Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

In 1973, the Oxnard city council received an initiative petition. Instead of proceeding on that petition, the City ordered the questions placed on the ballot. The majority of voters voted to have an elected mayor with a two-year term. In 2019, the city council adopted a resolution placing Measure B on the March 2020 ballot, seeking to amend the Oxnard City Code to extend the mayor’s term to four years and to establish a limit of three terms for city council members. Two weeks later, Starr delivered an initiative petition, seeking to extend the mayor’s term to four years but prohibiting a person from indefinitely alternating between mayor and council member without a break. The Ventura County Elections Division certified the signatures on Starr’s petition. Instead of placing Starr’s initiative on the ballot, the City exercised its option under Elections Code section 9215(a) to adopt the initiative as an ordinance without alteration.The court of appeal ordered the city to place the initiative on the ballot. The city’s action was a nullity under section 9217: “No ordinance that is either proposed by initiative petition and adopted by the vote of the legislative body of the city without submission to the voters, or adopted by the voters, shall be repealed or amended except by a vote of the people, unless provision is otherwise made in the original ordinance.” View "Starr v. Chaparro" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declared the congressional-district plan passed by the General Assembly invalid, holding that the General Assembly did not comply with Ohio Const. art. XIX, 1(C)(3)(a) and (b) in passing the plan and that a new congressional-district plan must be passed the complies in full with Article XIX and is not dictated by partisan considerations.At issue was 2021 Sub.S.B. No. 258, which was passed by a simple majority and signed into law by Governor Mike DeWine on November 20, 2021. The bill resulted in districts in which undue political bias was at least, if not more, likely to favor Republican candidates than the 2011 reapportionment that impelled Ohio's constitutional reforms. Petitioners argued that the congressional-district plan violated Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a). The Supreme Court held that the congressional-district plan was invalid in its entirety because it unduly favored the Republican Party and disfavored the Democratic Party and because it unduly split three counties, in violation of Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(b). View "Adams v. DeWine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Relators' petition for writs of mandamus arguing that the Harris County Commissioners Court had stripped more than one million Texans of their right to vote for a commissioner in the 2022 election, holding that this petition could not go forward under settled precedents sharply limiting judicial authority to intervene in ongoing elections.Relators asked the Court to enjoin the use of a map enacted by the commissioners court, claiming to be in possession of an alternative map that lawfully redrew precincts without excluding any voter from consecutive county-commissioner elections. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that this Court lacked the ability to address the merits of this petition due to certain timing and nature-of-relief problems discussed in this opinion. View "In re Khanoyan" on Justia Law

Georgia law places restrictions on which prospective candidates for elective office can appear on the general election ballot. The Libertarian Party of Georgia, prospective Libertarian candidates, and affiliated voters ask the court to hold that Georgia's ballot-access laws unconstitutionally burden their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and deny them equal protection.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court incorrectly held that the laws violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court explained that, under the Anderson framework, the laws need only be justified by the State's important regulatory interests. In this case, the interests the Secretary asserts—in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization's candidate on the ballot, in maintaining the orderly administration of elections, and in avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the general election—are compelling. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that Georgia's laws do not cause an equal protection violation. The court concluded that the Secretary's stated interest sufficiently justifies the distinction between candidates. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, vacated the district court's injunction, and remanded. View "Cowen v. Secretary of State of the State of Georgia" on Justia Law

Oakland citizens submitted a petition for a ballot initiative to approve a parcel tax to fund programs for early childhood education and college readiness. Measure AA appeared on the November 2018 ballot. The official ballot materials prepared by the City Attorney stated that a two-thirds vote was necessary for it to pass. The City Auditor’s analysis likewise stated the measure would go into effect “if adopted by two-thirds of voters”; 62.47 percent voted in favor of Measure AA. The City Council declared that the measure had passed (Elec. Code, 15400), indicating that uncertainty had arisen whether a majority or two-thirds vote was necessary. Opponents filed a reverse-validation action (Code Civ. Proc. 863), arguing that Measure AA had not received two-thirds of the vote required by Propositions 13 and 218. The trial court ruled in favor of the objectors.The court of appeal reversed. A citizen initiative imposing a special parcel tax is enacted when it receives a majority of the vote. Measure AA cannot be invalidated on the basis of the ballot materials’ voting-threshold statements because the statements did not concern the measure’s substantive features, were not alleged to be intentionally misleading, and cannot override the law governing the applicable voting threshold. View "Jobs & Housing Coalition v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

