Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between two competing slates of candidates, the Airey slate and the Green slate, who sought to appear on the ballot for the Democratic Town Committee primary election for Hartford's seventh district. Hartford election officials initially certified both slates for the primary. However, the Airey slate filed a complaint to disqualify the Green slate, and the Green slate counterclaimed to disqualify the Airey slate. The trial court ruled that only the Airey slate qualified, leading to the cancellation of the primary. On appeal, the higher court determined that neither slate qualified for the primary.The trial court, on remand, denied the Green slate's motion for a new primary election, reasoning that it lacked the authority to order a new primary under General Statutes § 9-329a (b) (3) because neither slate had qualified for the primary. The court noted that the statute contemplates a contested primary election that either was held or will be held, but in this case, no primary was held, and no candidates qualified.The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the trial court correctly concluded it lacked authority under § 9-329a (b) (3) to order a new primary. The court reasoned that the statute does not authorize a new primary when no candidates qualified for the original primary, and any vacancies should be filled according to local party rules. The court also rejected the Green slate's claim that the trial court's decision violated the fundamental rights of Democratic voters, as the candidates' failure to qualify for the primary was the cause of the canceled primary, not the court's decision. Lastly, the court declined to overrule or narrow the imputed knowledge doctrine, which grants standing to candidates aggrieved by election officials' decisions. View "Airey v. Feliciano" on Justia Law

The Institute for Free Speech (IFS), a nonprofit organization that provides pro bono legal services for First Amendment litigation, sought to represent a Texas politician and a political committee in challenging a Texas election law. This law requires political advertising signs to include a government-prescribed notice. IFS refrained from entering into representation agreements due to fear of prosecution under the Texas Election Code, which prohibits corporations from making political contributions, including in-kind contributions such as pro bono legal services.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed IFS's complaint for lack of Article III standing, concluding that IFS's claims were not ripe and that qualified immunity barred the individual-capacity claims. The district court assumed IFS had standing but found that the claims were not ripe because the prospective clients did not yet qualify as a candidate and a political committee. The court also concluded that sovereign immunity did not bar the official-capacity claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that IFS had standing to pursue its claims. The court found that IFS had demonstrated a serious intent to engage in constitutionally protected conduct, that its proposed conduct would violate Texas law, and that there was a substantial threat of enforcement. The court also concluded that IFS's claims were ripe for adjudication, as the prospective clients qualified as a candidate and a political committee under Texas law.The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of standing and ripeness. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the individual-capacity claims based on qualified immunity, as the right to provide pro bono legal services in this context was not clearly established. The court also affirmed that the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity applied, allowing the official-capacity claims to proceed. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Institute for Free Speech v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2009, Arkansas enacted a law limiting the number of voters one person could assist to six, with violations classified as misdemeanors. Arkansas United, a non-profit organization, and its founder, L. Mireya Reith, challenged this law, arguing it conflicted with Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which allows voters needing assistance to choose anyone to help them, except their employer or union representative.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas denied an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order but later granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, enjoining the enforcement of the six-voter limit. The court also awarded attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs. The State sought and obtained a stay of the injunction from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, allowing the six-voter limit to remain in effect for the 2022 General Election.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Section 208 of the VRA does not create a private right of action. The court found that enforcement of Section 208 is intended to be carried out by the Attorney General, not private parties. The court also rejected the argument that the Supremacy Clause provided a basis for a private right of action. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs, vacated the permanent injunction and the award of attorney fees and costs, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Arkansas United v. Thurston" on Justia Law

A challenge was brought against the Alaska Division of Elections for including Eric Hafner, a federal prisoner, as one of the four candidates on the 2024 general election ballot for the U.S. House of Representatives. Hafner, who finished sixth in the primary, was elevated to the general election ballot after two of the top-four candidates withdrew. The Alaska Democratic Party and Anita Thorne argued that Alaska law only allows the fifth-place candidate to replace a withdrawn candidate, not the sixth-place candidate.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, rejected the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. The court found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate irreparable harm and sided with the Division's interpretation of the law, which required successive replacements for withdrawn candidates. The court also concluded that Hafner was not constitutionally disqualified and that he was an indispensable party to the litigation.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court's decision. The court held that AS 15.25.100(c) requires the Division to replace successive withdrawn candidates on the general election ballot if additional primary candidates are available. The court found that the statute's language and the purpose of Ballot Measure 2, which aimed to increase voter choice, supported this interpretation. The court also noted that its precedent favors resolving ambiguities in election laws in favor of greater ballot access. Thus, the judgment of the superior court was affirmed. View "Alaska Democratic Party v. Beecher" on Justia Law

