Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Michigan allows independent candidates for statewide office to be placed on the general election ballot if the candidate submits a “qualifying petition,” with at least 30,000 valid signatures, submitted no later than “the one hundred-tenth day before the general election,” signed by at least 100 registered voters in each of at least half of Michigan’s 14 congressional districts. Signatures must be obtained within 180 days of the filing deadline. The filing deadline for the November 2018 election was July 19, 2018. The official process for an independent candidate trying to run for attorney general in that election began in January 2018. Major political parties do not choose attorney general candidates by primary election, but at conventions, “not less than 60 days before" the general election. The Republican and Democratic Parties held their nominating conventions in August 2018. Graveline began his attempt to qualify for the ballot in June 2018. Graveline served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney; the Hatch Act required him to resign before formally filing as a candidate for an elected office. Graveline collected 14,157 signatures, using 1,000 hours of volunteer time and spending $38,000. The state rejected his petition.The district court enjoined the enforcement of the statute as violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments and implemented an interim requirement allowing independent candidates to qualify for statewide offices by submitting a qualifying petition with 12,000 signatures. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The challenged provisions, in combination, impose a severe burden on the constitutional rights of independent candidates and their potential voter-supporters. The provisions are not narrowly drawn to advance compelling state interests. The district court did not abuse its discretion in crafting its remedy. View "Graveline v. Benson" on Justia Law

The 1993 National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. 20501(b)(1), requires states to register voters for federal elections, including “by application in person” at designated state offices. Each state must designate all offices that provide public assistance, all offices that provide state-funded programs primarily engaged in providing services to persons with disabilities, and “other offices. ” Each designated agency must offer certain voter registration services and, in California, must assign an employee to be responsible for the agency’s compliance (Elec. Code, 2406.) California’s Secretary of State coordinates the state’s responsibilities under the Act.The plaintiffs sought additional designations. The Secretary committed to designating as voter registration agencies programs for students with disabilities at community colleges, certain county welfare departments, and the Office of Services to the Blind. The trial court held, and the court of appeal affirmed, that the Secretary had a mandatory duty to designate as voter registration agencies state offices that administer General Assistance or General Relief programs and California Student Aid Commission Financial Aid Programs, as well as all private entities under contract to provide services on behalf of a voter registration agency. The court found that no mandatory designation duty existed as to offices administering the California Department of Education Nutrition Programs, special education offices, and Area Agencies on Aging. View "Senior Disability Action v. Weber" on Justia Law

After a political action committee and two political candidates successfully campaigned for a ballot measure in a Redondo Beach municipal election, two citizens filed suit against the committee and the candidates, claiming the candidates had controlled the committee, which had used an improper title for itself. The trial court ruled in favor of the committee and candidates, awarding them attorney fees.In consolidated appeals, the Court of Appeal concluded that the nonparties have standing to appeal the judgment; substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that Rescue was a general purpose committee and that neither candidate controlled it; and the trial court acted beyond its authority by issuing a judgment against nonparties to the action. The court affirmed the trial court's award of attorney fees to defendants, who were unquestionably the prevailing party. Finally, the court denied the request for sanctions because the appeal of the attorney fees was not frivolous. View "Travis v. Brand" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition filed by Mark W. Miller seeking to bar the Hamilton County Board of Elections and its members from placing the name of Aftab Pureval on the ballot as a candidate for mayor of Cincinnati in the May 4, 2021 nonpartisan primary election, holding that the board did not abuse its discretion.On appeal, Miller argued that the Board abused its discretion and clearly disregarded applicable law by denying his protest of Pureval's candidacy. Specifically, Miller argued that Pureval's part-petitions did not include sworn affidavits of the petition circulators in alleged violation of the Cincinnati City Charter. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Pureval's part-petitions included in circulator statements substantially complied with the charter's prescribed form. View "State ex rel. Miller v. Hamilton County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting Petitioners' request for a preliminary injunction and finding that the entirety of Ark. Code Ann. 7-9-601(b) is unconstitutional, holding that the circuit court did not abuse abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction.Petitioners filed a complaint arguing that section 7-9-601(b)'s requirements requiring sponsors of initiatives to obtain federal background checks from the Arkansas State Police are unconstitutional and should be enjoined. The circuit court granted Petitioners' request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the entirety of section 7-9-601(b) is unconstitutional and enjoining Respondents from applying its provisions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Petitioners demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and that irreparable harm would result in the absence of an injunction. View "Thurston v. Safe Surgery Arkansas" on Justia Law