The question in this case was whether the Secretary of State was required to count the signatures on an initiative petition of voters whose registration was deemed “inactive.” Plaintiffs were supporters of Initiative Petition 50 (2016) (IP 50) who sought to qualify that initiative for the 2016 ballot. After the secretary subtracted the signatures of voters with inactive registration, the petition did not have enough signatures to be placed on the ballot. Plaintiffs brought this action challenging the secretary’s exclusion of those signatures. Plaintiffs argued that voters with inactive registration could sign initiative petitions because, even if their registration was inactive, they were still registered, and therefore remain “qualified voters” within the meaning of Article IV, section 1. The secretary responded that those voters could not sign initiative petitions because voters with inactive registration were not “registered * * * in the manner provided by law,” and they therefore were not “qualified voters” within the meaning of Article IV, section 1. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded, like the secretary, that because voters whose registrations were inactive were not eligible to vote, they were not “qualified voters” within the meaning of Article IV, section 1. Accordingly, the Court held that their signatures on initiative petitions could not be counted, and that the secretary properly excluded them when determining the number of signatures submitted in support of IP 50. View "Whitehead v. Fagan" on Justia Law

In a direct appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the Commonwealth Court’s entry of a permanent injunction blocking the Secretary of the Commonwealth from certifying the results of the November 5, 2019 election in which the voters of the Commonwealth were asked to approve a proposed “victim’s rights amendment” (“Marsy’s Law”) which would be added as a new provision of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution – Section 9.1 (“Victim’s Rights Amendment”). The Commonwealth Court entered its injunction on the basis that the Victim’s Rights Amendment violated the requirement of Article XI, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that, “[w]hen two or more amendments shall be submitted they shall be voted upon separately.” After careful consideration, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court, because the Supreme Court determined the Victim’s Rights Amendment was, in actuality, a collection of amendments which added a multiplicity of new rights to the Pennsylvania Constitution, and, because those new rights were not interrelated in purpose and function, "the manner in which it was presented to the voters denied them their right to consider and vote on each change separately, as Article XI, section 1 mandates." View "League of Women Voters of PA v. Degraffenreid" on Justia Law

Zena Collins Stephens appealed both the court of appeals’ denial of a pretrial writ of habeas corpus and its reversal of the district court’s decision to quash Count I of the indictment. Stephens was elected to the position of sheriff of Jefferson County, Texas in 2016. While investigating someone else, the FBI uncovered information regarding potential campaign-finance violations concerning Stephens. The FBI then turned this information over to the Texas Rangers. The Rangers’ investigation concluded Stephens received individual cash campaign contributions in excess of $100. A grand jury indicted Stephens on three counts: Count I: tampering with a government record in violation of Texas Penal Code section 37.10 “by reporting a $5,000.00 individual cash contribution in the political contributions of $50.00 or less section of said Report;” iIn Counts II and III, unlawfully making or accepting a contribution in violation of Texas Election Code section 253.033(a) by accepting cash contributions in excess of $100 from two different individuals. On appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Stephens asked: could the Texas Legislature delegate to the Attorney General, a member of the executive department, the prosecution of election-law violations in district and inferior courts? To this, the Court answered "no:" because Texas Election Code section 273.021 delegated to the Attorney General a power more properly assigned to the judicial department, the statute was unconstitutional. Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court to dismiss the indictment. View "Texas v. Stephens" on Justia Law

A political consultant designed two campaign mailers that were distributed to voters in a local city council election. The mailers included statements about a local real estate developer and his litigation history with the city, and linked the developer to certain candidates. The developer sued the political consultant for libel based on allegedly false statements about him in the mailers, and the political consultant in turn filed a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that although the complaint arose from protected conduct, the developer demonstrated a probability of prevailing. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed and therefore affirmed the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion. View "Edward v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Arizona voters may vote by mail during the last four weeks of an election. The voter must sign an affidavit that is printed on a specially provided, postage-paid envelope. A ballot with a missing signature cannot be counted. On September 10, 2020, weeks before the upcoming presidential election, the district court enjoined the enforcement of Ariz. Stat. 16-548(A), which requires early voters to have signed their ballots by 7:00 PM on Election Day in order to have their votes counted. The Ninth Circuit granted emergency motions and stayed the injunction, pending appeal.In 2021, the Ninth Circuit entered a permanent stay. The state has shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Arizona's signature deadline imposes, at most, a "minimal" burden on those who seek to exercise their right to vote. The state made a strong showing that its deadline reasonably advances important regulatory interests in reducing the burden on poll workers, especially during the days immediately following an election. The public interest is served by preserving Arizona's existing election laws. Although Arizona’s law implicated national interests, at least when the election included presidential candidates, that factor alone did not mean that strict scrutiny must apply. The court noted that the Arizona legislature “laudably amended its election code in 2019 to allow voters an extended period to correct mismatched signatures." Arizona’s decision not to grant the same extension to voters who neglect to sign the affidavit passed constitutional muster. View "Arizona Democratic Party v. Hobbs" on Justia Law