Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Indiana counts an absentee ballot only if it is received by noon on Election Day. In September 2020, a district court found that rule unconstitutional, reasoning that the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, which has led to more use of mail-in voting, creates a risk that ballots mailed close to Election Day will not be received on time.The Seventh Circuit reversed an injunction requiring the state to count all absentee ballots received by November 13, 2020. Difficulties attributable to the virus do not require changes in electoral rules. If it is possible to vote in person, the rules for absentee ballots are constitutionally valid if they are supported by a rational basis and do not discriminate based on a forbidden characteristic. It is rational to require absentee votes to be received by Election Day, just as in-person voting ends on Election Day. Counting the votes, and announcing the results, as soon as possible after the polls close serves a civic interest. People can protect themselves by using early in-person voting or posting their ballots early. Those who act at the last minute assume risks even without a pandemic. Federal judges should avoid changing electoral rules close to an election. In September, COVID-19 was not a last-minute event; the district court acted too close to the election. View "Common Cause Indiana v. Lawson" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted the Secretary's emergency motion for stay pending appeal of the district court's order enjoining the Secretary and local officials from enforcing Governor Abbot's October 1, 2020 Proclamation which restricted hand-delivering mail ballots to a single designated early voting clerk's office. The Proclamation left in place the previous forty-day expansion for delivering mail-in ballots and the always-available option of the U.S. mail.The court considered the Nken factors in determining whether to grant a stay and held that the Secretary has made a strong showing that she will likely succeed on the merits, because the district court erred in analyzing plaintiffs' voting rights and equal protection claims. Assuming that the Anderson-Burdick balancing framework applies, the court concluded that the district court erred in applying it to the voting rights claim where the district court vastly overstated the "character and magnitude" of the burden allegedly placed on voting rights by the Proclamation. Rather, the Proclamation is part of the Governor's expansion of opportunities to cast an absentee ballot in Texas well beyond the stricter confines of the Election Code. Furthermore, the district court undervalued the state interests furthered by the Proclamation in ballot security, election uniformity, and avoiding voter confusion. In regard to the equal protection claims, the court concluded that the district court misconstrued the nature of the alleged burden imposed by the Proclamation. The court explained that the proclamation establishes a uniform rule for the entire State: each county may designate one early voting clerk's office at which voters may drop off mail ballots during the forty days leading up to the election. That voters who live further away from a drop-off location may find it inconvenient to take advantage of this particular, additional method to cast their ballots does not limit electoral opportunity. Therefore, the Secretary is likely to show that the Proclamation does not impermissibly classify voters based on county of residence, and a state's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory voting regulations. Finally, the court held that the remaining Nken factors favored a stay where the Secretary has shown irreparable harm absent a stay; the balancing of harms weighs in favor of the state officials; and the public interest favors the Secretary. View "Texas League of United Latin American Citizens v. Hughs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition sought by Relator to bar the Warren County Board of Elections from placing certain tax-reduction measures on the November 2020 ballot, holding that the Board did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law by placing the petitions on the ballot.The tax levies at issue allow supported the Mason City School District and sought to reduce nine tax levies by .01 mills. Relator filed a protest against placing the tax-reduction measures on the ballot. The Board denied the protest. Thereafter, Relator filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the the statutory requirements for ballot access were met, and therefore, the Board properly placed the petitions on the ballot. View "State ex rel. Meyer v. Warren County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellants' request for injunctive and declaratory relief that allows all Missouri voters to vote by mail without having their signatures on their ballot envelopes acknowledged by a notary or other official authorized by law to administer oaths, holding that the request for relief was not supported or warranted by Missouri law.In the face of the ongoing public health crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Missouri legislature expanded voting options for 2020 elections but put in place certain limitations on the newly created mail-in voting system. Appellants challenged one of those limitations - that absentee and mail-in ballot envelopes be notarized for certain voters. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in ruling that the plain and ordinary meaning of Mo. Rev. Stat. 115.277.1(2) does not allow Missouri voters who expect to confine themselves to avoid contracting the COVID-19 virus to vote absentee without notarization; and (2) where there is no constitutional right in Missouri to vote by absentee or mail-in ballot, Appellants' constitutional claims were without merit. View "Missouri State Conference of National Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. State" on Justia Law

A district judge extended Wisconsin’s deadline for online and mail-in registration by one week; extended the deadline for delivery of absentee ballots by mail by allowing for online delivery and access by October 29; and extended the deadline for the receipt of mailed ballots from Election Day to November 9, if the ballots are postmarked on or before November 3. On September 29, the Seventh Circuit denied motions for a stay in these appeals, reasoning that Wisconsin’s legislative branch was not authorized to represent the state’s interest in defending its statutes. Subsequently, the court certified the question to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, which responded that the state legislature is authorized to represent Wisconsin’s interest in the validity of state laws.The Seventh Circuit then stayed the district court order pending appeal. A federal court should not change the rules so close to an election and political rather than judicial officials are entitled to decide when a pandemic justifies changes to otherwise-valid rules. The district court entered its injunction six weeks before the election and less than four weeks before the first deadline that it altered. Voters have had many months to register or obtain absentee ballots and to cast ballots while preserving social distancing. The district court did not find that any person who wants to avoid voting in person on Election Day would be unable to cast a ballot in Wisconsin by planning ahead. Voters who wait until the last minute face problems regardless of the pandemic. View "Wisconsin State Legislature v. Bostelmann" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case had submitted Initiative Petition 2016-005 (IP 5) to the Oregon Secretary of State so that it could be certified in time for the 2016 ballot. Section (1) of IP 5 provided that the people “call for an Article V Convention by enacting into law this Application, in accordance with Article V of the U.S. Constitution,” for purposes of considering whether to amend the United States Constitution to allow greater regulation of corporations and other artificial legal entities and greater regulation of money used for political purposes. Section (2) added that the call for such a convention was continuing and did not terminate by the passage of time. Section (3) provided for copies of the call to be sent to various persons. And section (4) stated that the call “shall be codified in Title 17 of Oregon Revised Statutes.” In this case, the Secretary refused to certify IP 5 on the ground that it failed to meet the procedural requirements established by the Oregon Constitution. Specifically, the Secretary explained that she “ha[d] been advised that a court review of [IP 5] would probably determine that it does not propose a law within the meaning of Article IV, section 1 of the Oregon Constitution and therefore may not legally be adopted through the initiative process.” Plaintiffs then filed this action in circuit court. Among other things, they sought a declaratory judgment that the Secretary was required to certify IP 5. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the Oregon voters who adopted the initiative power did not intend that power to extend beyond state lawmaking, and that Article IV, section 1(2)(a) did not authorize the people to directly apply for a federal constitutional convention. View "Harisay v. Clarno" on Justia Law

