Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court misapplied the Anderson-Burdick framework when it enjoined the State defendants' enforcement of a long-standing Georgia absentee ballot deadline, which requires ballots to be received by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day to be counted. The district court, instead, manufactured its own ballot deadline so that the State is now required to count any ballot that was both postmarked by and received within three days of Election Day. Because the State defendants have met all four prongs of the Nken test, the court granted their motion to stay the injunction.The court concluded that the State defendants have shown that they will likely succeed on the merits of their claim because the district court did not properly apply the appropriate framework. The court explained that Georgia's decades-old absentee ballot deadline is both reasonable and nondiscriminatory, while its interests in maintaining that deadline (especially now that absentee voting has already begun) are at least "important"—as the district court itself recognized—and likely compelling. In this case, the district court erred by finding that Georgia's Election Day deadline severely burdened the right to vote, and by improperly weighing the State's interests against this burden. The court also concluded that Georgia will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay and a stay is in the public interest. Therefore, because Georgia's decades-old Election Day deadline for absentee ballots does not threaten voting rights, and is justified by a host of interests, the court stayed the district court's injunction of that deadline. View "The New Georgia Project v. Raffensperger" on Justia Law

The Libertarian Party of Connecticut and two of its affiliated candidates filed suit alleging that the State violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by requiring candidates for office to collect signatures from electors before appearing on the general election ballot. The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction on the ground that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits.Applying the Anderson-Burdick framework, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and concluded that Connecticut's laws do not impose a severe burden on plaintiffs' rights and the State's interest in requiring candidates for office to demonstrate some support before appearing on the ballot justified those laws. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Connecticut's laws impose only a reasonable, nondiscriminatory burden. In this case, the petitioning period ran for 218 days and the evidence demonstrates that petitioning was possible even under the challenging conditions in the State of Connecticut. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the State has the undoubted right to require candidates to make a preliminary showing of substantial support in order to qualify for a place on the ballot, and the signature requirements are an appropriate means of vindicating the State's interest. View "Libertarian Party of Connecticut v. Lamont" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court denied the motion filed by Plaintiffs to stay the effect of the mandate of this Court's decision issued in this matter on September 22, 2020 pending Plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, holding that Plaintiffs did not satisfy the test in order to stay the effect of the mandate.Plaintiffs argued that they will suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not granted because the ranked-choice-voting law will be in effect for the November election despite what they argued were an adequate number of signatures in support of the people's veto petition. The Supreme Judicial Court declined to stay the mandate, holding (1) the balance of harms and the public interest weigh against this Court's grant of Plaintiffs' requested stay; and (2) Plaintiffs did not establish a substantial possibility of success on the merits. View "Jones v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

Anastacia Morper sought preprimary designation as a candidate for the office of United States Representative from New Mexico’s Third Congressional District at the 2020 Republican Party Pre-Primary Convention. The Secretary of State invalidated forty-four of Morper’s nominating petitions because those petitions omitted the heading “2020 PRIMARY NOMINATING PETITION,” which the Secretary deemed to be critical information required by law. By extension, the Secretary invalidated the signatures on those forty-four nominating petitions. In doing so, the Secretary invalidated over seven hundred signatures, leaving only forty-three signatures on the five nominating petitions the Secretary did not invalidate. The Secretary informed Morper that she had not received the “minimum number of signatures required” to be “qualified as a candidate” for the preprimary convention. Morper appealed the Secretary’s decision to the district court. The district court upheld the Secretary’s decision concluding that “the Secretary of State has the right to reject . . . nominating petitions that were not on the form prescribed by law.” The Supreme Court reversed. "We appreciate that the reviewing official at the Secretary’s office may have been required to give the nominating petitions that Morper filed more than a cursory glance to ascertain that the petitions were in the form that Section 1-8-30(C) prescribes, contained the information that Section 1-1-26(A) requires, and were identical to the Secretary’s Form except for the omitted heading. However, this additional attention does not justify the Secretary’s argument that allowing her to invalidate any form that omitted the heading that she approved—regardless of whether the remainder of the form is identical to the Secretary’s Form—protects the integrity and fairness of the elective franchise." View "Morper v. Oliver" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted the Secretary's motion to stay the district court's preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of Texas House Bill 25 (HB 25), which eliminates straight-ticket voting. The court applied the factors for ruling on a stay and observed the Supreme Court's repeated emphasis that courts should not alter election rules on the eve of an election.In staying a preliminary injunction that would change election laws eighteen days before early voting begins, the court recognized the value of preserving the status quo in a voting case on the eve of an election, and found that the traditional factors for granting a stay favor granting one here. In this case, the Secretary has shown that she is likely to succeed on the merits that the district court erred in issuing an injunction that altered the status quo of Texas election law this close in time to an election. Furthermore, the Secretary has met the burden of showing irreparable injury absent a stay; any harms to plaintiffs do not outweigh the other preliminary factors; and public interest weighs heavily in favor of a stay. View "Texas Alliance for Retired Americans v. Hughs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court order temporarily enjoining two Montana election laws, holding that the court erred by enjoining a ballot deadline.At issue was the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction regarding two election laws. One law required absentee ballots to be returned to local election officers no later than 8 p.m. on Election Day and the other law restricted the delivery of such ballots by persons other than the elector. The Supreme Court affirmed the preliminary injunction against the Ballot Interference Prevention Act (BIPA) and vacated the preliminary injunction against the election-day ballot-receipt deadline, holding (1) the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by granting the preliminary injunction against enforcement of BIPA; and (2) the district court erred by enjoining the ballot deadline. View "Driscoll v. Stapleton" on Justia Law

