Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

In this original proceeding, the Supreme Court entered judgment dismissing this complaint asking the Court to nullify the results of the August 8, 2020 primary election for the City and County of Honolulu mayoral seat and allow all candidates who choose to continue to the November general election to have their names appear on the ballot, holding that the complaint failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted.Plaintiff was one of fifteen candidates for the City and County of Honolulu mayoral seat in the primary election. Rick Blangiardi and Keith Amemiya received the highest number of votes. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that their were multiple irregularities with the primary election. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, holding (1) the city clerk for the City and County of Honolulu was a necessary and indispensable party who should have been named as a defendant; and (2) in any case, the complaint failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted. View "Dicks v. State of Hawai'i Office of Elections" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's order denying Proposed Intervenors' renewed motion to intervene in an action brought by the NAACP challenging the validity of Senate Bill 824. S.B. 824 established, inter alia, photographic voter identification requirements for elections in North Carolina.After determining that it has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, the court held that the Proposed Intervenors have Article III standing to intervene for the purposes of intervention before the district court based on N.C. Gen Stat. 1-72.2 and Supreme Court precedent. The court rejected the arguments of the NAACP and the State Defendants that section 1-72.2 infringes on the powers of the Executive Branch in violation of the North Carolina Constitution's separation of powers provisions.In regard to intervention as a matter of right, the court held that the district court erred in determining that the Proposed Intervenors lacked a sufficient interest in the S.B. 824 litigation without careful consideration of section 1-72.2(a). Therefore, the court remanded for the district court to more fully consider the North Carolina statute in the analysis of the Proposed Intervenors' interest in the litigation. Because the Proposed Intervenors may have interests which may be practically impaired if not permitted to intervene in the action before the district court, the court remanded as to this issue as well. The court further stated that, although it was appropriate for the district court to apply the Westinghouse presumption since the Proposed Intervenors and the State Defendants appear to seek the same ultimate objective, the district court erred in demanding that the Proposed Intervenors overcome that presumption by the heightened standard of a "strong showing." In regard to permissive intervention, the court held that the district court failed to address sections 1-72.2(a) and (b) and 120-32.6. Given the import of those statutes, the court remanded for consideration of the permissive intervention request. View "North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. Berger" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court accepted a report from the superior court submitting three questions of law concerning a people's veto effort seeking to suspend P.L. 2019, ch. 539 - entitled "An Act To Implement Ranked-choice Voting for Presidential Primary and General Elections in Maine" - through the November 2020 general election, answered the questions, and remanded the matter to the superior court for further proceedings.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court answered (1) the Second Regular Session of the 129th Legislature served as the “session of the Legislature in which [L.D. 1083] was passed,” Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, 16-17; (2) Public Law 2019, ch. 539, was set to become effective on June 15, 2020, “90 days after the recess of” the Second Regular Session and was suspended upon the filing of the people’s veto petition; and (3) Title 21-A Me. Rev. Stat. 901(1) sets only an end date for the filing of applications for a people’s veto and not a starting cutoff that would prohibit the early filing of an application prior to the Legislature’s adjournment. View "Payne v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the superior court's judgment dismissing the declaratory judgment count of Appellants' complaint seeking a declaration that a certain citizen initiative failed to meet the constitutional requirements for inclusion on the November 2020 ballot, holding that the initiative was unconstitutional and could not be submitted to the electors for popular vote.At issue was a citizen initiative that proposed a resolve that would reverse an order of the Maine Public Utilities Commission granting Central Maine Power Company's (CMP) request for a certificate of public convenience and necessity for a 145-mile transmission line. Avangrid Networks, Inc., the company that owned CMP as a subsidiary, filed a complaint leading to the present litigation, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the initiative's constitutionality was not subject to judicial review before the election. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the initiative failed to meet the constitutional requirements for inclusion on the ballot because it exceeded the scope of the legislative powers conferred by article IV, part 3, section 18 of the Maine Constitution. View "Avangrid Networks, Inc. v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