The federal Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Georgia Supreme Court. In it, the federal appellate court asked whether OCGA section 45-5-3.2 conflicted with the Georgia Constitution, Article VI, Section VII, Paragraph I(a) or any other provision of the state constitution. The question arose over Deborah Gonzalez's attempt to qualify for the November 3, 2020 general election for the office of district attorney for the Western Judicial Circuit after Ken Mauldin resigned from the office effective February 29. The Georgia Secretary of State determined that Gonzalez could not qualify for the November 2020 election for district attorney because, under OCGA 45-5-3.2 (a), there would not be an election for that position until November 2022 – the state-wide general election immediately prior to the expiration of the Governor’s future appointee’s term. Though the vacancy began more than six months before the scheduled November 2020 election, the Governor did not make an appointment in time to maintain that scheduled election pursuant to the provisions of the statute. In May 2020, Gonzalez and four other registered voters sued the Governor and the Secretary of State at the federal District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Gonzalez alleged that OCGA 45-5-3.2 (a) violated Paragraph I (a) and moved for a preliminary injunction to mandate the Governor move forward with the November 2020 election for district attorney. The district court granted the request, finding Gonzalez would likely succeed on her federal due process claim because OGCA 45-5-3.2(a) conflicted with Paragraph I(a) and was therefore unconstitutional. The Supreme Court responded to the federal appellate court in the affirmative: the answer to the question was “yes” to the extent that OCGA 45-5-3.2 authorized a district attorney appointed by the Governor to serve beyond the remainder of the unexpired four-year term of the prior district attorney without an election as required by Article VI, Section VIII, Paragraph I (a) of the Georgia Constitution of 1983. View "Kemp v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Relators' petition for writ of mandamus directing the Texas Secretary of State to conduct the November 3, 2020 general election according to the statutory provisions suspended by the Texas Governor's July 27, 2020 proclamation suspending two provisions of the Texas Election Code as they relate to the general election, holding that Relators did not act diligently to protect their rights, and therefore, mandamus relief was not available.Under the July 27 proclamation, early voting by personal appearance begins six days earlier, and early voting ballots may be delivered to the clerk's officer prior to and including on Election Day. Relators, including the Republican Party of Texas and current and former state officials, initiated this original proceeding, arguing that the proclamation was not authorized by the Texas Disaster Act of 1975, and if it was, that the Act violates Tex. Const. art. I, 19 and 28. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Relators' delay in challenging the proclamation for more than ten weeks after it was issued precluded the consideration that their claims required. View "In re Steven Hotze" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Election Code did not authorize the Harris County Clerk to mail unsolicited ballot applications to all registered voters under sixty-five years of age, only some of whom were eligible to vote by mail, and remanded this case to the trial court to issue a temporary injunction prohibiting the clerk from mass-mailing unsolicited ballot applications to voters.Chris Hollins, the Harris County Clerk, announced on August 25, 2020 that he would send an application to vote to every registered voter in the county under age sixty-five, only a fraction of whom were eligible to vote by mail. The State sued Hollins, alleging that mass mailing applications would be an ultra virus action. The trial court denied the State's request for a temporary injunction. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the State had not demonstrated that it would be irreparably injured by Collins mass mailing applications. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Election Code does not authorize an early-voting clerk to send an application to vote by mail to a voter who has not requested one; and (2) the State satisfied the requirements for a temporary injunction in this case. View "State v. Hollins" on Justia Law

Indiana voters in 13 categories can vote by mail. One category encompasses voters aged 65 and older; others encompass disabled or homebound voters, voters who lack transportation, and voters who expect to be absent from the county on election day. For the June 2020 primary election, the Indiana Election Commission responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by extending absentee-voting privileges to all registered, qualified voters. The order was not renewed for the November general election. Indiana voters may vote during 28 days before the election; the state is implementing safety guidelines and procuring protective equipment. Plaintiffs argued that Indiana’s extension of absentee ballots to elderly voters violated the Twenty-Sixth Amendment by abridging younger voters' rights and that requiring some voters to cast in-person ballots during the pandemic infringes on their fundamental right to vote.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction requiring Indiana to permit unlimited absentee voting. The fundamental right to vote does not extend to a right to cast an absentee ballot. The pandemic, not Indiana’s laws, caused the difficulties that might accompany in-person voting. The Constitution explicitly authorizes states to prescribe the manner of holding federal elections; balancing the interests of discouraging fraud and mitigating election-related issues with encouraging voter turnout is a judgment reserved to the legislature. Federal courts must exercise caution and restraint before upending state regulations on the eve of an election. . Voting is already underway in Indiana. View "Indiana Vote by Mail, Inc. v. Okeson" on Justia Law