Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Individuals and organizations affiliated with the West Virginia Democratic Party challenged West Virginia Code 3-6-2(c)(3), under which election ballots for partisan state and federal elections are organized for each contest by listing first the candidates affiliated with the political party whose candidate for President received the most votes in West Virginia in the most recent presidential election. The plaintiffs contend that because candidates appearing first on the ballot “almost always” receive an increased vote share based solely on this priority status, this system favors candidates based on their political affiliation, violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments.The district court rejected jurisdictional challenges, including that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the complaint presented a nonjusticiable political question, and agreed with the plaintiffs on the merits. The Fourth Circuit vacated after holding that the district court properly asserted subject matter jurisdiction and a court may consider the lawfulness of the statute despite its partisan context. A ballot-order statute, which provides a neutral rule for listing candidates’ names on the ballot, does not violate the Constitution even though the statute may impair a candidate’s ability to attract “the windfall vote.” Such a statute places at most a modest burden on free speech and equal protection rights. Any modest burden imposed by the statute on the plaintiffs’ rights is justified by the state’s important interests in promoting voting efficiency and in reducing voter confusion and error. View "Nelson v. Warner" on Justia Law

In this original action, the Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition to prevent the Miami County Board of Elections from certifying Jessica Lopez's candidacy for municipal court judge to the November 2021 ballot, holding that Relator, Miami County Municipal Court Judge Gary Nasal, was not entitled to relief.Judge Nasal filed a protest with the Board challenging its decision to certify Lopez to the ballot as a candidate for municipal court judge in the November 2021 election. The Board denied the protest without explanation. Judge Nasal subsequently commenced this action for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the Board did not abuse its discretion or act in clear disregard of applicable law by denying the protest. View "State ex rel. Nasal v. Miami County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

In Georgia, in-person voters can vote on election day or during advance voting. Absentee voters, after applying for and receiving an absentee ballot, are responsible for returning their ballots directly to the county election office, depositing them into a ballot drop box, or mailing them to that office. The statute requires neither the state of Georgia nor county governments to cover the cost of postage for mailing ballots. Plaintiffs alleged that the Twenty-Fourth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause required Georgia to pay for postage for voters who choose to return their absentee ballots by mail; by not covering the cost of postage, Georgia is imposing an unconstitutional “poll tax” or fee on some absentee voters.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Requiring the payment of postage is not a “tax” or unconstitutional fee on voting. Georgia voters, without paying any money, have several options; even those voters who choose to mail in their absentee ballots buy postage from the U.S. Postal Service and the proceeds from postage sales are paid to USPS—not the state of Georgia— to account for the costs associated with delivering the mail. These voters are buying services from USPS. Georgia does not receive any money from those sales. View "Black Voters Matter Fund v. Secretary of State for the State of Georgia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus seeking to place a referendum on the November 2021 ballot asking voters to approve or disapprove an amendment to the Liberty Township Zoning Resolution, holding that the Delaware County Board of Elections did not abuse its discretion or disregard clearly applicable law in sustaining a protest to the referendum petition.The board of elections sustained the protest to the referendum petition because the petition did not include an adequate summary of the zoning amendment as required by Ohio Rev. Code 519.12(H). Relator, Scott Donaldson, sought this writ of mandamus ordering the board of elections to place the referendum on the ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Relator failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the board of elections abused its discretion or disregarded clearly applicable law in sustaining the protest to the referendum petition. View "State ex rel. Donaldson v. Delaware County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

In 1999, Agpawa pleaded guilty to federal felony mail fraud. In 2002, he completed his sentence. Agpawa ran for mayor of the City of Markham in 2017. There were no preelection challenges to Agpawa’s nominating petitions, but Cook County State’s Attorney Foxx sent Agpawa a letter stating that he was ineligible to serve as mayor because of his felony conviction. Agpawa won the election. Foxx filed a complaint, alleging that Agpawa had been convicted of an “infamous crime” and was prohibited from holding municipal office unless he received a presidential pardon under the Election Code. 10 ILCS 5/29-15. The appellate court affirmed judgment for Foxx.Agpawa sought relief from then-Governor Rauner, who issued a document that purported to be a “RESTORATION OF RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP ROGER AGPAWA.” Agpawa took the oath of office as Markham's mayor. The court vacated its earlier order. No appeal was taken. In 2020, Agpawa sought reelection. Opponents objected. The Markham Municipal Officers Electoral Board ruled in favor of Agpawa. The appellate court reversed. A subsequent amendment to the Election Code specifically refers to a restoration of rights by the governor.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the Board ruling. While the governor has no constitutional authority to pardon a federal conviction, the governor has statutory authority to mitigate the collateral electoral consequences of such a conviction by issuing a restoration of rights. Governor Rauner’s untitled document restored Agpawa’s Illinois rights of citizenship, including the right to hold municipal office. The court rejected arguments that the Illinois legislature had no authority to alter the effect of a federal conviction and that the statutory amendment violated the special legislation clause, was “void for vagueness,” should not be applied retroactively, and violated first amendment rights, the equal protection clause, and separation of powers principles. View "Walker v. Agpawa" on Justia Law