Calumet City held a referendum proposing that candidates could not seek the office of mayor while simultaneously holding an elected, paid state office. Before the outcome of the referendum was certified, Representative Jones of the 29th District of the General Assembly filed nomination papers seeking the office of mayor. The referendum was later certified as adopted. The day after certification, objectors brought suit to bar Jones from appearing on the February 2021 ballot in light of the newly passed referendum. The Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the City of Calumet City sustained the objection and removed Jones from the ballot. The circuit court of Cook County affirmed, directing that Jones’s name appear on the ballot but that all his votes be impounded or suppressed. The appellate court summarily reversed and ordered that Jones appear on the ballot.The Illinois Supreme Court stayed the appellate court order and subsequently reversed in favor of Jones. The referendum became effective on November 24, 2020, the date the election was certified. Because Jones filed his nomination papers on November 16, 2020, he was legally qualified to run for mayor at that time. His nomination papers were not defective at that time. View "Jones v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the City of Calumet City" on Justia Law

Madigan was elected to the Illinois House of Representatives in 1970 and re-elected to 25 additional two-year terms. He became Speaker of the House in 1983 and the state’s Democratic Party Chairman in 1998. In 2021 he withdrew from the race to be reelected as Speaker and resigned his seat in the House and his role as Chairman. Four candidates were on the ballot for the 2016 Democratic primary. Madigan won with 65% of the votes; Gonzales received 27%, Rodriguez 6%, and Barboza 2%. Gonzales sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Rodriguez and Barboza were stooges put on the ballot by Madigan’s allies to divide the Hispanic vote, violating the Equal Protection Clause.The district judge noted that Gonzales had made his suspicions public early in the race and that an editorial in the Chicago Sun-Times agreed with Gonzales. Concluding that the voters were not deceived, the court granted summary judgment against Gonzales. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district judge did not penalize Gonzales’s campaign speech. Speech, including in depositions and interrogatories, often affects litigation's outcome; a judge who takes account of speech that proves or refutes a claim does not violate the First Amendment. Gonzales told the voters that he thought Madigan had played a dirty trick. The electorate sided with Madigan. The Constitution does not authorize the judiciary to upset that outcome or to penalize a politician for employing a shady strategy that voters tolerate. View "Gonzales v. Madigan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court declaring Bobby Lee Jones ineligible to hold the office of Justice of the Peace, holding that the trial court erred by not providing Jones with a hearing on the propriety of taking judicial notice of an order in a prior case.In 2006, Jones ran for Justice of the Peace for Phillips County, District One. The court entered an order (2006 order) concluding that Jones was a convicted felon and was therefore ineligible to hold public office. In 2020, Jones again ran for Justice of the Peace for Phillips County, District One. In response, the State brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that Jones was ineligible to hold office because of his prior felony convictions. During trial, the trial court took judicial notice of the 2006 order, determined that res judicata applied, and concluded that Jones was ineligible to hold public office. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred by not providing Jones with a hearing on the propriety of taking judicial notice of the 2006 order. View "Jones v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court vacating the finding of the Arkansas Ethics Commission that Susan Weaver violated Ark. Code Ann. 7-6-228(c)(1) when a magazine published her campaign advertisement without a required disclosure during Weaver's 2018 judicial campaign, holding that substantial evidence did not support the Commission's decision.Faulkner Lifestyle published an ad of Weaver's candidacy without statutorily required financial disclosure language. The Commission found that section 7-6-228(c)(1) did not require a culpable mental state but, if it did, Weaver violated the statute by acting negligently. The circuit court vacated the finding, holding that the Commission erred in concluding that the standard of proof for a violation of section 7-6-228(c)(1) is strict liability and that insufficient evidence supported the Commission's finding that Weaver was negligent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence did not support the Commission's conclusion. View "Arkansas Ethics Commission v. Weaver" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted a petition for writ of mandamus and directed the Austin City Council to delete the word "anyone" from a proposed ordinance before placing it on the ballot, holding that Relators clearly established their entitlement to mandamus relief in one respect.The council's ballot language said the proposed ordinance created a criminal offense and penalty for anyone sitting or lying down on a public sidewalk or sleeping outdoors in or near downtown and for anyone camping in a public area not designated by the Parks and Recreation Department. The ordinance, however, did not apply "to anyone" who engaged in the enumerated activities but, rather, only a subset of those who engaged in the covered behavior could be penalized under the ordinance. The Supreme Court conditionally granted in part the petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the word "anyone" in the ballot language threatened to mislead the voters. View "In re Durnin" on Justia Law