The Democratic National Committee claimed that Wisconsin statutes would abridge some voters’ rights during the pandemic. A district judge extended the deadline for online and mail-in registration from October 14 to October 21; extended the deadline for delivery of absentee ballots by mail from October 22 by allowing for online delivery and access by October 29; and extended the deadline for the receipt of mailed ballots from November 3 (Election Day) to November 9, if the ballots are postmarked on or before November 3. The Seventh Circuit denied a stay, concluding that none of the appellants has a legal interest for purposes of appeal.The district court did not order the Republican Party intervenors to do something or forbid them from doing anything. The deadlines do not affect any legal interest of either organization or of their members.Appeal by the state, or someone with rights under the contested statute, is essential to review of a decision concerning the validity of a statute. The interest at stake here is not the power to legislate but the validity of rules established by legislation. All of the legislators’ votes were counted; all of the statutes they passed appear in the state’s code. The constitutional validity of a law does not concern any legislative interest. State executive officials are responsible for the vindication of the state’s interest in the validity of enacted legislation.While the Seventh Circuit previously held that Wis. Stat. 803.09(2m) permits the legislature to act as a representative of the state, the Wisconsin Supreme Court subsequently held that the interpretation violates the state’s constitution, which commits to the executive branch the protection of the state’s interest in litigation. View "Wisconsin State Legislature v. Bostelmann" on Justia Law

Kenton Onstad, individually in his capacity as a resident and elector of North Dakota District 4 and as chair of the District 4 Democratic-NPL Party, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel Secretary of State Alvin Jaeger to remove Terry Jones from the general election ballot as a candidate for the House of Representatives from District 4. Onstad argued Jones was constitutionally ineligible to hold the office of representative from District 4 because he will not have been a North Dakota resident for one year immediately prior to the November general election. Considering all of the facts and circumstances, the North Dakota Supreme Court found Jones would have been a North Dakota resident for more than one year at the time of the November 3, 2020 general election. Therefore, Jones satisfied the constitutional residency requirement for election to the office of state legislator and it was not error to place his name on the ballot. The Court denied Onstad’s petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Onstad v. Jaeger, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court upheld the order of the district court prohibiting the office of the Secretary of State from qualifying the Montana Green Party as a minor party eligible for the 2020 election ballot, holding that the district court did not err.Mont. Code Ann. 13-10-601(2) requires the political party seeking to nominate its candidates through a primary election to present the petition seeking to hold a primary election to select the party's noises for office and to obtain ballot access for those nominees for the November 2020 general election to election administrators. The Montana Green Party was not involved and did not endorse the petition process at the time the signatures were gathered and presented to election administrators. The district court concluded that the petition failed to meet the requirements of section 13-10-601(2) and enjoined the Secretary from giving any effect to the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the petition failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of section 13-10-601(2). View "Montana Democratic Party v. Stapleton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court vacating the Secretary of State's determination that an inadequate number of valid signatures had been submitted to place on the ballot a people's veto of An Act to Implement Ranked-choice Voting for Presidential Primary and General Elections in Maine, holding that the superior court erred in concluding that Petitioner had satisfied his burden of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality.Upon a petition for review of the Secretary of State's decision, the superior court determined that it was unconstitutional for the State to require that every circulator who collected signatures be registered to vote in the circulator's municipality of residence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the constitutional and statutory requirement that a circulator be a registered voter in the circulator's municipality of residence when collecting signatures violates the First Amendment. The Court remanded the cause with instructions to affirm the Secretary of State's determinations that the signatures contested on appeal were invalid and that an inadequate number of valid signatures had been submitted to place the people's veto on the ballot. View "Jones v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law