the Supreme Judicial Court granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss, holding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief.Plaintiffs filed a complaint bringing claims for certiorari and equitable relief, and for libel, and moved for a temporary restraining order enjoining the Secretary from publishing the proponents' arguments for and against the initiative petition. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the complaint, holding (1) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 54, 54 did not provide Plaintiffs with a private right of action, and therefore, count one of the complaint must be dismissed; (2) the Secretary cannot be held liable for defamation related to a publication required by law; and (3) Plaintiffs' emergency motion for a temporary restraining order was moot. View "Committee to Protect Access to Quality Dental Care v. Secretary of the Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the City of Virginia Beach and several local officials, claiming that the City’s exclusive use of at-large voting to elect members of its City Council diluted the votes of minority voters in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Before the district court ruled on that claim, however, Virginia’s General Assembly passed a law eliminating at-large voting for most of the seats on the City Council. Even so, the district court held, that the case was not moot, the City’s old all-at-large electoral system violated Section 2, and the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction remedying that violation going forward.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s decision concluding that the district court erred in reaching the merits. The General Assembly’s action left Plaintiffs challenging – and the district court assessing – an electoral system that no longer governs elections in Virginia Beach. The court explained that HB 2198 prevented the City from conducting any future City Council elections under the electoral system that Plaintiffs challenged, and other aspects of state and local law precluded the City from returning unilaterally to its old ways. Under those circumstances, Plaintiffs’ challenge is moot, and the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider its merits.     However, because Plaintiffs may have residual claims against the City’s new method for electing its Council, the district court may consider on remand whether Plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend their complaint, or develop the record more fully, to bring any new challenges as part of this proceeding. View "Latasha Holloway v. City of Virginia Beach" on Justia Law

The Municipal Election Commission of the town of Goodman, Mississippi (the Commissioners), rejected David Simmons’s Candidate Petition for the Municipal Office of Mayor of Goodman, Mississippi. After conducting an investigation into Simmons’s residency and voting history, the Commissioners rejected his petition due to his not having satisfied the residency requirement prior to the election date. Simmons appealed a circuit court's decision upholding the Commissioners’ decision to reject his petition, arguing the trial court’s decision was manifestly against the weight of the evidence because he had provided evidence of his physical presence in Goodman and of his intention to reside there permanently. Simmons also asserted he had provided evidence that rebutted the homestead exemption presumption. The Mississippi Supreme Court found the trial court did not commit manifest error by determining that Simmons had not proved that he had been domiciled in Goodman for the time prescribed by Mississippi Code Section 23-15-300(1), which was “two (2) years immediately preceding the day of election.” Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-300(1) (Supp. 2021). View "Simmons v. Town of Goodman" on Justia Law