Appellant Bobby Smith ran against Teresa Odum for the office of Probate Judge of Long County, Georgia on June 9, 2020. Following Odum’s victory, Smith filed a petition to contest the Election results, alleging there were: (1) irregularities committed by election officials; (2) illegal votes cast in the election; and (3) wrongfully rejected votes (collectively “irregularities”). After a three-day bench trial, the trial court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to cast doubt on the results of the Election and denied the petition. Smith appealed, asserting in four related enumerations of error that the trial court erred by not ordering a new election. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court determined seven ballots should have been rejected: “Those seven ballots are not sufficient to place the results of the Election in doubt given the nine-vote margin of victory in this case.” Finding no error in the trial court’s denial of Smith’s petition to contest the Election, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Smith v. Long Cty. Bd. of Elections & Registration, et al." on Justia Law

Two petitions reached the Idaho Supreme Court, both seeking to declare two statutes unconstitutional and to issue extraordinary writs: a writ of mandamus and a writ of prohibition. First, Michael Gilmore sought a declaration that Idaho Code section 34-1805(2), as amended by SB 1110, violated the people’s constitutional initiative and referendum rights. SB 1110 requires that, for an initiative or referendum to appear on the ballot, organizers must obtain a threshold number of signatures from “each of the thirty-five (35) legislative districts” in the state. Gilmore argued this violated the equal protection clause of the Idaho Constitution and unconstitutionally divides the people’s legislative power. Gilmore also petitioned for a writ of mandamus ordering the Idaho Secretary of State “not to implement” the statute as amended. In the second petition, Reclaim Idaho (“Reclaim”) and the Committee to Protect and Preserve the Idaho Constitution, Inc. (“the Committee”), sought a declaration that the new signature threshold mandated by SB 1110, requiring signatures from every legislative district, was unconstitutional. They also challenged the constitutionality of another statute, Idaho Code section 34-1813(2)(a), amended in 2020, stating that an initiative may not become effective earlier than July 1 of the year following the vote in which it was passed. Reclaim and the Committee contended both amended statutes nullify the people’s fundamental constitutional right to legislate directly. They also sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the Secretary of State from enforcing these statutory provisions. After review, the Supreme Court: (1) dismissed Gilmore's petition because he lacked standing; (2) granted Reclaim and the Committee's petition in part by declaring that section 34-1805(2) violated Article III, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution, and the SOS and Legislature failed to present a compelling state interest for limiting that right. Furthermore, the Court declared section 34-1813(2)(a), violated Article III, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution because it infringed on the people’s reserved power to enact legislation independent of the legislature. Accordingly, the Court granted Reclaim and the Committee’s petition for a writ of prohibition preventing the Secretary of State from enforcing this provision. View "Reclaim Idaho/Gilmore v. Denney" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court determining that Nebraska statutes authorizing the Governor to appoint election commissioners in Lancaster, Douglas and Sarpy Counties were constitutional, holding that the arguments of the Attorney General on appeal were without merit.On appeal, the Attorney General argued that election commissioners and their chief deputies are county officers and thus, under Neb. Const. art. IX, 4, the election commissioners and their chief deputies must be elected. The district court entered judgment against the Attorney General, concluding that election commissioners are not "county officers" under article IX, 4. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Legislature has determined that election commissioners and chief deputies are not county officers, and that determination does not fall outside of the Legislature's broad discretion. View "State ex rel. Peterson v. Shively" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over this challenge to the rejection of a referendum application, holding that the district court erred in its interpretation of Utah Code 20A-7-602.8(4)(a) and its conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction.Appellants, residents and registered voters of Morgan County, filed an application to submit an ordinance approving the development of a ski resort community to a referendum. The county clerk rejected the referendum application. Appellants then filed in the district court a petition challenging the rejection of the proposed referendum. The district court dismissed the challenge for lack of jurisdiction based on its reading of section 20A-7-602.8(4)(a). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) sponsors are prohibited from pursuing an extraordinary writ in the Supreme Court under section 602.8(4)(a) when they cannot satisfy the requirements of Utah R. App. P. 19; and (2) Appellants in this case appropriately raised their challenge in the district court. View "Croft v. Morgan County" on Justia Law

Based on activity related to former Kentucky Secretary of State Alison Lundergan Grimes’ campaign for the U.S. Senate seat held by Mitch McConnell in 2014, Emmons and Lundergan (Grimes’s father) were convicted for knowingly and willfully making unlawful corporate contributions aggregating $25,000 or more, Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. 30109(d)(1)(A)(i), 30118, and 18 U.S.C. 2; conspiracy to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. 371; willfully causing the submission of materially false statements, 18 U.S.C 1001(a)(2) and 2; and the falsification of records or documents, 18 U.S.C. 1519 and 2.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of the ban on corporate contributions as applied to intrafamilial contributions from a closely-held, family-run corporation. Such contributions present a risk of quid pro quo corruption. The district court adequately distinguished between independent expenditures and contributions in the jury instructions. The district court properly admitted evidence of Lundergan’s uncharged acts in connection with Grimes’ campaigns for Kentucky Secretary of State as res gestae evidence and under 404(b). The government presented sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find that Emmons had the requisite intent to cause unlawful corporate contributions and the Grimes campaign to submit false campaign-finance reports. View "United States v. Emmons" on Justia Law