In 2019, Margaret Parks and Veda Horton were candidates in the Democratic Primary runoff election for Humphreys County, Mississippi Tax Assessor and Collector. Horton received the most votes, and Parks contested the election. The circuit judge ruled that the primary should have been nullified and ordered a special election (a ruling not contested in this appeal). The circuit judge’s order was entered seven days after Horton was sworn. Parks moved the circuit court to declare her, the incumbent, the holdover officeholder, or, in the alternative, to declare the office vacant pending a special election. The circuit judge ruled that Horton was the lawful officeholder and denied the motion. This appeal challenged the circuit judge’s ruling, and the Mississippi Supreme Court had to consider whether the office should have been declared vacant or, if it was not, who the proper officeholder should have been until the new election is completed. The Supreme Court held that because Horton entered the term of office before the final adjudication of the election contest, under Mississippi Code Section 23-15-937, Horton was the lawful holder of the office until the special election. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit judge’s decision to deny Parks’s motion to declare her the holdover officeholder or to declare the office vacant. View "In Re: Democratic Primary for Humphreys County Tax Assessor and Collector: Parks v. Horton" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Georgia under O.C.G.A. 15-2-9: Does O.C.G.A. 45-5-3.2 conflict with Georgia Constitution Article VI, Section VIII, Paragraph I(a) (or any other provision) of the Georgia Constitution? View "Gonzalez v. Governor of the State of Georgia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Matthew Monforton's petition for judicial review of a final agency decision by the office of the Commissioner of Political Practices (COPP) dismissing an ethics complaint that Monforton had lodged against Jonathan Motl based on statements that Motl had made during a radio interview, holding that Motl's statements did not violate Mont. Code Ann. 2-2-136(4) of the Montana Code of Ethics.In his complaint, Monforton alleged that Motl's statements during a radio interview constituted improper election advocacy in violation of section 2-2-121(3)(a), an ethics rule that prohibits public officers and employees from using "public time, facilities, [and] equipment" to "solicit support for or opposition to the...election of a person to public office." The deputy COPP dismissed the ethics complaint. The district court upheld the dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's decision to uphold the dismissal of Monforton's ethics complaint on the basis that Motl's statements did not constitute unlawful opposition to the election at issue under section 2-2-121(3)(a). View "Monforton v. Motl" on Justia Law

In this case involving a consent judgment and decree entered on July 30, 2020, in the midst of the pandemic, effective for the September and November 2020 elections suspending Rhode Island's requirement that a voter using a mail ballot mark the ballot in the presence of two witnesses or a notary, the First Circuit reversed in part the district court's order denying a motion to intervene filed by the Republican National Committee and the Republican Party of Rhode Island (jointly, Republicans) and denied the Republicans' motion to stay the judgment and consent decree pending the outcome of the appeal, holding (1) the concerns in Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5 (20016), that would normally support a stay are largely inapplicable and even militate against a stay; and (2) as to the Republicans' status as intervenors, the district court's order denying intervention is reversed in part. View "Common Cause Rhode Island v. Rhode Island Republican Party" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by Douglas Bobovnyik to compel the Mahoning County Board of Elections to certify his name to the November 3, 2020 ballot as an independent candidate for the office of Mahoning County Sheriff, holding that the board did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law.The board found Bobovnyik ineligible to be a candidate for the officer of Mahoning County Sheriff because (1) Bobovnyik had not demonstrated that he had resided in Mahoning County for the year immediately preceding March 16, 2020, as required under Ohio Rev. Code 311.01(B)(2); and (2) the board had not received the results of Bobovnyik's background check, as required under Ohio Rev. Code 311.01(B)(6). Bobovnyik subsequently filed this mandamus action to compel the board to place his name on the ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the board's residency determination alone was sufficient to prevent Bobovnyik's name from being placed on the ballot. View "State ex rel. Bobovnyik v. Mahoning County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in issuing a temporary injunction enjoining the State from enforcing its current construction of the eligibility requirements for absentee voting stated in Tenn. Code Ann. 2-6-201(5)(C) and (D).The injunction temporarily mandated the State to provide any eligible Tennessee voter who applies to vote by mail in order to avoid transmission or contraction of COVID-19 an absentee ballot in upcoming elections. The mandate further mandated the State to implement the construction and application of section 2-6-201(5)(C) and (D) that any qualified voter who determines it it impossible or unreasonable to vote in person at a polling place due to the COVID-19 situation shall be eligible to check the box on the absentee ballot application that the person is ill or disabled and unable to appear at the person's polling place on election day. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment, holding (1) as to persons with special vulnerability to COVID-19 or who are caretakers for such persons, the State is instructed to ensure that appropriate guidance is provided to Tennessee voters with respect to the eligibility of such persons to vote absentee by mail; and (2) as to the remaining voters, the trial court erred in issuing the temporary injunction. View "Lay v. Goins" on Justia Law