Lori Elmore and the City of Whitehall filed a protest against the candidacy of Holly Stein for the Ward 4 seat on the Whitehall City Council, arguing that Stein did not meet the two-year residency requirement specified in Section 3(a) of the Whitehall Charter. Stein had filed her declaration of candidacy in January 2025, but Elmore contended that Stein had not lived in Ward 4 for the two years immediately preceding the election, as required by the charter. Stein admitted to living outside Ward 4 in 2023 but argued that the charter only required her to have lived in Ward 4 for any two-year period before the election.The Franklin County Board of Elections held a hearing on Elmore’s protest in March 2025 and ultimately denied the protest, allowing Stein’s name to remain on the ballot. Elmore and the City of Whitehall then sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Ohio to prevent the board from placing Stein’s name on the ballot.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that the phrase “next preceding” in Section 3(a) of the Whitehall Charter means “immediately preceding.” The court concluded that the two-year residency requirement applies to both ward and at-large candidates for the Whitehall City Council. Since Stein did not meet this requirement, the court held that the board’s denial of Elmore’s protest was unauthorized by law. Consequently, the court granted the writ of prohibition, preventing the board from placing Stein’s name on the November 4, 2025 general-election ballot. View "State ex rel. Elmore v. Franklin County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Seven petitions were filed with the Lucas County Board of Elections to recall the mayor and six members of the Maumee city council under R.C. 705.92. The board found the petitions valid and certified the recall questions for a special primary election. The City of Maumee and a citizen, Glenn Rambo, protested, arguing that the city’s charter does not provide for recall, R.C. 705.92 does not apply to the city, and the petitions did not comply with the statute. The board denied the protests.The relators sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the board from placing the recall questions on the ballot and a writ of mandamus to order the board to grant their protests. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. The court found that Maumee’s charter allows for the removal of elected officials as provided by the Constitution or laws of Ohio, but R.C. 705.92 does not apply to Maumee because it was not adopted under R.C. 705.03. The court held that the board erred in deeming R.C. 705.92 applicable to Maumee.The Supreme Court of Ohio granted the writ of prohibition, preventing the board from placing the recall questions on the ballot, and denied the writ of mandamus as moot. The court concluded that the recall procedure in R.C. 705.92 is not generally applicable to municipalities and can only be adopted as part of a statutory plan of government under R.C. 705.03, which Maumee did not do. View "State ex rel. Maumee v. Lucas County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Florida’s 2022 congressional districting plan. The plaintiffs, consisting of civic organizations and individual voters, argue that the plan violates the Florida Constitution's Fair Districts Amendment (FDA) by failing to retain a two-hundred-mile-long congressional district that previously enabled black voters in North Florida to elect representatives of their choice. The plaintiffs claim that the new plan diminishes this ability, contrary to the FDA's Non-Diminishment Clause.The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the Enacted Plan unconstitutional under the FDA, enjoining its use, and ordering the Legislature to adopt a remedial map. The First District Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of a sufficiently compact minority community in North Florida to merit protection under the FDA. The appellate court also questioned the binding nature of the Florida Supreme Court’s precedents on the Non-Diminishment Clause.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and upheld the Enacted Plan. The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proving the possibility of drawing a North Florida district that complies with both the Non-Diminishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. The court emphasized that compliance with the Equal Protection Clause is a superior obligation and that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that a non-diminishing district could be drawn without subordinating traditional race-neutral districting principles to racial considerations. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeal, though not its reasoning. View "Black Voters Matter Capacity Building Institute, Inc. v. Secretary, Florida Department of State" on Justia Law

In June 2023, the Town Board of Thornapple, Wisconsin decided to stop using electronic voting machines and switched to paper ballots for elections. This change was implemented in the 2024 federal primary elections. The United States sued the Town and certain officials, alleging that they failed to provide at least one accessible voting system for individuals with disabilities, as required by section 301 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). The United States also sought and obtained a preliminary injunction from the district court, requiring the Town to provide a HAVA-compliant system in the November 2024 federal election.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted the preliminary injunction, rejecting the Town's arguments that paper ballots did not fall under HAVA's purview and that the government failed to show a likelihood of irreparable harm. The court found that the Town's actions would likely deprive individuals with disabilities of the opportunity to vote independently and privately, as required by HAVA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the Town's use of paper ballots constitutes a "voting system" under HAVA. The court found that the government demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and a likelihood of irreparable harm. The court concluded that the Town's actions would likely deprive individuals with disabilities of the opportunity to vote independently and privately, thus violating HAVA's requirements. The preliminary injunction was upheld, requiring the Town to provide an accessible voting system in the upcoming election. View "United States v. Town of Thornapple" on Justia Law

In 2023, Maine voters passed "An Act to Prohibit Campaign Spending by Foreign Governments" to prevent foreign governments and entities influenced by them from contributing to or influencing elections. The Act also requires media platforms to ensure they do not distribute communications that violate this prohibition, with violators facing civil and criminal penalties. Several companies and individuals, including Central Maine Power (CMP) and Versant Power, challenged the Act, claiming it violated the First Amendment. The district court granted a preliminary injunction against the Act, and Maine appealed.The United States District Court for the District of Maine granted the preliminary injunction, finding that the Act was likely unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The court held that the Act's prohibition on spending by entities with at least 5% foreign ownership was not narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. It also found that the definition of "foreign government-influenced entity" was overly broad and likely to stifle domestic speech regardless of actual foreign influence. The court declined to sever the unconstitutional provisions from the rest of the Act, reserving the issue for later consideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the Act's 5% foreign ownership threshold was not narrowly tailored and that the definition of "foreign government-influenced entity" was overly broad. The court also found that the Act's restrictions on contributions and expenditures were likely unconstitutional. The court did not address the issue of severability, leaving it for the district court to decide. The court also did not find it necessary to discuss the preemption determination in affirming the injunction. View "Central Maine Power Co. v. Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices" on Justia Law

Alex Titcomb and four other registered Maine voters challenged the wording of a ballot question for citizen-initiated legislation that would amend Maine voting laws. They argued that the question did not meet statutory requirements to be understandable and not misleading to a reasonable voter. The proposed legislation included various changes to election laws, such as requiring photo ID for voting, ending ongoing absentee voting for seniors and people with disabilities, and other modifications.The Superior Court (Cumberland County) affirmed the Secretary of State’s decision on the wording of the ballot question. The court found that the language used in the question was understandable and not misleading. Titcomb appealed this decision, arguing that the question improperly singled out the effect on seniors and people with disabilities and used confusing terms.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and upheld the Superior Court’s judgment. The court concluded that the ballot question was not misleading and was understandable to a reasonable voter. The court noted that the language used in the question accurately reflected the proposed legislation and that the terms used were clear to an informed voter. The court also found that the length of the question, while longer than usual, was necessary to convey the various changes proposed in the legislation. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Titcomb v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law